Roberts v. Federal Exp. Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 September 1992
• Citation: 842 S.W.2d 246
• Parties: Richard J. ROBERTS, and Elizabeth A. Roberts, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 246

842 S.W.2d 246

Richard J. ROBERTS, and Elizabeth A. Roberts Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Jackson.

Sept. 14, 1992.

Larry E. Parrish, Robert P. Campbell, Jr., Memphis, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Charles W. Hill, Robert B.C. Hale, Waring Cox, Memphis, Robert C. Von Ohlen, Jr., John B. Austin, Adler, Kaplan & Begy, Chicago, Ill., James R. Mulroy, Federal Exp. Corp., Memphis, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

DROWOTA, Justice.

This malicious prosecution action involves the question of whether Defendant had probable cause to institute criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding, on the undisputed facts, that Defendant had probable cause for instituting prosecution. In so holding, the trial court recognized that, under existing precedent, the ultimate determination of probable cause is a question of law for the court. We conclude that the existence of probable cause is a question (1) unrelated to a prosecutor's subjective belief, and (2) properly decided by a jury.

Plaintiff Richard Roberts ¹ worked for Defendant Federal Express Corporation for nine years, compiling an exemplary job record. As a maintenance mechanic, his duties included working on Defendant's concealed security cameras.

Defendant's sorting process sometimes results in contents being spilled from mutilated packages. Plaintiff had often picked up spilled contents and turned them in, although not necessarily on the same day. On one occasion he turned in a box of 13 diamond rings. Defendant has also experienced problems with employee theft. Plaintiff had, in the past, helped Defendant uncover employee dishonesty.

On February 1, 1988, while at work, Plaintiff was taking medication for severe back pain. Although fellow employees urged him to go home, he continued to work. At some point while on the job, Plaintiff discovered a gold ring, an aerosol can, a videotape, a silver spoon, chocolate candy, and a dildo on Defendant's premises. He placed the videotape in a sleeve, and the other articles in the pockets of his jacket.

Sometime later that day, apparently affected by the medication, Plaintiff had a fellow employee take him to a break area. On the way there, Plaintiff told this employee of the items in his jacket and that he needed to turn them in. Upon reaching the break area, Plaintiff slept for the remainder of his shift.

At approximately 5:00 p.m. at the end of his shift, Plaintiff was awakened by another employee. Plaintiff, still drowsy, was then driven to an employee exit that contained an electronic screening device. Plaintiff went to this exit despite holding special permission to leave the premises via locations not equipped with surveillance devices.

As Plaintiff was passing through one of these screening devices the alarm sounded. Plaintiff backed up and removed a set of keys and returned through the device. The alarm sounded a second time. Plaintiff then removed his jacket and a knife he had in his possession and passed back through the screening device. The alarm did not sound. Allegedly, that's when Plaintiff realized that he had left certain items that he had picked up from mutilated packages in his pockets. Plaintiff contends that he was disoriented and forgot the items were in his jacket due to medication he had been taking. Plaintiff appeared drowsy to the security guard.

Plaintiff explained to the security officers that he had found the items and forgot to turn them in and had no intention of stealing them. Plaintiff was retained for approximately four hours and questioned for about 30 to 45 minutes. The officers took Plaintiff's statement concerning the incident during this period. In addition, they discussed the valium tablets and Plaintiff took two security officers over to the location where he found the items. Thereafter, Plaintiff was released and given a suspension. ²

On February 10, 1988, Defendant caused an arrest warrant to be issued charging Plaintiff with grand larceny. A Shelby County Grand Jury later returned a no true bill.

When Plaintiff brought this action for malicious prosecution, the trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, finding Defendant had probable cause to institute the criminal proceedings. This finding was made in procedural conformance with existing precedent mandating that the ultimate determination of probable cause is a question of law for the court. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

I.

In order to establish the essential elements of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a prior suit or judicial proceeding was instituted without probable cause, (2) defendant brought such prior action with malice, and (3) the prior action was finally terminated in plaintiff's favor. See Christian v. Lapidus, 833 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tenn.1992); Lewis v. Allen, 698 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tenn.1985). The present case concerns the element of probable cause.

Probable cause is established where "facts and circumstances [are] sufficient to lead an ordinarily prudent person to believe the accused was guilty of the crime charged." See Logan v. Kuhn's Big K Corp., 676 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tenn.1984); Lewis v. Williams, 618 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tenn.1981). However, this Court has also stated that "[t]he prosecutor must in good faith have honestly believed the accused was guilty of the crime charged." See Logan, 676 S.W.2d at 951; Lewis, 618 S.W.2d at 303. We now conclude that the existence of probable cause does not depend on the subjective mental state of the prosecutor.

A malicious prosecution is one brought in the absence of probable cause, and with malice. These two elements are distinct. Whereas malice concerns the subjective mental state of the prosecutor, appraisal of probable cause necessitates an objective determination of the reasonableness of the prosecutor's conduct in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Accord Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863, 765 P.2d 498, 506, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 344-45 (1989); Dobbs, Belief and Doubt in Malicious Prosecution and Libel, 21 Ariz.L.Rev. 607 (1979) (rejecting Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 662 comment c (1977)).

Properly defined, probable cause requires only the existence of such facts and circumstances sufficient to excite in a reasonable mind the belief that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. While a mind "beclouded by prejudice, passion, hate and malice" is not "reasonable," see Poster v. Andrews, 183 Tenn. 544, 554, 194 S.W.2d 337, 341 (1946), the question whether a particular prosecutor is so motivated goes only to the element of malice. Probable cause is to be determined solely from an objective examination of the surrounding facts and circumstances.

II.

We now review whether the question of probable cause should be decided by the court or jury.

The existence of probable cause has long been characterized as a mixed question of law and fact:

The facts from which...