Roberts v. Mays Mills, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 November 1922
• Docket Number: 443.
• Parties: ROBERTS ET UX v. MAYS MILLS, INC.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

114 S.E. 530

184 N.C. 406

ROBERTS ET UX v. MAYS MILLS, INC.

No. 443.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 22, 1922

Appeal from Superior Court, Mecklenburg County; Finley, Judge.

Action by Seth Roberts and wife against the Mays Mills, Inc. From a judgment for plaintiffs in insufficient amount, they appeal. New trial ordered.

Where an employee is discharged in September, and thereby precluded from participating in an annual bonus distributed in December because of alleged utterances and criticisms made outside the course of his employment, and not because of any inferiority in his service, held, that such employee was entitled to have the issue of whether his discharge was upon sufficient grounds tried by a jury, and it was error to take such issue from the jury.

The plaintiffs brought this action to recover $46.70 alleged to be due for wages for work for the week ending September 13 1920, and for the recovery of $191.83 bonus, and for $553.60 claimed as damages for breach of contract of employment, the same being wages for the period from September 13, 1920, to December 25, 1920, at the rate of pay theretofore earned by plaintiff and his wife.

It was admitted that the plaintiffs were in the employment of the defendant working in his cotton mill during January, 1920 and had been employed theretofore for probably two years; that during the early part of January, 1920, the following notice was posted by the defendant in his mill:

"January 15, 1920. On November 15 we posted notice stating that we had made preliminary estimate of our accounts for the year 1919, sufficiently definite to warrant our announcing that on December 29 we would make an increase of 10 per cent. in the wages of all mill operatives and also would again pay the 5 per cent. bonus at Christmas time in 1920. We have now completed our accounts for 1919, and find that it is possible for us to not only advance wages 10 per cent., which was done on Dec. 29, but also to pay 10 per cent. bonus at Christmas time in 1920, instead of 5 per cent. bonus. Therefore a 10 per cent. bonus will be paid at Christmas time in this year to those who have been continuously in the company's employ since this present month of January. Mays Mills, Incorporated, Maysville, N. C."

The defendant admitted the claim for $46.70 for wages earned in the week prior to September 13, 1920, and tendered an offer of judgment for this amount, but denied the right of either of the plaintiffs to recover on account of the claim for bonus or for unearned wages on account of alleged breach of contract of employment. The court below gave judgment for the $46.70 admitted by the defendant, and held that neither of the plaintiffs was entitled to recover on the other claims.

From the above judgment the plaintiffs appealed.

Marvin L. Ritch and J. F. Flowers, both of Charlotte, for appellants.

Tillett & Guthrie, of Charlotte, for appellee.

CLARK C.J.

This case presents for the first time in this court the construction of the effect of an offer by employers to extend a bonus to employees provided they remain a specified length of time, which offer is accepted by the employee entering upon his employment upon such inducement. Should the employee fail to execute his part of the agreement by remaining for a specified time, or is dismissed for failure to do efficient work or for any other good cause, he forfeits his claim to the bonus offered. The question here presented is: Can the employer arbitrarily terminate such agreement at any time without legal and sufficient cause?

In this case the evidence of the plaintiff was uncontradicted that he saw the notice of the offer of a bonus of 10 per cent. posted in the mill, and thereby he was induced to stay and work until he could draw the bonus; that before the offer of the bonus was made he intended to quit, and would have done so but for its being raised to 10 per cent. His wife and coplaintiff makes the same allegation. There was evidence that the work of the plaintiffs was entirely satisfactory to the employers. He testified that there was no complaint of the work of himself and wife. The foreman, J. D. Norwood, under whom the plaintiff worked, testified that the character of his work was good, that he had no occasion to complain of it, and if there had been any complaint it would have been made to him, and that he had received no complaint in regard to it. He also testified that he had known the plaintiff some four years, and his general reputation was good, and his general reputation as a workman in a cotton mill was good. The witness Robinson, who discharged the plaintiff at the direction of the superintendent, Dawson, stated that he had known Roberts and wife since 1917, and that the work of both was satisfactory to the company. In short, the evidence is that the work of the plaintiff and his wife was entirely satisfactory, and that their discharge was not caused by any dissatisfaction with their work, but because of criticism which Seth Roberts is alleged to have made outside the mill of an officer, but which he denied. Welsh, the chief executive of the mill, testified:

"I gave instructions to have Roberts discharged, and my reasons were that he was critical of an officer of the law we had employed there to keep the place clean. I had no other reason."

The plaintiff objected to all the testimony relative to the matters that occurred outside the mill, and that were not in any way connected with his work, and excepted to the refusal of the court to exclude such testimony. The plaintiffs contend that the 10 per cent. bonus offered was a part of the stipulated compensation for work to be performed, and that the defendant would have no right to discharge the plaintiffs for the reason assigned, and thereby defeat the plaintiffs in their purpose to remain in the mill and work according to the offer contained in the notice as to all who remained continuously in its employment until Christmas. They also contended that the allegations of the conversation outside the mill, if true, which they denied, did not authorize their discharge by the defendant, there being no complaint as to their work; that the defendant could not discharge them without any legal reason authorizing them to do so, and that, in effect, they did this and are liable to the plaintiffs for 10 per cent. of the wages earned at least up to the time of the discharge as a part of the stipulated compensation for the work actually done.

The plaintiff also excepted because the court instructed the jury that, if they believed the evidence, and found the facts in accordance therewith, to answer the first issue "No," and to save trouble that he would answer it for them "No." There was conflicting evidence as to the conversation on account of which the plaintiff Roberts was discharged, and we need not in this case pass upon the question whether there was sufficient ground for discharge, for whether there was such conversation was a disputed issue of fact upon which the jury alone was competent to pass. The language which the witnesses for the defendant testified that the male plaintiff used, and for using which he was discharged, was as follows: The witness Welsh testified that he "gave instructions to have Roberts discharged, and his reason was that he was critical of an officer of the law that the company had employed to help keep the place clean; that he had no other reason."

L. R. Parker, witness for the defendant, testified that he was an employee of the mill, and superintendent of the Sunday School there, and he heard Roberts on August 20, 1920, state in the presence of other employees: "Oh, hell; the way they have Sunday School now they have not a fitten place to go to. The Bible did not teach us to have Sunday School the way they do; that the way it was one man should speak at a time, and the way they had Sunday School there, it was not fitten to go to, all chattering at one time." The witness says he told Mr. Brymer about that conversation, and Welsh, the vice president and general manager, had Roberts discharged. Brymer also testified that he was a deputy sheriff, and he had arrested some boys 16 and 17 years old and summoned them to court; that on Monday morning thereafter, some of these boys being in the crowd, and the matter being mentioned, the plaintiff Roberts spoke up and said: "I consider that a dirty trick for you to be out that time of night bothering the boys. It was not your damned business." The witness says he told Welsh about this conversation of Roberts. Welsh stated that Parker and Brymer had made the above reports to him, and he gave orders to have Roberts discharged.

The plaintiff testified that he did not make the statement that the Sunday School was an unfit place for people to go to. He says that in regard to the boys he stated to defendant's witness: "I don't care if these boys are arrested for gambling, but why do they think they should have a chain-gang sentence? Most of the boys work at night and sleep Saturdays, and don't care to go to bed, and were out there for pastime mostly, and, furthermore, they did not bother you."

The judge upon this conflicting evidence instructed the jury that "if the jury believed the evidence and find the facts in accordance therewith then answer the first issue 'No.' " The defendant was entitled to have the jury pass upon the evidence and find the truth of the allegation, and, further, whether it justified the discharge of the plaintiff from their employment, on which matter we do not need to express an opinion until the facts are found as to what was said.

In 34 Cyc. 1650, it is said that, when there is a reward offered "when the plaintiff has performed part of the service, and is prevented by the offerer or...