Roberts v. Portland Water Dist

• Decision Date: 23 September 1924
• Citation: 126 A. 162
• Parties: ROBERTS et al. v. PORTLAND WATER DIST.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

126 A. 162

ROBERTS et al.

v. PORTLAND WATER DIST.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 23, 1924.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County, at Law.

Proceeding by Margaret Roberts and others to determine necessity of appropriation of private land for public purpose against Portland Water District. On plaintiffs' exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and DUNN, MORRILL, WILSON, and DEASY, JJ.

William H. Gulliver and John B. Thomas, both of Portland, for plaintiffs.

D. E. Moulton, of Portland, for defendant.

DUNN, J. These petitioners owned certain land in Standish. By invoking the power of eminent domain, delegated to it in 1907, chapter 433, Private and Special Laws, the Portland water district took and preliminarily occupied that land, on the 19th day of March in 1923, for the laying out and construction of pipes and other waterworks improvements. No question that the nature of the use was public arises. On a later day the owners of the land seasonably filed the petition which is the background of the two questions presented for decision. One question concerns whether, without beginning over, part only of the land originally taken may be held by the district. The other question goes to taxable costs.

The petition is under the general statute enacted in 1911, and included in the latest revision of the statutes as sections 23 to 25 inclusively of chapter 61, R. S., to which statute this donee of the right of eminent domain is subject. R. S. c. 51, § 2. The statute, as consequential, here runs "Sec. 23. The owner of property which is the subject of appropriation for public purposes by any water district may, upon hearing, have the necessity of the particular appropriation determined.

"Sec. 24. The owner of such property may, within thirty days after the beginning of condemnation proceedings, file in the office of the clerk of courts of the county where the property is situated, a petition to the supreme judicial court, for a decision as to the necessity of the appropriation. * * * Any justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, in term time or vacation, upon such petition, may appoint three disinterested commissioners, residents of the county in which the property is situated, one of whom shall be learned in sanitary matters, to determine the necessity of the particular appropriation.

"Sec. 25. The commissioners shall fix a time for hearing, and give written notice thereof to the owner and to the district seeking to acquire said property. At the hearing all parties in interest shall be heard; * * * the burden of proof to show the necessity of the particular taking shall rest upon the party seeking to acquire the property. * * * The prevailing party shall recover costs as in actions at law. * * *'

The landowners petitioned that commissioners pass on the necessity for taking their land, asserting the taking to be unnecessary. Commissioners were appointed. They fixed the time for hearing, and gave notice and heard the parties. Their conclusion was that the exigency necessitated the taking of the greater part, but not all, of the land for proper public uses. They reported accordingly. The report was confirmed. Besides, though the matter was not formally up, the court by mutual request ruled on costs; the ruling being favorable to the respondent. The petitioners reserved exceptions on the confirmation and the ruling, and the exceptions were allowed.

Plainly the situation is one involving statutory interpretation and construction. By interpretation the true sense of any form of words is ascertained. Construction draws warrantable conclusions not always included in the direct expression. In interpreting and construing a statute one must, so to speak, walk round the legislation, view it from every side and in every light, and read its letter and deduce its spirit conformably to well-established rules, till from it he has unfolded the single controlling thought around which everything in the whole enactment shall center, and to which in the final determination all shall at last return.

Every word of the statute is simple. None is barrier or hindrance to perspicuity. And fitting enough expression secures clearness when the several sections are brought together.

Let us take up the first section. The word "particular" seems to fit the movement of the petitioner's contention that it is the unitary taking which must be sustained or not, while the word has in itself a meaning that matches with the words preceding and curbs the immediately following word "appropriation." But pass on to the next section. Consonance with the foregoing section is perfect though "particular" is omitted from the principal clause, and "appropriation" is apt to place and context without the qualifier. Nor does the repetition of "particular" in the subordinate clause add force. What this section provides is that the owner of the property taken may petition that whether there was necessity for the appropriation of his land be decided by judicatory authority.

Of course "particular" was used with purpose. Particular is a word of sundry meanings. In Hamlet each particular hair was made to stand on end And Addison, in the Vision of Justice, writes:

"It was the particular property of this looking glass to banish all false appearances, and show people what they were."

The law knows the earlier of two successive estates, on the termination of which a devise over is to take effect, as the particular estate in contradistinction to total ultimate ownership. There are particular liens, carrying the right of retaining property, as distinguished from general liens. And particular average, in marine insurance, in case of partial loss by perils of the sea. Causes are particular and so are the customs and methods and opinions and propositions. A science or art has its particular utility. Synonyms of "particular" are "special," "specific," "personal," "private," "individual," "precise," and "detailed." No useful purpose would be sufficed by extending the list. The construction of the word in the statute as meaning the same as "detailed" is perhaps as fair as any. The water district, in exercising the right of eminent domain, must file plans in designated public places, which show the location of the land to be taken and appropriately describe it, and the owner's name where...