Roberts v. Roberts

• Citation: 1 N.W.2d 269,231 Iowa 394
• Decision Date: 09 December 1941
• Docket Number: 45774.
• Parties: ROBERTS et al. v. ROBERTS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

1 N.W.2d 269

231 Iowa 394

ROBERTS et al. v. ROBERTS et al.

No. 45774.

Supreme Court of Iowa

December 9, 1941

Luther M. Carr, of Newton, and Putnam, Putnam Fillmore & Putnam, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Cross & Hammill and Campbell & Campbell, all of Newton, for appellees.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

J. L. Roberts died testate, May 26, 1940, leaving surviving him his widow and seven children, born by a former wife. The widow elected to reject the will and claimed her distributive share. The estate is abundantly solvent and the determination of such distributive share should present no difficulty herein. The controversy is between the seven children and the representatives of the estate. It involves primarily the question whether certain notes executed by the children and held by the testator at the time of his death should be collected. The answer to each question raised is to be found in the interpretation to be given to certain provisions of the will. The court interpreted the will substantially as contended for by plaintiffs and enjoined defendants from collecting the notes. Defendants appeal.

The will devised to the widow the income from the entire estate during her lifetime. Since she has rejected the will, we are not concerned with the devise to her. The will further provided that all property in the estate be devised and bequeathed to two sets of trustees, the two trusts being designated Trust No. 1 and Trust No. 2. Trust No. 1 included an undivided three-sevenths of the entire estate and was established as a spendthrift trust for the benefit of one son and two daughters of testator, to be terminated at the discretion of the trustees after the lapse of ten years from the death of the widow. Trust No. 2 included the other undivided four-sevenths of the entire estate and was established as a spendthrift trust for the benefit of the remaining four sons of testator, to be terminated on the tenth anniversary of the death of the widow. Each set of trustees was authorized to form a corporation for the management of the trust property devised and bequeathed to each.

In fixing the interests of the beneficiaries, paragraph 4 of the will provided, "The proportionate interest hereby created devised and held in trust for each named beneficiary of Trust No. 1, shall be one-third of said undivided three-sevenths except as modified by paragraph 9 of this will." And said paragraph also provided, "The proportionate interest hereby created, devised and held in trust for each named beneficiary of Trust No. 2 shall be one-fourth of said undivided four-sevenths except as modified by paragraph 9 of this will."

The controversy regarding the collection of the notes of the children of testator, owing to him at his death, arises by reason of the provisions of the aforesaid paragraph 9 of the will, which provides as follows:

"It is my intention that the principal of any indebtedness of any of my children represented by promissory notes, owing to me at the time of my decease, whether outlawed or not, shall go to my estate as property thereof. To effectuate this, it is my will that the amount of the indebtedness of each child indebted to me shall be charged against the one-seventh interest devised in trust for the benefit of such child in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4. In the event of a conveyance of the real property by my said Trustees devised in Trust No. 1 and Trust No. 2 in exchange for shares of stock in a corporation organized at the election of the Trustees of Trust No. 2 and my executor and executrix, the amount of stock equivalent to the amount of the indebtedness of each child shall be deducted from the one-seventh interest of each said child held in trust, and the said stock thus deducted shall be held by my executor and executrix independently of Trust No. 1 and Trust No. 2, until such time as my executor and executrix shall see fit to distribute the same. When the total amount of stock held by my executor and executrix representing the total amount of indebtedness to my estate is distributed, three-sevenths thereof shall be transferred to and become a part of Trust No. 1 and one-third of said three sevenths shall be held by the trustees of Trust No. 1 in trust for each of the beneficiaries thereof; and four-sevenths of said total amount of stock representing the indebtedness of my children to my estate shall be transferred to and become a part of Trust No. 2 and one-fourth of said four-sevenths shall be held by the trustees of Trust No. 2 in trust for each of the beneficiaries thereof.

"In the event there is no conveyance to any corporation of my real property devised in trust by the terms of this will, I direct that there shall be an appraisal, made by the appraisers selected by my executor and executrix, of the value of all of the real property devised by this will; thereafter, the total amount of the indebtedness of my children to my estate shall be added to such appraisal valuation and the resulting sum shall be divided into seven equal parts thereafter, there shall be set off against each of said parts the amount of the indebtedness of each child and the resulting differences shall then be divided by the entire appraisal valuation and the resulting quotients shall represent the proportionate interest in trust of each child in the entire amount of my real property devised in trust."

The court construed the foregoing provisions to the effect that "indebtedness upon promissory notes owing him by any of his children, whether such indebtedness is barred by the Statute of Limitations or not, should not be collected by his Executors or Trustees as debts, but that the principal thereof only be considered as a part of the share of the debtor in his Estate and used only for the purpose of computing and ascertaining the proportionate share and interest of the respective debtors in the Estate in the manner directed in the Will, analogous to the method of computing advancements in Estates." Since actions had been commenced on certain of the notes involved herein, defendants were "permanently restrained and enjoined from proceeding further with any of said suits either against the parties to this action who are joined in said suits or against spouses of parties to this action who signed said promissory notes and are joined as parties in said actions thereon. The defendants are also permanently enjoined and restrained from starting or prosecuting any other suits in any Court against any of the plaintiffs on promissory notes signed by any of said plaintiffs and owing to the decedent, or against any co-signer with any of the plaintiffs on such promissory notes. The defendants are also directed to surrender to plaintiffs their respective promissory notes on which existing suits are based, to release of record any and all mortgages securing such promissory notes, and to deliver to the respective plaintiffs their Abstracts of Title held in connection with such mortgages."

I. Appellants' first proposition challenges the jurisdiction of the court to entertain an independent action in equity, such as this, for the construction and interpretation of decedent's will, asserting that the language of the will is plain and unequivocal, there is no ambiguity and that this action cannot be maintained.

Appellants rely upon our decision in the case of Anderson v. Meier, 227 Iowa 38, 42, 287 N.W. 250, 252. In that case, we affirmed a decree which dismissed an independent action in equity to interpret a will. In holding that we did not have jurisdiction, we state:

"'It is a fundamental doctrine in the construction of wills that, where the language is plain and unequivocal, there is no room for construction.' In re Estate of Thomas, 220 Iowa 50, 54, 261 N.W. 622, 624, citing Smith v. Runnels, 97 Iowa 55, 65 N.W. 1002; Jordan v. Hinkle, 111 Iowa 43, 82 N.W. 426; Scott v. Scott, 132 Iowa 35, 109 N.W. 293; Guilford v. Gardner, 180 Iowa 1210, 162 N.W. 261."

We have also held in the case of Wintermute v. Heinly, 81 Iowa 169, 47 N.W. 66, that, where a will is so ambiguous that its meaning cannot be determined, it will be considered void and the property will be inherited pursuant to the statutes for descent and distribution.

The New Century Dictionary defines the word "ambiguous" as follows, "Of doubtful nature or meaning; uncertain; having a double meaning; open to various interpretations; equivocal". Jurisdiction of an independent action in equity to interpret a will exists where there is some ambiguity present which requires interpretation. The fact that the meaning of the will can be ascertained does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to entertain such an action for, unless such is the case, the will is void. We think that, while the intention of the testator herein can be ascertained and, accordingly, the will can and must be sustained, there is sufficient ambiguity in the language used to sustain jurisdiction of an action in equity to determine such intent.

In contending that the court erred, appellants assert that the language of the will is plain and unequivocal to the effect that the notes owed by testator's children, whether outlawed or not, referred to in paragraph 9 of the will, should be collected both as to principal and interest if not outlawed and, after the collectible notes have been collected, the principal of all notes, whether outlawed or not, is to be deducted from the one-seventh interest of each indebted beneficiary. In so contending, appellants assert as follows:

"He had the right to tell the legal representatives of his estate that these notes were to go to his estate as property thereof and to be collected by them as such, and in addition, charge the amount of the debts even after being...