Roberts v. Roberts

Decision Date20 February 1946
Docket NumberNo. A-704.,A-704.
Citation192 S.W.2d 774
PartiesROBERTS v. ROBERTS.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

W. H. Reid, of Dallas, for appellant.

Irwin & Irwin, of Dallas, for appellee.

BREWSTER, Justice.

This cause is here on certified questions from the Court of Civil Appeals at Dallas, hence the parties will be designated as they were in that court.

R. E. Roberts, appellant, sued his wife, Minnie Roberts, appellee, for a divorce on the ground of cruel treatment and for partition of their community property. She answered, denying appellant's charges and alleging that it was necessary for her to employ attorneys to protect her legal rights. She alleged that she had employed the attorneys signing her answer; that on numerous occasions they had advised her as to the suit and as to her legal rights; and "that by reason thereof, the plaintiff became liable to this defendant and to the attorneys signing this petition for reasonable attorney fees and expenses," to the amount of $2,500. Her prayer was: "* * * defendant prays that plaintiff take nothing by his suit and that upon final hearing hereof that plaintiff's suit for divorce be in all things denied and that judgment be entered in behalf of the attorneys signing this answer for their fees and expenses * * *."

The jury found: (1) That appellant had not been an actual, bona fide inhabitant of this state for one year next preceding the filing of his suit, which, under the court's instructions, rendered it unnecessary to answer issues submitting his allegations of cruel treatment; and (2) that a reasonable sum for appellee's attorneys was $900.

In consequence of the first finding and on motion of appellee, the suit was dismissed. In his judgment of dismissal the trial court found that appellee acted in good faith and on probable grounds in contesting the suit, and awarded her $900 as attorneys' fees.

Appellee's attorneys conducted her defense at the trial, but were not parties to the suit. After the judgment was entered she assigned it to them without appellant's joinder.

Stating that its members were unable to agree as to the validity of the attorneys' fee judgment, the court of civil appeals says in its certificate:

"In view of the disagreement among the members of this court, and the conflicts in decisions of the courts of appealVarn v. Varn, 58 Tex.Civ.App. 595, 125 S.W. 639; Hill v. Hill, Tex.Civ.App., 125 S.W. 91; Gonzales v. Gonzales, 117 Tex. 183, 300 S.W. 20; Martin v. Martin, Tex.Com.App., 17 S.W.2d 789; Jones v. Jones, 128 Tex. 309, 97 S.W.2d 949; Kelly v. Gross, Tex. Civ.App., 293 S.W. 325; Id., 4 S.W.2d 296; Pappas v. Pappas, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W. 2d 1115, et al., cited in the accompanying opinions—it is deemed advisable to certify the following questions:

"Question No. 1: Can a wife in a divorce suit recover against her husband a fee due and owing her attorneys for services rendered in the divorce suit where the suit was dismissed because her husband had not resided in this State for one year next preceding the filing of his petition?

"Question No. 2: When in a divorce suit a divorce is denied or the suit dismissed, has the trial court the power to render judgment in favor of the wife against her husband for contractual fees due and owing her attorneys who rendered her services necessary for the preservation of her personal and property interests?

"Question No. 3: Can attorneys, who have rendered services to the wife necessary for the preservation of her personal and property rights, maintain against the husband in the divorce suit, either in their own name, or in the name of the wife for and in behalf of such attorneys, a cross action or counterclaim for reasonable attorneys' fees due and owing them for such services?

"Question No. 4: Under the pleadings and facts above related, was it error for the court below, after the suit was dismissed, to enter judgment in favor of the wife against her undivorced husband for $900 due and owing to her attorneys for services rendered the wife in the divorce action?"

It is unnecessary to answer the first three questions, as an answer to Question No. 4 will dispose of this appeal. We have decided that the correct answer to that question is "No," and that our answer in no way conflicts with any decision cited in the certificate, supra.

No action for divorce was involved in either Gonzales v. Gonzales, 117 Tex. 183, 300 S.W. 20, or Martin v. Martin, Tex. Com.App., 17 S.W.2d 789. In the former case the wife, deserted by her husband, sued him for $196, which she alleged she had spent for necessaries out of her separate funds. In the latter case the wife sought the appointment of a receiver to collect the salary of her husband, from whom she was permanently separated, and to pay her such part of it as might be necessary for the support of herself and their child. In each case the court pointed out that the remedies of the wife to compel support by her husband, independently of a divorce proceeding, are defined by the statutes; that, since a direct suit by her against him is not one of them, it cannot be maintained.

In Kelly et al. v. Gross et al., Tex.Civ. App., 293 S.W. 325; Id., 4 S.W.2d 296 (error refused), plaintiffs sued both the husband and wife on a contract to represent the wife in a suit for divorce and adjudication of property rights brought by the husband, under the terms of which they were to receive for their services a half interest in what she might recover as her share of the property involved. They alleged that the defendants thereafter became reconciled, resumed marital relations, and dismissed the suit, rendering it impossible for plaintiffs to perform their contract. They alleged, further, that had they been permitted to complete the contract they would have recovered for the wife property of the value of $13,804.50; that, therefore, they were entitled to recover from both defendants $6,902.25 as damages for breach of contract. In the alternative, they sought recovery of $3,000 as the value of services rendered the wife. The question on the last appeal was the correctness of the action of the trial court in sustaining a general demurrer to their petition. The court held that that action as to the suit for $6902.25 on the alleged contract was correct;...

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33 cases
  • Alwazzan v. Alwazzan
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • December 6, 2018
    ...estranged husband after their divorce action was dismissed because he did not meet the one-year state residency requirement. 144 Tex. 603, 192 S.W.2d 774, 777 (1946). And, in In the Matter of the Marriage of Parr , the court determined that the husband should pay the wife’s attorney’s fees ......
  • Noyes v. Jack, 7046
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 29, 1969
    ...fees are allowed a wife in a divorce suit is that they are necessaries. There is no statute or rule allowing them. Roberts v. Roberts, 144 Tex. 603, 192 S.W.2d 774. There is a host of cases to this effect. The husband has a common law obligation to furnish necessaries for the wife And child......
  • Ayre v. J.D. Bucky Allshouse, P.C., 14-95-00748-CV
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 13, 1996
    ...and thus, their clients must bring any malpractice claims during the underlying action to avoid res judicata. See Roberts v. Roberts, 144 Tex. 603, 192 S.W.2d 774, 778 (1946); Soto v. Phillips, 836 S.W.2d 266, 268-70 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Elliott v. Hamilton, 767 S.W.2d......
  • Vance v. Davidson
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 20, 1995
    ...an action in which attorney's fees are requested and awarded, attorney becomes a party to the judgment). See also Roberts v. Roberts, 144 Tex. 603, 192 S.W.2d 774, 777 (1946) (holding that attorneys were as bound by judgment "as if they had been parties to the suit"); Akin v. Akin, 276 S.W.......
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