Roberts v. State
Decision Date | 13 June 1905 |
Citation | 51 S.E. 374,123 Ga. 146 |
Parties | ROBERTS. v. STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
The evidence fully authorized the jury to find that the deceased was murdered, that the accused was the murderer, and that the defense of insanity was not sustained.
The circumstances tending to show that the deceased was killed with the instrument named in the indictment were sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that this charge was sustained.
When the body of a woman alleged to have been murdered was found upon a bed in a room of the house which she occupied as a dwelling, with the head crushed in two places, in such a manner as to indicate that the fatal wounds were inflicted with some blunt, smooth, and round instrument, which crushed the skull without breaking the skin, such as a pole or piece of iron piping, and, shortly after the discovery of the body, bloody bedclothes were found behind a cot in the same room, and a curtain pole, fractured about the middle—the breaks appearing to be fresh—was found behind a trunk in an adjoining room, such pole, upon being identified by witnesses who so found it, was admissible in evidence upon the trial of the person charged with the murder.
When the facts above indicated were shown by the evidence, and the pole was introduced, the solicitor general had the right, in his argument to the jury, to contend that this pole was the weapon used by the murderer.
When a husband is on trial for the alleged murder of his wife, evidence tending to show a long course of ill treatment and cruelty on his part toward her, continuing until shortly before the homicide, is admissible. Such evidence tends to show malice and motive, and to rebut the presumed improbability of a husband murdering his wife.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 26, Cent. Dig. Homicide, §§ 289, 298, 322.]
The testimony of a witness that on a given occasion a particular person appeared to be excited, or did not so appear, is not subject to objection upon the ground that it is a mere opinion or conclusion of the witness, and therefore inadmissible.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 14, Cent. Dig. Criminal Law, § 1037.]
Upon the trial of a criminal case, it is not error for the judge to shape his general charge to the jury upon the evidence alone, but he should at some stage of the change appropriately instruct the jury with reference to the prisoner's statement.
The trial judge fully instructed the jury in reference to the law applicable to the defense of insanity, and the amount of mental capacity necessary to commit the crime charged, and did not err in failing to repeat the charge upon the subject of such mental capacity, in immediate connection with his instruction that if the jury should find that the accused took the life of the deceased as charged, and was at the time of such mental unsoundness as to be incapable of committing a crime, they should acquit him.
There was no error in refusing to charge that the defendant had introduced evidence of his insanity at the time the alleged offense was committed, and that, if the jury believed from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the alleged offense the accused was insane, they should acquit him.
The fact that the solicitor general, after asking a witness for the accused if he had not, during the course of his examination, made a certain statement, and eliciting from the witness the reply that he had not said to the witness, in the hearing of the jury; "I say that you did, " is not cause for a new trial, although the statement of the prosecuting officer was objected to at the time, and the court failed to rebuke his improper conduct, as the jury, having heard all of the testimony of the witness, were not at ail likely to be misled by such statement, and the particular question about which the dispute arose was immaterial.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from Superior Court, Walker County; W. M. Henry, Judge.
J. B. Roberts was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.
Roberts was indicted for the murder of his wife, and upon his trial, in February of the present year, he was convicted upon evidence which was wholly circumstantial. He made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted. The grounds of the motion were: (1) That the verdict was contrary to law. (2) That it was contrary to the evidence. (3) That it was contrary to the law and the evidence, and without evidence to support it. (4) Because the indictment charged that the offense was committed by striking the deceased with a curtain pole, and the evidence wholly failed to show that it was committed in this way. (5) Because the verdict was strongly against the weight of the evidence introduced to show the insanity of the accused at the time the alleged crime was committed. (6) Because the evidence clearly showed that at the time of the homicide the accused was of such unsoundness of mind as to be incapable of forming a criminal intent. (7) Because J. S. Wilson was permitted, over the objection of the defendant, to testify as follows: (8) Because this witness was allowed to testify: (9) Because the court permitted J. P. Tucker to testify: (10) Because the following evidence of Mrs. De Witte was illegally admitted: (11) Because "a curtain pole, shivered about the middle, which had been identified by witness W. H. Henderson as a pole found in defendant's house, in an adjoining room from that in which the remains of deceased lay, behind a trunk, the day after the homicide, and which was offered in evidence by the state after the defendant had closed his testimony, was illegally admitted" in evidence. (12) Because the following testimony of Miss Lollie Roberts, who testified in rebuttal for the state, was illegally admitted: ...
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