Roberts v. State

• Decision Date: 22 November 2002
• Citation: 863 So.2d 1149
• Parties: Jason Larry ROBERTS v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

863 So.2d 1149

Jason Larry ROBERTS v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-00-2134.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

November 22, 2002.

Rehearing Denied January 24, 2003.

Certiorari Denied May 2, 2003.

Steven Speakman, Auburn, for appellant.

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Robin Blevins, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

Alabama Supreme Court 1020708.

SHAW, Judge.

Jason Larry Roberts appeals an order of the circuit court directing him to pay $12,166.25 in restitution to the parents of Andrea Michelle Danford. Roberts was convicted of criminally negligent homicide, a violation of § 13A-6-4, Ala.Code 1975, for the shooting death of Ms. Danford.¹ The circuit court sentenced Roberts to one year in prison, imposed a $2,000 fine, and ordered him to pay restitution to Ms. Danford's parents (hereinafter "the parents") for expenses they had incurred in cleaning their daughter's automobile ($825) and for various funeral and funeral-related expenses ($11,341.25).

Roberts argues that the parents were not entitled to any restitution because they accepted a $100,000 payment from his insurance carrier in settlement of a potential wrongful-death action, see § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975, before the restitution hearing and they had agreed to release all of their claims against him. The circuit court rejected this argument, concluding that the release in the civil case was not a defense to restitution in the criminal case and that no portion of the settlement payment could be attributed to, and therefore credited against, the parents' pecuniary damages that were proven at the restitution hearing. For the following reasons, we agree with the circuit court's conclusion that a previous settlement in a civil case does not necessarily release a defendant from his or her obligation to pay restitution. We also conclude that under the particular circumstances of this case, a setoff of the civil settlement against the pecuniary damages established by the parents at the restitution hearing was not appropriate. Therefore, we affirm the restitution order.

As noted, the restitution order followed the settlement of a wrongful-death claim the parents had asserted against Roberts. Before trial, the parents settled with Roberts's insurance carrier for $100,000 and signed a general release discharging Roberts from liability for

"any and all claims, demands, damages, costs, expenses, loss of services, actions, and causes of actions arising from any act or occurrence, up to the present time, and particularly [on] account of all personal injury, disability, property damage, loss of services and loss or damages of any kind sustained or that [they] hereafter may sustain in consequence of an accident that occurred on or about the 21st day of November, 1999...."

(Supp. C. 9.)

Roberts does not appeal his conviction. The dispositive issues on appeal concern the legal effect of the civil settlement and the release of the parents' civil-damages claim. Roberts maintains that the circuit court erred in ordering any restitution. Specifically, he argues that, because his insurance carrier paid the parents an amount substantially in excess of what they actually claimed in expenses incurred in connection with their daughter's death, the parents suffered no pecuniary loss for which restitution could be made. Stated differently, Roberts argues that the circuit court should have credited the insurance proceeds against the parents' expense claims and, furthermore, that the release barred the court from ordering any restitution. The State contends that the civil settlement and the accompanying release had no effect on the court's statutory authority to order the restitution as part of Roberts's sentence.

The right of crime victims to receive restitution is set forth in the Restitution to Victims of Crimes Act, § 15-18-65 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 ("the Act"). Several sections of the Act are pertinent to our discussion of the issues presented here. Section 15-18-65, Ala.Code 1975, states:

"The Legislature hereby finds, declares and determines that it is essential to be fair and impartial in the administration of justice, that all perpetrators of criminal activity or conduct be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct or activity for any pecuniary loss, damage or injury as a direct or indirect result thereof. The provisions of this article shall be construed so as to accomplish this purpose and to promote the same which shall be the public policy of this state."

"Pecuniary damages" is defined in § 15-18-66(2), Ala.Code 1975, as follows:

"All special damages which a person shall recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities; the term shall include, but not be limited to the money or other equivalent of property taken, broken, destroyed, or otherwise used or harmed and losses such as travel, medical, dental or burial expenses and wages including but not limited to wages lost as a result of court appearances."

"Victim" is defined in § 15-18-66(4), Ala. Code 1975, as:

"Any person whom the court determines has suffered a direct or indirect pecuniary damage as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. `Victim' shall not include any participant in the defendant's criminal activities."

Section 15-18-75, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

"Nothing in this article limits or impairs the right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue or recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has paid or has been ordered to pay restitution pursuant to this article may not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the restitution. However, the court shall credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in favor of the victim in such civil action.

"If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages for a victim, that issue is conclusively determined as to the defendant, if it is involved in a subsequent civil action."

Section 15-18-78, Ala.Code 1975, states:

"(a) A restitution order in a criminal case shall be a final judgment and have all the force and effect of a final judgment in a civil action under the laws of the State of Alabama. The victim on whose behalf restitution is ordered, the executor or administrator of the victim's estate, or anyone else acting on behalf of the victim, shall be entitled to all the rights and remedies to which a plaintiff would be entitled in a civil action under the laws of this state as well as any other right or remedy pertaining to such restitution order as may be provided by law.

"(b) The provisions of this section shall be read and deemed in pari materia with other provisions of law. Provided however, the provisions of this section are cumulative and shall not be construed so as to deprive any victim of any other remedy or relief to which a victim may now or hereafter be entitled pursuant to law."

The legislative purpose underlying the Act, as evidenced by the plain language of § 15-18-65, was to fully compensate victims of crime for "any pecuniary loss, damage or injury" suffered as a direct or indirect result of a criminal act. See Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 773 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), and Gladden v. State, 644 So.2d 1267 (Ala. Crim.App.1993). In Ex parte Clare, 456 So.2d 357, 358 (Ala.1984), the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

"The Court of Criminal Appeals states that included in the concept of special damages is the right to receive punitive damages. This, however, is incorrect. The purpose of the above-cited statute, as announced by the legislature, is to ensure

"`... that all perpetrators of criminal activity or conduct be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct or activity for any pecuniary loss, damage or injury as a direct or indirect result thereof....' (Emphasis added.)

"Code 1975, § 15-18-65 (1982 Repl.Vol.). These special damages, then, are based on the theory of compensation. In Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Keiley, [ 2 Ala.App. 629, 56 So. 838 (1911)], the Court of Appeals discussed the issue of damages, and stated:

"`Actual damages are recoverable at law, out of a wrongdoer by the injured party as a matter of right as compensation for the actual loss sustained by him by reason of such wrong. Punitive damages are damages over and above such sum as will compensate a person for his actual loss, and the law permits their imposition, in proper cases, at the discretion of the jury, not because the party injured is entitled to them as matter of right, but as punishment to the wrongdoer, and to deter him and others in similar businesses from such wrongdoing in the future.'

"2 Ala.App. 629, 637, 2 Ala.App. 629, 56 So. 838, 841 (1911), citing Oliver v. Columbia, N. & L. R.R. Co., 65 S.C. 1, 43 S.E. 307 (1902). The legislative intent of the restitution statute is to compensate, and not to punish. We, therefore, hold that the special damages that the victim is entitled to in this case are limited to an amount which fully compensates the victim, and these damages may not be punitive in nature."

Although the purpose of restitution is to effectuate the compensation of a crime victim and although a restitution order has all the force and effect of a final judgment in a civil action in Alabama, it is nonetheless clear that the Legislature intended that restitution remain an integral part of traditional criminal sentencing. Thus, this Court has held that the Legislature, in providing for civil enforcement of a restitution order, did not intend to make restitution a civil action. Restitution is not subject to the requirements of a civil adjudication merely because it is enforceable in the same manner as a civil judgment. See Rice v. State, 491 So.2d 1049 (Ala.Crim. App.1986).

Furthermore, although compensation to the victim may have...