Roberts v. State

• Decision Date: 29 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. S07A0600.,S07A0600.
• Citation: 282 Ga. 548,651 S.E.2d 689
• Parties: ROBERTS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

282 Ga. 548

651 S.E.2d 689

ROBERTS v. The STATE.

No. S07A0600.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

October 9, 2007.

Reconsideration Denied October 29, 2007.

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Jeffrey L. Grube, Warner Robins, for Appellant.

Kelly R. Burke, Dist. Atty., Duncan Michael Munn, Asst. Dist. Atty., Timothy Michael Marlow, Asst. Dist. Atty., Benjamin Henry Pierman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

BENHAM, Justice.

This appeal is from Michael T. Roberts's conviction for the murder of James Raffield.¹ The evidence adduced at trial showed the victim rode with Jason Mills to an apartment complex in Warner Robins at 3:30 a.m. on January 18, 2002, to purchase marijuana. Raffield bought a small amount of marijuana from Kenshaun Taylor, who testified at trial he obtained the marijuana from appellant's apartment, at which time he told Roberts that Raffield had a large sum of money. Raffield and Mills gave an acquaintance from the apartment complex a ride to a nearby store, then returned to the parking lot where the purchase of marijuana had occurred. According to Taylor, Roberts had decided to rob the men upon their return to the apartment complex and had armed himself for the purpose. Taylor testified he took the gun from Roberts, but while he spoke with Raffield, Roberts took the gun from Taylor's waistband, pointed it at Raffield and ordered him to "give it up," then shot him once in the chest. Mills drove Raffield to a hospital where he died from a single gunshot wound to his chest.

1. The evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Roberts guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder with the underlying felony of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Roberts argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress custodial statements he made after being arrested.

"In ruling on the admissibility of an in-custody statement, a trial court must determine whether, based upon the totality of the circumstances, a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the statement was made freely and voluntarily. Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of the defendant's statement at a Jackson v. Denno hearing will be upheld on appeal." Cit.

Folson v. State, 278 Ga. 690(2), 606 S.E.2d 262 (2004). The only evidence presented to the trial court regarding the motion to suppress was the testimony of the interrogating officer and the executed forms by which Roberts waived his right to remain silent and his right to be represented during questioning by an attorney. Since that evidence supported the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, we find no error in the trial court's decision. Id.

3. In support of his contention the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruit of a search of an apartment at the complex where the crime was committed, Roberts asserts probable cause to authorize the issuance of the search warrant was not shown. The evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress showed that the magistrate who issued the search warrant was informed that an eyewitness at the scene saw persons involved in the shooting enter and exit the apartment in question. Since that testimony was sufficient to show a fair probability that evidence of the crime would be found at the premises described in the warrant, the judge issuing the search warrant had a substantial basis for determining that there was probable cause to issue the warrant. Ibekilo v. State, 277 Ga.App. 384(1), 626 S.E.2d 592 (2006).

4. Roberts contends the trial court erred in denying his demurrer because the indictment did not properly allege the essential elements of the predicate offense of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery.² The indictment alleged that Roberts, with the intent to commit theft, attempted to take money, the property of another, from the victim by use of a firearm, an offensive weapon. "A person commits the offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon. . . ." OCGA § 16-8-41(a). Since the indictment set out all the essential elements of the crime and Roberts could not admit to those allegations without being guilty of a crime, the indictment was sufficient against a general demurrer. Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177(2), 611 S.E.2d 52 (2005). To the extent Roberts's attack on the indictment can be considered a special demurrer, seeking greater specificity, that demurrer was waived by his failure to interpose it prior to pleading to the indictment. Id.³

5. In response to Roberts's motion pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the trial court required the prosecuting attorney to provide "a race-neutral, case-related, clear and reasonably specific explanation for the exercise of its strikes" (Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345(6), 496 S.E.2d 674 (1998)) used to excuse four African-American jurors. After hearing the explanation, the trial court found no discriminatory pattern in the use of the State's peremptory challenges. That finding "is entitled to great deference and will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Cit." Id. The State explained one strike as being based, among other reasons, on the juror's acquaintance with a witness, which is a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. Curles v. State, 276 Ga. 237(5), 575 S.E.2d 891 (2003). Another witness was challenged because she was both single and unemployed. A juror's unemployment, when coupled with other race-neutral reasons, has been accepted as a race-neutral reason for a challenge. Slade v. State, 270 Ga. 305(1), 509 S.E.2d 618 (1998). In the present case, the prosecuting attorney's expressed concern that a juror who is both single and unemployed may lack sufficient ties to the community to be concerned about law enforcement constitutes such an additional reason. Roberts's effort to discredit the stated reason by pointing out there were other single or unemployed or retired persons on the panel who were not challenged does not take into account the difference between unemployment and retirement and fails to show there were any other jurors who were both single and unemployed. The remaining two jurors were peremptorily challenged by the State because they stated that family members had been treated badly in encounters with law enforcement personnel. That, too, has been accepted as a race-neutral basis for exercising peremptory challenges. Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5(10), 426 S.E.2d 844 (1993). Since the record establishes the State presented reasons for the strikes that have been recognized as valid, we conclude the trial court's determination that no discriminatory pattern had been shown was not clearly erroneous and provides no basis for reversal.

6. Roberts complains his character was improperly placed in issue when the State introduced evidence he was a drug dealer and gave police a false name when questioned after the shooting. In Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 456(1), 448 S.E.2d 177 (1994), this Court held that a statement "as to what transpired shortly before and shortly after the commission of the murder was admissible as relevant res gestae evidence," noting that "the State is entitled to present evidence of the entire res gestae of the crime. Even though a defendant is not charged with every crime committed during a criminal transaction, every aspect of it relevant to the crime charged may be presented at trial. This is true even if the defendant's character is incidentally placed in issue. Cit." In the present case, testimony established that the murder occurred in the course of an attempted armed robbery that was incidental to and followed directly from Roberts's participation in the sale of marijuana to the victim. Roberts's identification as a drug dealer was, therefore, part of the res gestae. Likewise, his effort shortly after the crime to deflect police attention by giving a false name was part of "what transpired shortly. . . . after the commission of the murder" (id.) and was admissible as part of the res gestae. See also Luke v. State, 131 Ga.App. 799(4), 207 S.E.2d 213 (1974) (reversed on other grounds, State v. Luke, 232 Ga. 815, 209 S.E.2d 165 (1974)), holding a lie to police by a defendant questioned at the scene of a crime to be admissible as part of the res gestae. Since the fact of Roberts being a drug dealer and his false identification of himself both constitute part of the res gestae of the crime, there was no error in admitting that evidence even though it incidentally placed his character in issue. Johnson v. State, supra.

7. Roberts enumerates as error the trial court's grant of a motion in limine excluding evidence of the victim's conduct several hours preceding his death. Since there was no evidence at trial that any conduct of the victim played a role in his shooting death, evidence of his conduct elsewhere and at another time was not part of the res gestae or otherwise relevant. Murphy v. State, 267 Ga. 100(4), 475 S.E.2d 590 (1996). Accordingly, we discern no error in the trial court's grant of the State's motion in limine.

8. A police witness qualified as an expert on fingerprint identification was asked about the accuracy of identification based on palm prints. Roberts objected on the ground the question called for the witness to testify to the ultimate question in the case and enumerates as error the trial court's overruling of the objection. Since the ultimate question was not identification but whether Roberts was guilty of murder (See Spradlin v. State, 90 Ga.App. 97(2), 82 S.E.2d 238 (1954))...