Roberts v. Stell

• Decision Date: 06 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 14798,14798
• Citation: 367 N.W.2d 198
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: Dorothy ROBERTS, Claimant and Appellant, v. Kermit STELL, d/b/a Best Western Motor Inn, Employer and Appellee, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty, Insurer and Appellee. . Considered on Briefs

Page 198

367 N.W.2d 198

Dorothy ROBERTS, Claimant and Appellant, v. Kermit STELL, d/b/a Best Western Motor Inn, Employer and Appellee, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty, Insurer and Appellee.

No. 14798.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs March 6, 1985.

Decided May 1, 1985.

Jerry C. Rachetto of Driscoll, Mattson, Rachetto & Christensen, Deadwood, for claimant and appellant.

Terence R. Quinn of Stephens, Quinn & Buckmaster, Belle Fourche, for employer and insurer, appellees.

HENDERSON, Justice.

ACTION

This is a worker's compensation case involving an employee's fall on the employer's outside premises. Compensation was denied. An appeal has been filed from the circuits court's Order affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Division of Labor and Management, Department of Labor. We affirm.

FACTS

Dorothy Roberts (claimant-appellant) was employed as a motel resident manager by Kermit Stell, d/b/a Best Western Motor Inn (employer-appellee) in Deadwood, South Dakota. Claimant lived in an apartment with her husband located on the motel premises just behind the office. These accommodations were provided to claimant as part of her compensation and allowed her to process late registrations and telephone inquiries.

On Thursday, April 7, 1983, claimant slipped and fell on the motel premises. She fractured her hip, which rendered her partially and permanently disabled. Thursday was claimant's regular day off and she was not on call or required to remain at the motel, but was free to come and go as she pleased. At the time of the accident, claimant had just returned from the beauty shop and was leaving with her husband to go grocery shopping when it is claimed that she slipped on some ice on a walkway in front of her apartment. Two other witnesses, however, testified that there was After the incident in question, claimant initially brought a civil action which resulted in a verdict for employer. That judgment was affirmed by this Court by an Order dated November 30, 1984. See Roberts v. Stell, 360 N.W.2d 692 (S.D.1984). During the pendency of the civil action, claimant also filed this worker's compensation action which the Department of Labor heard in July 1984. Following this hearing, the Department of Labor entered Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law which concluded, inter alia, that claimant's activities on April 7, 1983, were for her personal benefit and pleasure and were not related to her employment; that her injuries did not result from a risk or danger peculiar or incidental to her employment; and that claimant failed to prove that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment.

no ice in the general area in which claimant fell.

Claimant thereafter appealed this decision to the circuit court which affirmed the Department of Labor's decision. It is from this latter Order that claimant now appeals.

DECISION

DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF FACT,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

WHICH HELD THAT CLAIMANT'S INJURIES DID NOT RESULT FROM A

RISK PECULIAR TO HER EMPLOYMENT? WE HOLD THAT IT DID NOT.

Injuries are compensable under the Worker's Compensation Statutes, SDCL tit. 62, et seq., if it arises "out of and in the course of the employment...." SDCL 62-1-1(2). Pickrel v. Martin Beach, Inc., 80 S.D. 376, 124 N.W.2d 182 (1963).

For an injury to arise out of "the employment", it is necessary and sufficient that there be a causal connection between the injury and the employment, but the employment need not be the direct or proximate cause of injury, it being sufficient if the accident had its origin in the hazard to which the employment exposed the employee while doing his work. Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D. 376, 17 N.W.2d 913; Bergren v. S.E. Gustafson Construction Co., 75 S.D. 497, 68 N.W.2d 477. The words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident took place. The contents of the statute do not limit the application to the periods during which an employee is actually engaged in the work that he is hired to perform.... In other words, an employee is within the course of his employment if what he is doing is naturally related or incidental to his employment or he is doing that which his contract of employment expressly or impliedly authorizes. Wilson v. Dakota Light & Power Co., 45 S.D. 175, 186 N.W. 828; Jacobson v. Strong & Waggoner, 66 S.D. 552, 287 N.W. 41; Lang v. Board of Education, 70 S.D. 343, 17 N.W.2d 695.

Krier v. Dick's Linoleum Shop, 78 S.D. 116, 118-19, 98 N.W.2d 486, 487-88 (1959). See also, Bearshield v. City of Gregory, 278 N.W.2d 166 (S.D.1979).

In the case at bar, as outlined above, claimant was required to live on her employer's property and was injured on her day off when she slipped and fell as she was leaving to go buy groceries. The Department of Labor denied claimant worker's compensation benefits because it found her activities to be personal and not related to her employment; the injury did not result from a risk or danger peculiar or incidental to her employment; and claimant failed to prove her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Claimant here contends that this decision is in error for two reasons.

First, claimant argues that because she was required to remain on the premises during her regular work time, she necessarily had to eat her meals there and thus it was a definite employment necessity to go grocery shopping. In effect, claimant seems to be arguing that because she was required to live on the premises and therefore eat her meals there, grocery shopping on her day off is "naturally related or incidental" to her employment and thus within the course of her employment. Krier, 98 N.W.2d at 487. This contention, however, is without merit. All persons gainfully employed are not permitted to go grocery shopping during regular working hours but are required to do so on their time off. Claimant here testified that she did not work during the week from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and was free to go during this...