Roberts v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 06 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | 109,199,109,203.,Nos. 109,196,s. 109,196 |
| Citation | 313 P.3d 837 |
| Parties | James E. ROBERTS, Jr., Darwin C. Williams, Orville D. Button, David E. Williams, Cecil W. Emerson, Timothy L. Anderson, Anthony J. Clark, John A. Koelsch, Edward C. Johnson, James R. Rowray, and George E. Gilmore, Appellants, v. Shawn SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Kansas Department on Aging and Disabilities, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Pawnee District Court; Bruce T. Gatterman, Judge.
Gerald E. Wells, of Lawrence, for appellants.
Corrine E. Johnson, litigation counsel, of Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., ARNOLD–BURGER and POWELL, JJ.
The appellants, civilly committed sexually violent predators, are patients in the custody of the Secretary of the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services (Secretary) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, K.S.A. 59–29a01 et seq. During 2012, the appellants filed three petitions for habeas corpus under K .S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501. The district court stayed the habeas corpus actions and ordered the appellants to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to proceeding in the district court. Prior to the expiration of the stay order, the appellants filed motions for relief that were ultimately denied by the district court. Although their habeas corpus petitions were not dismissed, the appellants filed the present appeal.
On appeal, the appellants contend that the enactment of K.S.A.2012 Supp. 59–29a24 excuses them from their obligation to exhaust appropriate administrative remedies prior to filing a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Secretary disagrees with the appellants' contention. Moreover, the Secretary argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over the appellants' appeal because no final order was entered by the district court. The State also argues that appellate counsel should not have been appointed to represent the appellants in this appeal. We agree with the Secretary, and we dismiss the appellants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. During September 2012, the appellants—who are patients in the Sexual Predator Treatment Program at Larned State Hospital—filed three petitions in Pawnee County District Court seeking writs of habeas corpus pursuant to K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501. In late September and early October 2012, the district court filed an order in each case staying the proceedings for 90 days pending proof that the appellants exhausted their administrative remedies pursuant to K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501.
Before the expiration of the 90 days, the appellants filed a motion for relief in each case. They argued that the provisions of K.S.A.2012 Supp. 59–29a24—which was enacted by the 2012 Kansas Legislature—exempted them from the requirement that they exhaust appropriate administrative remedies prior to seeking a writ of habeas corpus under K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501. On December 5, 2012, the district court denied each of the appellants' requests for relief. It did not, however, dismiss the appellants' habeas corpus petitions. Shortly thereafter, the appellants appealed, and appellate counsel was appointed to represent them on appeal.
The Secretary contends that there is no jurisdiction over this appeal because the district court did not dismiss the appellants' habeas corpus petitions. The right to appeal is statutory. See Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 291 Kan. 597, 609–10, 244 P.3d 642 (2010); Flores Rentals v. Flores, 283 Kan, 476, 480–81, 153 P.3d 523 (2007). Thus, “[w]hether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which an appellate court's scope of review is unlimited.” Svaty, 291 Kan. 597, Syl. ¶ 1.
Under K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–2102(a)(4), we have appellate jurisdiction over a “final decision in any action.” A final decision is one that In re T.S.W., 294 Kan. 423, 433, 276 P.3d 133 (2012).
Here, the district court stayed the appellants' habeas corpus actions for 90 days until they exhausted their administrative remedies. But instead of exhausting their administrative remedies, the appellants filed motions for relief in the district court, contending that K.S.A.2012 Supp. 59–29a24(d) removed any exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus actions filed pursuant to K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501. Although the district court denied the motions for relief, it did not dismiss the appellants' habeas corpus petitions. Likewise, nothing in the record on appeal reveals that the district court ever terminated the stay.
Generally, a stay is not a final decision. See Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 289–90, 200 P.3d 467 (2009) (); Turner v. Steele, 47 Kan.App.2d 976, Syl. ¶ 11, 282 P.3d 632 (2012) (); Kansas Pipeline Partnership v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 22 Kan.App.2d 410, 418, 916 P.2d 76,rev. denied 260 Kan. 994 (1996) (). Accordingly, we find that neither the stay nor the denial of the appellants' motions for relief constituted final decisions for the purpose of appeal.
We recognize that the collateral order doctrine is a narrow and sparingly used exception to the final order rule. “[T]o be collaterally appealable, the order must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Svaty, 291 Kan. 597, Syl. ¶¶ 8–9, 612. An order is “effectively unreviewable” when it implicates “ ‘rights which could be lost or irreparably harmed if immediate review were denied.’ “ Reed v. Hess, 239 Kan. 46, 54, 716 P.2d 555 (1986) (quoting Coleman v. Sherwood Medical Industries, 746 F.2d 445, 446 [8th Cir.1984] ).
Here, we find that the first two...
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