Roberts v. Western Pac. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 June 1951
• Citation: 104 Cal.App.2d 816,232 P.2d 560
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: ROBERTS v. WESTERN PAC. R. CO. Civ. 14673.

Page 560

232 P.2d 560

104 Cal.App.2d 816

ROBERTS v. WESTERN PAC. R. CO.

Civ. 14673.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

June 19, 1951.

Rehearing Denied July 19, 1951.

Hearing Denied Aug. 16, 1951.

S. Roberts, in pro. per.

E. L. Van Dellen, San Francisco, for respondent.

SCHOTTKY, Justice pro tem.

Plaintiff and appellant filed an action against respondent railroad company and against two defendants who are officials of the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks.

The first cause of action of the complaint alleged has plaintiff was hired as a clerk by respondent railroad company in 1945 and worked as such clerk until September 1949; that he was in a craft covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the railroad and the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, etc.; that such collective agreement contained provisions setting forth the rights of the railroad employees as to seniority, promotions, displacements, etc. and the procedural requirements necessary to assert and to protect these rights. The complaint set forth Rule 40(a) of said agreement which reads:

'In reducing forces seniority rights shall govern. At least 48 hours advance notice will be given employees affected in reduction of forces or abolishing positions, and the Division and General Chairmen shall be furnished a copy of such notice. Employees whose positions are abolished may exercise their seniority over union employees; other employees affected may exercise their eniority rights in the same manner. Employees displaced, whose seniority rights entitle them to a regular position shall assert such rights within 10 days. Employees who do not possess sufficient seniority to displace a junior employee shall be considered as furloughed.' The complaint went on to allege that on August 7, 1949, plaintiff was displaced, or 'bumped' by a senior employee, and as his seniority rights were such as to entitle him to a regular position he came within the scope of the portion of said Rule 40(a) which required that in order to protect his seniority rights he must assert such rights within 10 days; that not knowing of any other job in or near San Francisco he could 'bump' into under the Rules, he called upon the Railroad Company's Freight Agent's Chief Clerk and told him he thought he would have to go on furlough under Rule 40(b) and was given blank forms for such purpose by said Chief Clerk; that he executed said forms on August 9 and mailed two of them to the Company's Division Superintendent and two others to defendant Frank James as General Chairman of the Brotherhood; that he received no notice or indication that there was any objection to his going on furlough or that his forms were not proper; that on September 7, 1949 he was advised by letter that he had violated Rule 40(a) in that he failed to assert his seniority rights to certain positions at San Francisco held by employees junior to him within the 10 day period, and that therefore he had lost his seniority and his name had been dropped from the Clerks Seniority Roster; that on September 13, 1949, he was informed by letter that he was not to report for further work at the company's office. The complaint further alleged that plaintiff's said discharge was contrary to said Agreement and that defendants Frank James and W. L. Hatfield by and with their advice and interpretations of said Agreement aided and abetted the Company in their discharge and dismissal of plaintiff and that all the defendants were actuated by animosity and malice toward plaintiff. Plaintiff then alleges that by reason of his wrongful dismissal he has been damaged by the loss of wages amounting to about $64 per week, purchase of law books and supplies amounting to $29.07.

In his second cause of action plaintiff realleged all of the foregoing and alleged further that the two individual defendants and certain officers and employees of the Railroad Company 'actuated by ill-will, hatred, enmity and malice toward plaintiff, entered into a conspiracy to vex, annoy and harass plaintiff in order and in an effort to cause him to resign his position with the company, and in the event they were not successful, then by procuring, and causing his discharge and dismissal therefrom.' The three alleged overt acts of conspiracy were that one of the individual defendants removed certain papers from appellant's desk and repeatedly complained to appellant's superior that appellant was not doing and was not capable of doing his work properly, and that in March 1949 certain of the officers and employees of the railroad refused to allow appellant to exercise his seniority rights on a specified job.

In his third cause of action appellant realleged the foregoing and contended that under California Civil Code, sec. 2170 and under sec. 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 3, the railroad owed a duty to appellant which had been violated.

The prayer of the complaint demanded that plaintiff be restored to his former position and seniority; that he recover wages for the time lost; that he recover $29.07 special damages and $1000 exemplary damages; and further prayed for a declaratory judgment setting forth the meaning and effect of the collective bargaining agreement as he interpreted it.

Respondent Railroad Company demurred to each of the three causes of action upon the ground that no cause of action was stated against respondent and also that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. In its memorandum opinion the trial court stated:

'The cases recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States entitled Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795, and Order of Ry. Conductors v. Southern Railway Co., 339 S.Ct. 255, 70 S.Ct. 585, 94 L.Ed. 811, seem to decide plainly that a State Court has no jurisdiction to interpret a collective bargaining agreement or order the reinstatement of an employee. Therefore, so far as this...