Roberts v. Young

• Decision Date: 21 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. COA95-120,COA95-120
• Citation: 464 S.E.2d 78,120 N.C.App. 720
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Nathan Wayne ROBERTS, Derald Wayne Roberts, and wife, Mary Jenene Roberts v. Ronald Charles YOUNG and Carolyn Nelson Tuggle.

Page 78

464 S.E.2d 78

120 N.C.App. 720

Nathan Wayne ROBERTS, Derald Wayne Roberts, and wife, Mary Jenene Roberts v. Ronald Charles YOUNG and Carolyn Nelson Tuggle.

No. COA95-120.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 21, 1995.

Long & Parker, P.A. by Robert B. Long, Jr., and W. Scott Jones, Asheville, for plaintiff-appellee Nathan Wayne Roberts.

Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Davis, P.A. by Roy W. Davis, Jr., and Michelle Rippon, Asheville, for unnamed defendant-appellant, State Farm Automobile Insurance Company.

MARK D. MARTIN, Judge.

Unnamed defendant State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) appeals from jury verdict alleging 10 assignments of error. We find no error.

State Farm contends the trial court erred by: (1) failing to bifurcate the damages issue; (2) admitting evidence relating to punitive damages; (3) allowing plaintiff, at the close of its evidence, to dismiss its claim for punitive damages; (4) instructing the jury on the effect of plaintiff's withdrawal of the punitive damages issue in a materially different way than proposed by State Farm; (5) instructing the jury on the effect of the withdrawal of the punitive damages issue prior to closing arguments; (6) failing to submit State Farm's proposed issue concerning the plaintiff's recovery of actual damages; (7) requiring State Farm, even though it offered no evidence, to present the first jury summation; (8) admitting into evidence plaintiff's exhibit 45, defendant's Answers to Request for Admissions, and permitting plaintiff's counsel to argue the same in summation; (9) denying State Farm's Motion for a New Trial; and (10) denying State Farm's Motion to Toll Prejudgment Interest.

On 28 October 1991 plaintiff Nathan Roberts (Roberts) filed his complaint for personal injuries and medical expenses. Roberts amended his complaint on 14 May 1993 to include an allegation of emotional distress and to add Derald and Mary Roberts, Roberts' parents, as plaintiffs. Derald and Mary Roberts ultimately dismissed their emotional distress claim without prejudice. Roberts also dismissed his claim against Carolyn Tuggle without prejudice.

The facts surrounding the accident are undisputed. On 11 October 1994 Young was driving a 1974 Oldsmobile. At around 9:30 or 10 p.m., Young drove into an apartment complex located on Erskine Street. After leaving the apartment complex, nearby police officers were suspicious of Young's activities and stopped his car. As the officers approached his vehicle, Young sped away and the ensuing chase eclipsed speeds of 75 miles per hour. In his efforts to elude the police, Young ran a red light at the intersection of Southside and Charlotte streets and struck Roberts' car. When the police officers arrived at the scene of the accident, Roberts was semi-conscious and bleeding extensively.

At trial Roberts presented evidence tending to show he suffered the following injuries as a result of the accident: (1) a broken right leg which required the insertion of a steel rod; (2) several broken teeth which will require future corrective surgery; (3) the initial symptoms of temporomandibular dysfunction; (4) lacerations on his chin, including a scar which plastic surgery will not completely erase, and lacerations on his right leg; (5) pain in his lower back and sciatic nerve; and (6) muscle damage to his right leg. At oral argument the parties stipulated that Roberts' present and future medical expenses total approximately $30,000.

Beyond his observable physical injuries, medical and psychological experts testified Roberts suffered a "closed head injury"--an injury which often results in personality changes, memory and attention deficits, irritability, and an overall slowing of mental functions. Roberts' also called family and teachers who cited specific manifestations of Roberts' post-accident changes in personality and decreased mental capacity.

At trial Young stipulated: (1) he was negligent in operation of his vehicle; and (2) his negligence was the proximate cause of Roberts' injuries. Further, neither Young nor State Farm presented any evidence regarding the injuries Roberts suffered in the accident.

After being charged solely on the issue of damages, the jury returned a verdict for Roberts in the amount of $450,000. Young and State Farm appealed. On 6 March 1995 Young voluntarily dismissed his appeal.

A.

State Farm contends, in its first and second assignments of error, that the trial court abused its discretion by failing: (1) to bifurcate the compensatory and punitive damages issues; and (2) to exclude evidence relating to punitive damages at trial.

Bifurcation is governed by N.C.R.Civ.P. 42(b), which provides:

The court may in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice and shall for considerations of venue upon timely motion order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.

N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b) (1990) (emphasis added). State Farm contends the trial court was required, pursuant to Rule 42(b), to bifurcate the damages issue.

" 'Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain words of the statute.' " Hyler v. GTE Products Co., 333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993) (quoting Correll v. Division of Social Services, 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)). If the language of the statute is clear, this Court must implement the statute according to the plain meaning of its terms. Id. Further, when according a statute its plain meaning, courts "may not interpolate or superimpose provisions and limitations not contained therein." Preston v. Thompson, 53 N.C.App. 290, 292, 280 S.E.2d 780, 783, disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 304 N.C. 392, 285 S.E.2d 833 (1981).

Rule 42(b) provides the trial court "may ... order a separate trial on any claim...." N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b) (1990) (emphasis added). The definition of "may" is "have liberty to--used nearly interchangeably with can." WEBSTERS NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 523 (7th ed. 1969). The use of "may," as opposed to "shall," is indicative of discretion or choice between two or more alternatives. See United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 996, 91 S.Ct. 1224, 28 L.Ed.2d 535 (1971). Thus, we believe, contrary to State Farm's contentions, that the plain language of Rule 42(b) vests in the trial court broad discretionary authority to determine when bifurcation is appropriate.

Our interpretation of Rule 42(b) is in complete accord with our Supreme Court's admonition the trial court must accept a broad supervisory role over the structure of a trial. In re Will of Hester, 320 N.C. 738, 741-742, 360 S.E.2d 801, 804 (1987). As our Supreme Court stated:

The paramount duty of the trial judge is to supervise and control the course of the trial so as to prevent injustice. In discharging this duty, the court possesses broad discretionary powers sufficient to meet the circumstances of each case. This supervisory power encompasses the authority to structure the trial logically and to set the order of proof.

Id. (citations omitted). The legislative comment to Rule 42 also supports this view stating, "the power of severance is an indispensable safety valve to guard against the occasion where a suit of unmanageable size is thrust on the court. Whether or not there should be a severance rests in the sound discretion of the judge." N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 42, official commentary (1990).

Because of its broad discretionary powers, the trial court's decisions regarding trial supervision and control will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of discretion. Hester, 320 N.C. at 742, 360 S.E.2d at 804. A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes "a patently arbitrary decision, manifestly unsupported by reason." Buford v. General Motors Corp., 339 N.C. 396, 406, 451 S.E.2d 293, 298 (1994) (citing State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 248-249, 415 S.E.2d 726, 732 (1992)).

In the present case, State Farm made its motion to bifurcate the punitive and compensatory damages issues after the case was called for trial. State Farm argued the jury would be confused and the compensatory award inflated if evidence relating to punitive damages was presented and thereafter dismissed. After careful review of the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by denying State Farm's motion to bifurcate the damages issue.

Further, in light of our decision upholding the trial court's denial of State Farm's motion to bifurcate, admission of evidence regarding the issue of punitive damages was proper. See N.C.R.Evid. 401, et seq.

B.

State Farm alleges, in its third assignment of error, that the trial court erred by allowing Roberts to dismiss his claim of punitive damages.

N.C.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:

[A]n action or any claim therein may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of the court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the plaintiff rests his case, or; (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.

N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1) (1990) (emphasis added). As previously indicated, where the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain language of the statute. See Hyler, 333 N.C. at 262, 425 S.E.2d at 701. Under the plain language of Rule 41(a)(1), we believe a plaintiff is vested with the authority to dismiss any of its claims prior to close of its case-in-chief. See Whitehurst v. Transportation Co., 19 N.C.App. 352, 355, 198 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1973) (holding plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss his action is limited in duration by Rule 41(a)(1) to any time before plaintiff rests his case.).

In the instant case, Roberts presented his Motion to Dismiss the issue of punitive damages under Rule 41...