Robertson v. Boston & A.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 29 November 1893 |
| Citation | 160 Mass. 191,35 N.E. 775 |
| Parties | ROBERTSON v. BOSTON & A.R. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
James B. Carroll, for plaintiff.
William H. Brooks, for defendant.
This is an action of tort, brought by a locomotive engineer employed by the Connecticut River Railroad Company, for personal injuries received by him through the alleged negligence of the servants of the defendant. At the close of the evidence for the plaintiff, the presiding judge directed a verdict for the defendant, and reported the case for the determination of this court.
The declaration contains counts at common law, and also counts under St.1887, c. 270. The plaintiff's argument was confined to the common-law counts; and, as we are of opinion that he was entitled to go to the jury on these counts, we need not consider the others.
There was evidence that the plaintiff was, with the locomotive engine in his charge, lawfully in the yard of the defendant and that by the negligence of the servants of the defendant in giving a wrong signal, his engine went off the tracks at an open switch. The plaintiff was not injured by this accident. Three attempts were then made to get the engine on the tracks again, by attaching an engine of the defendant to the plaintiff's engine, and letting on steam. The coupling of the two engines together was done by the servants of the defendant. In the first attempt the plaintiff endeavored to assist by pulling the throttle of his engine and letting on steam. His engine was damaged by going off the tracks, the cover on the cylinder head being cracked, and the cylinder rod bent. The plaintiff discovered this condition of things before the first attempt to get his engine on the tracks failed. After this, and before the second attempt was made, the plaintiff got off his engine to fix the cylinder rod, and was off when the second attempt was made, and had just got back to the engine when the third attempt was made. When the first attempt was made, the engines were coupled together with a link; at the second attempt, they were coupled by a rope, which broke; and, at the third attempt, they were coupled by a rope having a link on one end and a hook on the other. The link was fastened in the mouth of the drawbar of the plaintiff's engine, and the hook, instead of being put into the mouth of the drawbar of the other engine, was placed on top of the drawbar, and was kept in place by the coupling pin. In the third attempt, the pin broke, the rope flew back, and the hook struck the plaintiff on the head, and injured him severely. There was also evidence that this mode of fastening the pin was an improper mode, and the jury might have found that the servants of the defendant were negligent. The defense rests upon other grounds. The defendant contends that, by the force of certain agreements made by the officials of the two railroad companies, the Connecticut River Railroad Company was bound, in case of a wreck, to return the locomotive engine to the track, although the expense of so doing was to be borne by the Boston & Albany Railroad Company, and that it was the duty of the plaintiff to assist in clearing the wreck. This agreement, made in 1884, after providing that delivery of freight should be considered as made when the engine of one company should be attached to cars in the yard of the other reads as follows: "In case of a wreck or damage to the cars attached to an engine of the Connecticut River Railroad, that company is to take care of the wreck, and bear the loss or damage." In 1885 there was added to the agreement the following: "It is...
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