Robertson v. Craver
| Decision Date | 20 May 1893 |
| Citation | 55 N.W. 492,88 Iowa 381 |
| Parties | ROBERTSON v. CRAVER. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Poweshiek county; A. R. Dewey, Judge.
Action for breach of promise of marriage. Jury trial. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.John T. Scott and H. S. Winslow, for appellant.
Haines & Lyman, for appellee.
1. It is averred that plaintiff and defendant, in January, 1891, entered into a marriage engagement; that the marriage was to take place about December 25, 1891; that in April, 1891, the defendant married another woman, and thus put it out of his power to perform his contract with the plaintiff. The answer admits the marriage of the defendant, and denies the other allegations of the petition.
2. Plaintiff was asked, “Do you know whether or not he [the defendant] bought his father's homestead?” The question was objected to as leading, suggestive, incompetent, and calling for a conclusion. She answered: “Yes, sir; he told me he had bought his father's place the first time I saw him after he was married.” Defendant moved to strike out the answer as incompetent and immaterial; the statement having been made since the defendant's marriage, and referring to matters occurring after his marriage. The motion was overruled. Questions so framed are not necessarily leading. Woolheather v. Risley, 38 Iowa, 486;State v. Watson, 81 Iowa, 383, 46 N. W. Rep. 868. It is sometimes permissible to direct the attention of the witness to the particular fact about which information is sought. Graves v. Insurance Co., 82 Iowa, 637, 49 N. W. Rep. 65. The purchase of a homestead was a fact. The question did not call for a conclusion. The ruling was without prejudice, as the same fact was testified to by another witness, and was not disputed.
3. Plaintiff was also asked, on direct examination, this question: “When you heard that he was married, how did it affect you?” It was objected to as incompetent and immaterial, and the objection overruled. She answered, “I hated it awful bad.” The question, we think, was proper. It called for facts touching her condition, mental and physical, as a result of the marriage. The answer, though not in good form, was but one way of expressing the mental condition of the witness. Besides, in the course of the trial, the answer was withdrawn from the jury. Other witnesses were asked questions relating to plaintiff's condition after she had heard of defendant's marriage, thus: “You may state to the jury how it affected her, or how it seemed to affect her.” The court held the question was not incompetent, and the witness answered, “She didn't talk about the matter, only she was downhearted.” It was competent to show how, if at all, the defendant's marriage affected the plaintiff. Her wounded feelings, mortification, and pain, if any, resulting from defendant's breach of the contract, were all proper to be shown as elements of damage.
4. Error is assigned on the ruling of the court excluding evidence as to plaintiff's declarations made after the marriage contract was broken. We think there was no error in these rulings. The questions asked did not indicate that they related to expressions of plaintiff as to her feelings towards defendant before the breach of the contract. How she felt towards the defendant after he had deceived her, and put it out of his power to fulfill his contract with her, could in no way tend to show what her feelings towards him were while the engagement lasted. It was not proposed to show that these declarations, though made after defendant's marriage, related to her feelings towards or affection for him during the time the engagement subsisted. Moreover, the objection that the matter inquired about was not proper cross-examination was well grounded.
5. A witness was asked what the plaintiff was doing in the way of getting ready to be married.” “Do you know anything about Rosa making preparations for marriage?” These questions were objected to as assuming a fact not proven, and the objection was overruled, and the witness answered: “Yes, sir; piecing quilts, and doing fancy work.” Prior to the examination of this witness, testimony had been introduced, without objection, which showed these and other preparations for marriage. Indeed, there appears to be no conflict in the evidence touching preparations on part of plaintiff for a marriage. In that respect, and in view of the undisputed evidence in the case, the ruling was correct. But defendant urges that the questions assumed the existence of the contract of marriage, and cites Jones v. Layman, (Ind. Sup.) 24 N. E. Rep. 363. The question in that case was: “What declaration, if any, did she make in regard to her disappointment, and refusal of defendant to marry, at the time she showed you the letter?” It will be observed that the entire inquiry was based upon the thought expressed in the question, that defendant had refused to marry the plaintiff. Again, the question related to a declaration made by plaintiff in the absence of defendant, after the engagement had been broken. The court held the question objectionable for the latter reason, as well as because it assumed a breach of the contract. In the case at bar the evidence called for and elicited related to preparations which plaintiff was making for a marriage during the continuance of the engagement. Evidence of the conduct of the plaintiff, if it relates to the time covered by the engagement, or to a time when first informed of the fact that her intended husband has married another, is admissible to prove her consent to the alleged marriage and contract. We do not think the questions, as asked, were objectionable.
6. A brother of plaintiff who had testified on direct examination that, while the defendant was keeping company with his sister, no one else was going with her, was asked: “Did you not, then, at that house on your father's farm, tell Mr. Craver, the defendant in this case, that your sister (plaintiff) had made a mash on Shadley there, at John Stilwell's?” An objection to the question was sustained on the ground that it was incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant. The evident drift of this question was to show that the witness had made statements to defendant inconsistentwith his testimony on direct examination. The question was clearly proper. What the answer would have been, of course, we cannot say; but it was proper for defendant to show if he could, on the cross-examination, that he was mistaken in his statements made in his examination in chief. The ruling of the court placed an undue restriction on the right of cross-examination.
7. On cross-examination a witness testified that plaintiff had kept company with one Mackey a short time before she began going with defendant. The court, on motion of plaintiff, struck out this evidence as immaterial and irrelevant. This action is assigned as error. We think the ruling was right. Defendant's claim seems to be that the...
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