Robertson v. Robertson, S96A0183
| Decision Date | 11 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. S96A0183,S96A0183 |
| Citation | 467 S.E.2d 556,266 Ga. 516 |
| Parties | ROBERTSON v. ROBERTSON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Domestic relations. Gwinnett County Superior Trial Judge: James W. Oxendine.
Douglas H. Pike, Atlanta, for appellant Hazel Robertson.
Thomas James Robertson, Plantation, pro se.
Hazel and Thomas Robertson, appellant and appellee respectively, were divorced pursuant to a consent final judgment and decree entered February 27, 1990. Appellant was awarded custody of the parties' two minor children and appellee was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $1,250 per month. On June 24, 1994 appellee filed a petition for modification of child support; appellant answered and moved that appellee be held in contempt based on an arrearage in past child support payments in an amount to be determined. 1 Appellee amended his modification petition, attaching thereto a "compromise agreement" dated November 22, 1993 and signed by the parties, which purported to compromise appellee's arrearage as of that date at $12,500 and, following an initial payment of $3,000, to reduce for the next succeeding six months the amount payable by appellee to $800 per month, of which $400 would be applied toward the arrearage and $400 toward current support. Thereafter, under the terms of the agreement, appellee's original support obligations would be reinstated. 2 Appellee petitioned that the agreement be made the order of the court or, in the alternative, that the court determine that the arrearage as of November 22, 1993 was only $12,500. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that since the execution of the agreement, appellee had paid only $12,387.95, including the $3,000 and the court admitted, without objection from appellee, a summary of payments made by appellee showing his total arrearage at $79,215.55, including accrued interest and $4,704.91 in medical payments arrearage. The purported compromise agreement was admitted into evidence over appellant's objection for the limited purpose of mitigating the wilfulness of appellee's contempt. 3 Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order finding that although appellee was in arrears, his failure to pay was not wilful and that he should not therefore be held in wilful contempt. The court determined that the amount of the arrearage was only $23,612.05 4 which appellee was ordered to eradicate by monthly payments of $200. His child support obligation was reduced to $466.67 per month. In calculating the amount of the arrearage, the trial court stated that it had considered, inter alia, the parties' intent, as evidenced by their oral communications and written documents, to compromise the amount of the arrearage. This appeal follows our grant of petitioner Hazel Robertson's application seeking discretionary review of the trial court's order.
1. Appellant contends that the trial court, in calculating the amount of arrearage in child support owed by appellee, improperly considered evidence of a "compromise" by the parties of appellee's child support obligation. We agree.
It is well-settled that a modification action under OCGA § 19-6-19 is the sole means by which a child support award included in a divorce decree may be modified. While the parties are free to enter into an agreement purporting to modify the child support obligation (OCGA § 19-6-15(a)), that agreement becomes enforceable only when incorporated in an order of the court pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-19. Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100, 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995); Foster v. Foster, 260 Ga. 813(2), 400 S.E.2d 629 (1991). It is equally well-established that an order modifying child support may operate only prospectively. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560(1), 385 S.E.2d 279 (1989). The purported compromise agreement was admitted, over appellant's objection, for the limited purpose of showing that appellee's contempt was not wilful. Pretermitting any issue concerning the validity of the agreement itself and whether the agreement was properly admitted for the stated purpose, it was error for the trial court to consider, in arriving at the amount of appellee's arrearage, evidence of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jackson v. Sanders
...Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100, 100, 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995) (citation omitted; emphasis in original); see also Robertson v. Robertson, 266 Ga. 516, 518(1), 467 S.E.2d 556 (1996) (“It is well-settled that a modification action under OCGA § 19–6–19 is the sole means by which a child support a......
-
Spurlock v. Department of Human Resources
...Wilson v. Wilson, 270 Ga. 479, 512 S.E.2d 255 (1999); Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439, 511 S.E.2d 167 (1999); Robertson v. Robertson, 266 Ga. 516, 518(1), 467 S.E.2d 556 (1996). Likewise, this Court has repeatedly exercised jurisdiction in cases involving DHR's review pursuant to OCGA § 19-11......
-
Marks v. Soles
..." Wright v. Burch , 331 Ga.App. 839, 843 (1) (c), 771 S.E.2d 490 (2015) (punctuation omitted), quoting Robertson v. Robertson , 266 Ga. 516, 518 (1), 467 S.E.2d 556 (1996). Thus although a trial court is authorized to " ‘modify child support obligations and enter orders regarding repayment ......
-
Strunk v. Strunk
...and manner of the payment of the arrearage had the issue been raised in a contempt action that she brought. See Robertson v. Robertson, 266 Ga. 516(1), 467 S.E.2d 556 (1996); Floyd v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 551(1), 277 S.E.2d 658 (1981); Deese v. Deese, 230 Ga. 105, 196 S.E.2d 16 (1973). We have be......