Robertson v. State
Decision Date | 08 January 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 10-18-00228-CR,10-18-00228-CR |
Parties | FREDRICK VONSHA ROBERTSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 85th District Court Brazos County, Texas
In two issues, appellant, Fredrick Vonsha Robertson, challenges his conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance—cocaine—four grams or more but less than 200 grams. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d) (West 2017). Specifically, Robertson contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence due to the absence of probable cause to support a warrant to search his residence and by denying his request for an article 38.23(a) jury instruction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (West 2018). We reverse and remand.
In his first issue, Robertson contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence due to the absence of probable cause to support a warrant to search his residence.
"A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Kelly v. State, 529 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (citing Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). In performing this review, we generally use a bifurcated standard of review, affording deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and reviewing de novo the application of law to the facts. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). However, when the question before the trial court is whether probable cause supported the issuance of a search warrant, as is the case here, the trial court does not make credibility determinations but is instead limited to the four corners of the affidavit. State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). When we review a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant, we apply a highly-deferential standard, and we will uphold the magistrate's probable-cause determination as long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable causeexisted. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
"Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a 'fair probability' that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the specified location." Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317). It is a 'flexible and nondemanding' standard." Id. (citing 40 GEORGE W. DIX & ROBERT O. DAWSON, TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5.03 at 292 (2d ed. 2001)). To justify the issuance of a search warrant, the affidavit in support thereof must set forth facts sufficient to establish probable cause:
(1) that a specific offense has been committed, (2) that the specifically described property or items that are to be searched for or seized constitute evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person committed that offense, and (3) that the property or items constituting evidence to be searched for or seized are located at or on the particular person, place, or thing to be searched.
In his motion to suppress, Robertson asserted that the affidavit in support of the search warrant stated that a confidential informant went to the address of 2408 Old Hearne Road—an address that is about a mile away from 2408 Old Kurten Road—and purchased cocaine from "Fred." However, using this information, police obtained a search warrant for 2408 Old Kurten Road, the address of Robinson's residence. After ahearing, at which two witnesses testified, the trial court overruled Robertson's motion to suppress. The trial court then entered numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In his affidavit in support of the complained-of search warrant, Bryan Police Officer Randell Hall stated the following:
At the hearing on Robertson's motion to suppress, Officer Kyle Cottle of the Bryan Police Department testified that he was involved in the investigation of drug sales occurring on Old Kurten Road; that he observed the controlled buy that was referenced in Officer Hall's affidavit; and that the controlled buy took place at 2408 Old Kurten Road,not Old Hearne Road.2 Officer Cottle emphasized that the reference to Old Hearne Road was a discrepancy and that the affidavit should have read 2408 Old Kurten Road at all times. Moreover, according to Officer Cottle, no law-enforcement activity was conducted at 2408 Old Hearne Road.
In its findings of fact, the trial court stated the following:
As mentioned above, in reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit to support a search warrant, the trial court is generally limited to that which is contained...
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