Robeson v. Squadrito

• Decision Date: 07 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 3:97-CV-369RM.,3:97-CV-369RM.
• Citation: 57 F.Supp.2d 642
• Parties: Kevin T. ROBESON and Thomas J. Clark, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph M. SQUADRITO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

57 F.Supp.2d 642

Kevin T. ROBESON and Thomas J. Clark, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph M. SQUADRITO, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:97-CV-369RM.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

April 7, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Christopher C Myers, Myers and Geisleman, Fort Wayne, IN, Samuel L Bolinger, Fort Wayne, IN, for plaintiffs.

John O Feighner, Haller and Colvin, Fort Wayne, IN, Janet L Parsanko, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Joseph Squadrito, Henry E. Fink, Henry Dill, defendants.

G William Fishering, III, Laura L Reuss, Beers Mallers Backs and Salin, Fort Wayne, IN, John O Feighner, Haller and Colvin, Fort Wayne, IN, Janet L Parsanko, Indiana Atty. General, Indianapolis, IN, for Linda Bloom, Jack McComb, Ed Raosseau, defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MILLER, District Judge.

In this suit, Kevin Robeson and Thomas Clark challenge certain conditions they claim existed during their stays in the Allen County Jail in 1997 and 1998. Mr. Robeson and Mr. Clark sue Sheriff Joseph Squadrito, Jail Commander Henry Dill, Lieutenant Henry Fink, and Allen County Commissioners Ed Rousseau, Linda Bloom, and Jack McComb. All defendants seek summary judgment on all of Mr. Robeson's and Mr. Clark's claims. Granting of the defendants' summary judgment motions with respect to Mr. Robeson's claims is warranted for the reasons set forth below. No response to the motion was filed on behalf of Mr. Clark; judgment on his claims is appropriate on the bases set forth in the defendants' motions, as well as those discussed below with respect to Mr. Robeson.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Robeson was incarcerated in the Allen County Jail for the following approximate periods: February 11 to March 18, 1997, June 25, 1997 to July 2, 1997, and April 6 to 20, 1998. He now raises claims against the Allen County Sheriff, Jail Commander, a lieutenant, and the Commissioners under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Mr. Robeson challenges circumstances he claims existed during his stays at the Allen County Jail. He claims the jail was severely overcrowded (sometimes housing over 700 inmates, though designed to house only 382) and that he was kept in a day room and so slept on the floor. He claims the day room was so crowded that he couldn't even walk through it, and that sleeping on his thin mattress on the concrete floor caused stiffness in his back. Of the four shower heads, only one functioned consistently, and he was denied an indigent pack of envelopes, paper, pencil, deodorant, and shampoo for weeks. He claims he was the victim of an assault in March 1997 because no correctional officer was available to supervise or provide security. He also claims that he was denied adequate recreation and exercise. Mr. Robeson claims that his diet was not appropriate for his hypoglycemic condition, that the servings of food were too small, and that he was denied his high blood pressure medication.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) "mandates entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial." "Where the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial ... there can be no `genuine issue of material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."

Although the moving party must initially identify the basis for its contention that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party cannot rest on his pleadings, but must produce his own evidence. Rule 56(e) requires that the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof on an issue allege specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial by his own affidavits or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file....

In considering whether there are any genuine issues of material fact we view the record and extract all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Where a fact is disputed, the nonmoving party must show that the disputed fact is material under the applicable law. The applicable law will dictate which facts are material. Only disputes that could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.

National Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc. v. Superior Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 264-265 (7th Cir.1996) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard

Mr. Robeson's claims are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment,¹ which prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The standard contains two components: (1) objectively, the injury must be sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, and (2) subjectively, the prison official's actual state of mind must be one of "deliberate indifference" to the deprivation. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-838, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 473 (7th Cir.1998). The objective component requires an "extreme deprivation" that denies the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, and forces the plaintiff to endure a situation that is "beyond the bounds of human decency." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). The Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons" or jails, and only those deprivations denying "`the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). "Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment," Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir.1987); see also Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1997); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1251 (7th Cir.1985) ("In determining whether prison conditions constitute punishment, and thus violate the Constitution, the court should consider whether the conditions complained of are compatible with `the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'").

B. Conditions of Confinement

Mr. Robeson's principal complaint pertains to overcrowding at the Allen County Jail. Overcrowding itself is not an Eighth Amendment violation, but if it "leads to deprivation of food, proper sanitation, or medical care, or when it is accompanied by dangerous conditions, it may amount to cruel and unusual punishment." Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F.Supp. 397, 406 (N.D.Ind.1997) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Mr. Robeson does not complain solely of overcrowding; he asserts several deprivations, the cumulative effect of which he believes amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. The court's task, then, is to decide whether the evidence he presents, viewed in the light most favorable to him, raises a genuine issue of fact for trial. The court has carefully reviewed the evidence Mr. Robeson presents, specifically including his deposition testimony and the photographs and videotape depicting the density and conditions existing at the jail, and concludes that Mr. Robeson has not raised a genuine issue of fact regarding the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation.

When the evidence is viewed as favorably to Mr. Robeson as possible, Mr. Robeson spent about five weeks in a crowded day room, sleeping on a thin mattress on the floor for weeks, which caused his back to stiffen. Of the four shower heads, only one consistently functioned for the 36+ inmates in the block.² Another inmate assaulted Mr. Robeson in March 1997 after seeing that no correctional officer was supervising them. Mr. Robeson was not taken to the gymnasium for recreation or allowed out of the day room to move around. The servings of food he received were small, sometimes as little as two to four teaspoons. Mr. Robeson asked for an indigent pack containing envelopes, paper, pencil, deodorant, and shampoo, but the request was denied for a period of weeks.

The conditions of Mr. Robeson's confinement at the Allen County Jail do not rise to the level of deprivations of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Mr. Robeson slept on a mattress on the floor for several weeks in a crowded day room, but the events and environment he describes do not amount to more than discomfort or inconvenience. Sleeping on a mattress on the floor, without aggravating circumstances (e.g., no mattress, low temperature without blankets, unreasonable vermin infestation), is not of constitutional magnitude. See Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 85 (5th Cir.1986); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 672 (11th Cir.1990); Powell v. Cook County...