Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome
| Decision Date | 06 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | Nos. WD,s. WD |
| Citation | 989 S.W.2d 238 |
| Parties | ROBIN FARMS, INC., et al., Appellants, v. David and Mary BARTHOLOME, et al., Respondents. 55605, WD 55709. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Robert W. Wheeler, Keytesville, for appellants.
Don Chapman, Jr., Brookfield, for respondents.
Before: SPINDEN, P.J., and EDWIN H. SMITH and RIEDERER, JJ.
Robin Farms, Inc. (Robin Farms); Harlow Fay, Inc. (Harlow Fay); John and Karen Fay; and Steven and Linda Fay appeal from the circuit court's judgment, inter alia, denying John Fay and Robin Farms's Rule 51.05(d) 1 motion for a change of judge for cause; entering sanctions against John and Karen Fay, Robin Farms, Harlow Fay, and their attorney in the amount of $5,750 for violation of Rule 55.03(b); denying John Fay and Robin Farms's motion for a continuance, filed pursuant to Rule 65 and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (the SSCRA), 50 U.S.C. § 521 (1990); 2 and sustaining the motion for summary judgment of the respondents, Cy and Doris Riddell, and David and Mary Bartholome, on their counterclaim against them for ejectment. The respondents cross-appeal from the circuit court's judgment sanctioning John and Karen Fay, Robin Farms, Harlow Fay, and their attorney. The dispute between the parties arose over the right to possession of a 167-acre farm owned by the respondents and located in Linn County, which was initially leased by the respondents to Harlow Fay, which lease it subsequently attempted to assign, without the express written consent of the respondents, to Robin Farms.
The appellants raise four points on appeal. In Point I, they claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying John Fay and Robin Farms's motion for change of judge because a reasonable person would question the impartiality of the Honorable Gary E. Ravens presiding over their case. In Point II, the appellants claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter sanctions against John and Karen Fay, Robin Farms, Harlow Fay, and their attorney because, in filing their motion for sanctions, the respondents violated Rule 55.03(c). In Point III, they claim that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling John Fay and Robin Farms's December 18, 1997, motion for continuance because, under the SSCRA, the trial court was required to grant the continuance. In their Point IV, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in sustaining the respondents' motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim for ejectment because there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the respondents had a legal right to immediate possession of the farm. The respondents raise one point in their cross-appeal. They claim that the court abused its discretion in sanctioning John and Karen Fay, Robin Farms, Harlow Fay, and their attorney in the amount of $5,750 because this amount was unreasonable.
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Cy and Doris Riddell and Margaret and Leslie Sensintaffar owned a farm located in Linn County, Missouri, which consisted of approximately 167 acres. On or about February 27, 1985, the Riddells and the Sensintaffars leased the farm to Harlow Fay for a term commencing March 1, 1985, and expiring December 31, 1985, and for successive annual terms thereafter, unless either party, prior to the expiration of the original term or any subsequent terms, served written notice of an intent to terminate the lease at least sixty days prior to the expiration of the current term. The lease further provided that Harlow Fay, whose corporate president was appellant John Fay, could not sublet or assign the lease without the lessors' express written consent and that if it did, the lessors had the right to re-enter and take immediate possession of the farm. Sometime thereafter, the Sensintaffars' interest in the farm passed to the respondents, David and Mary Bartholome.
Sometime in 1986, Harlow Fay assigned its lease to Robin Farms, whose corporate president was also John Fay, without asking for or receiving the respondents' express written consent. Sometime thereafter, Robin Farms sublet the house located on the farm to appellants Steven and Linda Fay.
In December 1995, John Fay, presumably acting on behalf of Robin Farms, made an oral offer to the respondents to buy the farm, including the house, for $700 per acre, or to buy only the house with some acreage, in exchange for bulldozer and terracing work he agreed to perform on the farm. In February 1996, the respondents made an oral counteroffer to sell the farm and house for $750 per acre. Robin Farms alleges that in January or February 1996, it entered into an oral contract with the respondents for the sale of the farm to it in exchange for $120,000 and the bulldozer and terracing work on the farm, valued at $25,000.
On or about February 17, 1996, Robin Farms sent the respondents a written contract for the sale of the farm, which was never executed. Sometime thereafter, the respondents contacted real estate agent Bob Peterson for assistance in selling the farm. On February 23, 1996, they entered into a real estate contract to sell the farm to Beeler Farms, Inc. (Beeler Farms), whose corporate president was Keith Beeler. As a result, on June 26 and again on July 10, 1996, the respondents sent written notice of their intent to terminate the farm lease as of December 31, 1996, to Harlow Fay, John Fay, Steven Fay, and Ellis Burns, the trustee of the Stockwell Land Trusts.
On October 15, 1996, Harlow Fay, and John and Karen Fay filed a four-count petition in the Circuit Court of Linn County naming the respondents, Bob Peterson, and Keith Beeler as defendants and seeking: (1) the specific performance of the alleged oral contract for the sale of the farm to Harlow Fay; (2) as an alternative to Count I, damages for quantum meruit for the bulldozer and terracing work; (3) damages for the respondents' alleged tortious interference with Harlow Fay's farming business; and (4) damages for the respondents' alleged tortious interference with John and Karen Fay's farming operation.
On November 19, 1996, the respondents, Peterson, and Beeler filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 55.03(b), alleging that the appellants' petition had no factual or legal validity. On December 2, 1996, the appellants filed their first amended petition adding Robin Farms as a plaintiff and amending it to allege that Harlow Fay had assigned its farm lease to it. On December 5, 1996, the respondents, Peterson, and Beeler filed their second motion for sanctions alleging that the appellants' first amended petition had no factual or legal validity. Also on that date, they filed a motion to dismiss the appellants' first amended petition. On December 20, 1996, the respondents filed their counterclaim for ejectment against Harlow Fay, Robin Farms, and John and Karen Fay, alleging that: (1) they were the owners of the farm; (2) Robin Farms was in actual possession of the farm; and, (3) Harlow Fay had assigned its lease to Robin Farms without their express written consent, in violation of the lease, causing the lease to be in default and resulting in neither having a legal right to possession of the farm.
On January 3, 1997, the court sustained the respondents, Peterson, and Beeler's motion to dismiss the appellants' first amended petition, but giving the appellants thirty days to file their second amended petition. On January 21, 1997, the court allowed the respondents to amend their counterclaim by interlineation, apparently to add Steven and Linda Fay as parties. On February 3, 1997, the appellants filed their second amended petition, inter alia, amending Count IV to allege a claim by Steven and Linda Fay against the respondents for wrongful eviction. On February 14, 1997, the respondents, Peterson, and Beeler filed a third motion for sanctions, alleging that the appellants' second amended petition had no factual or legal validity. Also on that date, the respondents filed a motion for summary judgment on all four counts of the appellants' petition and on their counterclaim for ejectment. On April 22, 1997, the trial court sustained the respondents' motion as to the appellants' Counts III and IV, finding that they had failed to state therein a cause of action upon which relief could be granted, and on their counterclaim for ejectment as to Robin Farms, Harlow Fay, and John and Karen Fay. Accordingly, on April 28, 1997, the trial court issued a writ for possession of the farm by the respondents, but not the house, in which Steven and Linda Fay continued to reside. The two remaining counts of the appellants' petition were set for trial on August 1, 1997.
On July 28, 1997, the appellants filed a motion for continuance. The alleged basis for the motion was that John Fay had been called to military service in the United States Navy for the period of July 21 through August 1, 1997, preventing him from attending the trial on August 1. The court sustained this motion without a hearing and reset the trial for August 21, 1997.
On August 18, 1997, the appellants filed a motion to amend their petition for a third time, seeking to amend their Count I to a breach of contract claim, which motion was denied by the court. John Fay and Robin Farms also filed a "Motion For Recusal of Honorable Gary E. Ravens," alleging that on August 10, 1997, they learned that Judge Ravens, while in private practice, had represented respondent Mary Bartholome, resulting in a conflict of interest requiring his recusal, pursuant to Rule 2, Canons 1, 2, and 3 D of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The court denied the motion on August 20, 1997. On August 18, 1997, John Fay and Robin Farms filed a second motion for continuance, again alleging that John Fay could not attend the scheduled trial date due to his military service. The court denied the motion on August 20, 1997.
On August 21, 1997, a writ of...
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...and accepted, it does not become part of the record and cannot be considered as evidence in the case. Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238 (Mo.App. 1999) reflects the “multiple personality” of documentary evidence by stating that in order for a document to be received into eviden......
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...and accepted, it does not become part of the record and cannot be considered as evidence in the case. Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238 (Mo.App. 1999) relects the “multiple personality” of documentary evidence by stating that in order for a document to be received into evidenc......