Robinett v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.

Decision Date06 July 1972
Docket NumberNo. 25613,25613
Citation484 S.W.2d 506
PartiesWilbur ROBINETT et al., Appellants, v. KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Dean F. Arnold, Kansas City, for appellants; Bagby, Benjamin & Arnold, Kansas City, of counsel.

William H. Woodson, Kansas City, for respondent; Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, Kansas City, of counsel.

PRITCHARD, Judge.

For personal injuries caused by electrical shock, and for loss of consortium, plaintiffs at the trial asked the jury for $15,000.00 damages. The jury returned a verdict for defendant. Defendant says that plaintiffs' claimed errors in the giving of instructions to the jury are inconsequential because plaintiff, Wilbur Robinett, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, citing Burroughs v. Union Electric Company, Mo.App., 366 S.W.2d 69.

There was a subdivision on Skiles Avenue in the southeast part of Kansas City, Missouri, in which houses were being constructed. Defendant's custom for new subdivisions was to dip primary electrical lines under public streets so that traffic on the streets would not contact overhead wires. During the course of excavation of a basement on or near the scene of the occurrence, one of the underground lines was damaged, and defendant's trouble crew ran an uninsulated overhead wire, with poles, about 300 feet long, across Skiles Avenue into the construction area. The wire was less than 18 feet above the street, and as it went into the construction area it was about 'eave' height. Two days after the underground line was damaged, and ten days before Robinett was injured, the underground lines were repaired, but the overhead wire remained energized.

On July 28, 1969, Robinett was engaged in hauling top soil to 10404 Skiles in a tandem axle dump truck. He had not made any trips to that address prior to the time of the occurrence. He backed into the site at an angle to avoid running over new sidewalks. As he backed in he saw the temporary overhead wire which the truck cleared by about two feet from its top. He backed on in close to a porch and dumped the load of dirt in one pile, then pulled up about two feet until the tailgate came shut, then he had to get on the truck running board to latch the tailgate, before which he let the dump bed down. He then got back into the truck and started to drive out at two or three miles an hour, taking the same general path as that taken in backing in. He looked both ways on Skiles for traffic. He then heard a noise and a big puff of black smoke came out from under the right side of the hood. He thought the truck was afire, and he got out of the truck, and as he stepped on the ground, he received a charge of electricity. The truck was completely burned.

On cross-examination Robinett testified that in his years of driving trucks he worked around electrical lines and was familiar with their appearances. He was familiar with his truck, and its hydraulically actuated dump bed, which would be raised or lowered while the truck was in motion. He had heard that the underground electrical line on Skiles had been damaged and that a temporary line had been put in there. When he arrived at 10404 Skiles he got out of his truck and looked around. He saw the electrical line and knew that was what it was as he drove under it. As he dumped the load he raised the bed to its full height. The pathway he drove on was fairly level. As he backed in, he watched the wire to see how much clearance he was going to have as he went under it, and he knew that if a wire were contacted with a vehicle, it was very likely to be dangerous. On redirect examination, Robinett testified that he did not know that the underground cable had been repaired ten days before, and did not know whether or not power was on in the overhead wire. His truck was three inches higher when it was unloaded. There was a ditch where the underground line had been filled over, and the front end of the truck was over it when it caught afire.

Plaintiffs' witness, Chester Wilburn, was one block north on Skiles, and saw a dump truck run into the line, 'I saw it flash.' Defendant's witness, Albert P. Jackson, who was standing nearby on the street, was watching the truck unloading dirt, and its pulling forward. The noise caught his attention, and he saw the truck bed in an up position. Defendant produced evidence that the truck was 8 feet high with the dump bed down, and if it were raised to angle of 10 degrees from straight up (as it was at the scene), it would extend to a height of 18 feet, 4 inches.

Under the facts above outlined, it was a jury question as to Robinett's contributory negligence in driving forward with the dump bed up so that it might come into contact with the wire. There was no evidence that he knew the wire was energized; there was no evidence that he knew the dump bed would still be up and would contact the wire in the distance he had to travel forward to get the dump bed under or on the wire. There was evidence that Robinett was engaged also at the time in watching for traffic. The Burroughs case is distinguishable on its facts. There, the plaintiff knew the crane holding the cable which came into contact with the wire was higher than the wire, yet, without looking, he walked down a slope without seeing whether the cable would contact it. There is no evidence here that Robinett actually knew at any time that the dump bed was higher than the wire. Compare the cases in which the issue of contributory negligence was declared to be a jury question; Burk v. Missouri Power & Light Company, Mo., 420 S.W.2d 274, 279(8, 9); Erbes v. Union Electric Company, Mo., 353 S.W.2d 659; and Potter v. Sac-Osage Electric Cooperative, Inc., Mo., 335 S.W.2d 192, 198.

Plaintiffs' instructions Nos. 3 and 5, each defined 'negligence': 'as used in this instruction means the failure to use the highest degree of care which means that degree of care that a very careful and prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances.' Instruction No. 7 submitted the contributory negligence of Robinett in failing to keep a careful lookout for electric wires, or that he permitted the truck to contact the electric wire. Robinett says that Instruction No. 7 is erroneous because, first, it did not define 'negligence' as applied to him as his failure to use ordinary care, and the omission of such definition constituted misdirection because his verdict directing instructions properly defined defendant's negligence as the failure to use the highest degree of care. The argument seems to be that plaintiffs' definition of negligence applied to all verdict directing instructions in the case. Note, however, that by its terms, the definition of negligence as being the failure to use the highest degree of care was specifically restricted or directed to Instructions Nos. 3 and 5.

In Helfrick v. Taylor, Mo., 440 S.W.2d 940, 945, it was said, where an instruction was given defining 'negligence' used in a contributory negligence instruction, that 'Its use was mandatory. See Notes on Use following MAI 11.02. See also the illustrations on use of instructions in MAI 31.01, 31.02, 31.03 and 31.04, all of which include an instruction defining 'negligence. " This statement was said to be dictum in Brewer v. Swift & Company, Mo., 451 S.W.2d 131, 134, which case reserved the question of...

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    ...of the position of immediate danger does not cure the error or make it any the less a reversible error. Robinett v. Kansas City Power and Light Company, Mo.App., 484 S.W.2d 506, 510. Non-Citation of Defendant Plaintiffs' second point relied on, duly preserved in the trial court, is that the......
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    ...Service Company, 270 S.W.2d 713 (Mo.1954); Martin v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 640 S.W.2d 491 (Mo.App.1982); Robinett v. Kansas City Power & Light Company, 484 S.W.2d 506 (Mo.App.1972). The issue of contributory negligence is dependent upon all of the factors involved in the situation. "The kn......
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    ...that negligence must be defined as set forth in MAI 11.02(1), as a necessary ingredient of that probability,' Robinett v. Kansas City P & L Co., Mo.App., 484 S.W.2d 506, 510; in Epps v. Ragsdale, Mo.App., 429 S.W.2d 798, there was a positive misdirection in that the court gave an inapplicab......
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    ...plaintiff contends par. 3(f) and instruction 2 are specific negligence citing and principally relying upon Robinett v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 484 S.W.2d 506 (Mo.App.1972). Defendant contends the pleading and submission were general, citing and principally relying upon Hunter v. Nort......
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