Robins v. Donovan Creek Drainage Dist. No. 2.

• Decision Date: 28 January 1929
• Docket Number: 27465
• Citation: 120 So. 184,152 Miss. 872
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ROBINS v. DONOVAN CREEK DRAINAGE DIST. No. 2, et al. [*]

120 So. 184

152 Miss. 872

ROBINS v. DONOVAN CREEK DRAINAGE DIST. No. 2, et al. ^[*]

No. 27465

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 28, 1929

Division A

1 DRAINS. Statutory method, provided for assessment and collection of revenue to pay drainage district's obligations, is exclusive (Laws 1912, chapter 195, section 23, and sections 9, 24, 25, as amended by Laws 1914, chapter 269, sections 8, 14, 15).

Method provided by Laws 1912, chapter 195, section 23, and sections 9, 24, 25, as amended by Laws 1914, chapter 269, sections 8 14, and 15, for assessment and collection of revenue to pay and discharge obligations of drainage district, is complete and therefore, exclusive.

2. DRAINS. Chancery court could not order sale of drainage district lands to pay indebtedness to contractor, where no levy of taxes had been made (Laws 1912, chapter 195, section 23, and sections 9, 24, 25, as amended by Laws 1914, chapter 269, sections 8, 14, 15).

Under Laws 1912, chapter 195, section 23, and sections 9, 24, 25, as amended by Laws 1914, chapter 269, sections 8, 14, and 15, chancery court had no jurisdiction to order sale of lands of drainage district to pay contractor, who constructed drainage canal, balance of indebtedness on notes of district above estimated cost of construction, for which assessment was made, where no levy of taxes had been made to discharge remaining indebtedness due.

HON. THOMAS M. HAMAN, Special Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Prentiss county., HON. THOMAS M. HAMAN, Special Chancellor.

Suit by D. W. Robins against the Donovan Creek Drainage District No. 2, and others. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill of complaint, complainant appeals. Affirmed, and cause remanded.

Decree affirmed, and cause remanded.

Bolton & Monaghan, for appellant.

Insofar as this appeal is concerned, it must be conceded that complainant has a cause of action and is entitled to relief of some sort. The only question raised by this demurrer is whether or not that sought in this bill is proper. Complainant comes into chancery court asserting a right to a lien on the lands of the district and seeking to have it established and enforced. If he be entitled to this, then the demurrer should have been overruled. It is our contention that the statute under which this district was organized (chap. 195, Laws of 1912, and chap. 269, Laws of 1914) give the bondholder such a right. Sec. 24, chap. 269, Laws of 1914, provides as follows: "All bonds and evidences of indebtedness issued by the commissioners under the terms of this act shall be secured by a lien on all lands, and railroads subject to taxation. . . .

The court below took the position that the lien declared by statute was a lien only in favor of the district for the collection of taxes, and that the district pledged this, which was its only asset, to the creditor or bondholder; that the only security which the bondholder has is to call on the district to enforce this lien and from the proceeds pay its indebtedness. Such a view is clearly refuted by the wording of the statute itself, for it plainly says: "All bonds and evidences of indebtedness issued by the commissioners under the terms of this act shall be secured by a lien on all lands, etc." Sec. 24, Chap. 269, Laws of 1914; Sec. 4988, Hem. Code 1927. The common practice is to speak of liens being in favor of and security being held by the creditor and not the debtor, and the legislature is presumed to have intended by language used the meaning of it which is commonly accepted.

The bond were issued by the district and the legislature declared them to be valid. They are unpaid and we are confronted with the problem of enforcing payment. Suit might have been instituted on the bonds in a court of law, but all we could get would be a judgment against the district that the indebtedness was due, which would be little more than the bonds themselves which the legislature had declared to be the valid obligations of the district. We would still have no more lien for the collection of the money than we had before. The bill shows a valid obligation on the part of the district, which necessarily imports legal liability therefor; it shows a default and a right to relief in plaintiff, and we think shows enough facts and rights to entitle complainant to resort to a court of equity to have all of these manifold questions that might arise settled at one time and a lien established as provided by statute without having to pursue multiple actions through courts of law and the long delay incident thereto.

W. C. Sweat, for appellees.

The law under this drainage district was attempted to be organized, and the bonds issued or notes executed, is chap. 195, Laws of 1912, as amended by chap. 269, Laws of 1914, and presents an elaborate scheme for the organization of a drainage district and for the issuance of bonds and certificates of indebtedness thereon, and for the collection of revenue for the purpose of paying the bonds and interest thereon. To this law alone we must look for authority for the collection of funds to pay these bonds. When the complainant in this cause took the notes of this district, he took them with full notice of the provisions of the law under which they were issued, and he was bound by the provisions thereof; and when you look to this law you look in vain for any authority for the holder of the indebtedness to go into a court of equity for the purpose of enforcing the payment of its indebtedness. Unless the complainant has shown some specific ground for equity jurisdiction, he would certainly have no right to call upon a court of equity to enforce his demands. No such ground has been shown.

The statute under which the bonds were issued sets out in great detail the manner for the raising of revenues to pay the indebtedness, and names the particular public officers who are to exercise this function. Nowhere in the statute is there anything to suggest that a court of equity should have any jurisdiction in the matter whatever. "A court of chancery has no jurisdiction to interfere with the public duties of any department of government, except under special circumstances, and where necessary for the protection of rights of property. In accordance with this rule, equity possesses no power to revise, control or correct the action of public, political, or executive officers or bodies at the consent of a private person, except as incidental to the protection of some private right, or the prevention of some private wrong, and then only when the case falls within some acknowledged and well-defined head of equity jurisdiction." 10 R. C. L., p. 343.

The organization of the drainage district, the issuance of bonds thereon, the assessment of the benefits to the property, and the levy and collection of taxes for the payment of the obligations is purely a statutory remedy, and the enforcement thereof must be in strict conformity with the statute. While the law under which this drainage district was organized provides that it should be liberally construed in order that the purposes of the act may be carried out, it does not mean that it should be liberally construed in so far as the collection of the revenue is concerned. In so far as the collection of the revenue is concerned, it must be done in strict conformity with the statute; otherwise, it would amount to the taking of property without due process of law. 9 R. C. L., p. 659; 19 C. J., p. 735.

The bill states that no taxes are being levied on said district, or other provisions made for the raising of funds with which to pay said indebtedness and no steps are being taken by any of the commissioners, or officers of the district, to raise funds to liquidate said indebtedness. It will thus be seen that the bill charges that no levies have been made, and we are unable to see how the appellant can now get the court to order the lands sold for the payment of taxes, which he concedes have not been levied. If the taxes have not been levied, and they should have been levied, the statute provides ample means for the levying and collection of taxes and the organization and operation of drainage districts. Being purely statutory the remedy provided thereby is the exclusive remedy, and, especially so when the remedy provided is ample as in the case at bar.

Argued orally by C. R. Bolton, for appellant, and W. C. Sweat, for appellee.

OPINION

COOK, J.

Appellant, D. W. Robins, filed a bill in the chancery court of Prentiss county against the Donovan Creek drainage district No. 2 of Prentiss county, and the owners of lands in said district, alleging that, on the 7th day of April, 1920, said drainage district was organized by the board of supervisors of Prentiss county under the provisions of chapter 195 of the Laws of 1912, and chapter 269 of the Laws of 1914, and the amendments thereto, a general description of all the lands embraced in the district being set forth in the bill of complaint; that commissioners were appointed, and they entered into a contract with appellant for the construction of a drainage canal for said district, which contract was approved by the board of supervisors; that, under said contract, instead of issuing bonds to raise funds with which to pay for said work, they agreed to give appellant four notes in the aggregate sum of twenty thousand one hundred forty-one dollars and thirty cents in payment for said work, which procedure is expressly authorized by chapter 260 of the Laws of 1914; that the appellant performed said contract, and the promissory notes of the district were executed and delivered to him; that there was a balance due on said notes of six thousand two hundred forty-three dollars and twenty-three cents on March 1, 1927, and that...