Robinson v. City of Chowchilla
| Decision Date | 27 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. F060571.,F060571. |
| Citation | 202 Cal.App.4th 382,134 Cal.Rptr.3d 696,11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 15451,2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 18432 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | John ROBINSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF CHOWCHILLA et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Law Offices of Bennett & Sharpe, Inc., Fresno, Barry J. Bennett, Thomas M. Sharpe, Elaine M. Yama, Heather N. Phillips, Katwyn T. DeLaRosa and Ann M. Bennett for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Costanzo & Associates, Fresno, Neal E. Costanzo; Cota Cole, Madera, and Thomas E. Ebersole for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from (1) an order denying him attorney fees under California's private attorney general doctrine, which is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.51 and (2) an order applying section 998 to limit his recovery of costs to those incurred prior to defendants' May 7, 2007, offer to compromise.
We conclude that this litigation, which resulted in a published decision regarding the meaning and application of Government Code section 3304, subdivision (c)( Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 368, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 687), enforced an important right affecting the public interest and conferred a significant benefit on the general public and a large class of persons. Thus, we will reverse the denial of the motion for attorney fees and remand to the trial court for it to determine whether the “financial burden of private enforcement” justifies an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5 using the cost-benefit analysis recently approved by the California Supreme Court in Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 342, 241 P.3d 840.
We also conclude that (1) substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the offer to compromise was in fact served upon plaintiff's counsel and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendants' section 998 offer to compromise the lawsuit for approximately $61,000 was reasonable and made in good faith. Nevertheless, we will direct the trial court to vacate its order taxing costs until it has resolved the attorney fees motion, after which it may enter an appropriate order regarding the motion to tax costs.
Plaintiff John Robinson was employed as chief of police by the City of Chowchilla for approximately six years. When his employment was ended in September 2003, Robinson sued the City of Chowchilla, its city council, and a city administrator, Nancy Red (collectively, City). Robinson alleged that City (1) violated his rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) (Gov.Code, § 3300 et seq.), (2) breached his employment contract, and (3) wrongfully terminated his employment in violation of public policy.
In 2005, Robinson won his POBRA claim and the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate, ordering City to provide Robinson with written notice of removal, the reasons for the removal, and an opportunity for an administrative appeal in accordance with Government Code section 3304, subdivision (c).
City challenged the trial court's issuance of the peremptory writ of mandate through both a writ petition and an appeal filed with this court. We summarily denied the writ petition and dismissed the appeal. ( Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (Oct. 27, 2006, F048561) [nonpub. opn.] [].)
In May 2007, while City's motion for summary adjudication was pending, City served Robinson's attorney with a section 998 offer to compromise the case for $61,592.47, with each party bearing its own costs. Robinson did not accept the offer.
In June 2007, the trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of City as to the fifth cause of action (wrongful termination in violation of public policy) on the ground that Robinson did not file any claim for damages with City as required by the Government Claims Act (Gov.Code, § 810 et seq.).
The remaining claims in Robinson's complaint were heard by the trial court in July 2008. In February 2009, the trial court issued a statement of decision, finding that City breached Robinson's employment contract and that Robinson was entitled to receive six months' severance pay and benefits under the terms of the contract.
In November 2009, the trial court filed a first amended judgment. With respect to Robinson's first cause of action, the amended judgment (1) stated a peremptory writ of mandate had been issued in June 2005 and City filed a return in April 2008 and (2) denied Robinson's request for monetary damages under that cause of action. As to Robinson's second (injunctive relief) and third (declaratory relief) causes of action, the amended judgment stated that, because Robinson had an adequate remedy at law for breach of contract, judgment was granted in favor of City. On the fourth cause of action (breach of contract), the amended judgment awarded Robinson damages and prejudgment interest of approximately $50,000.
This court affirmed the first amended judgment in its entirety and published a portion of the opinion concerning the interpretation and application of Government Code section 3304, subdivision (c). ( Robinson v. City of Chowchilla, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th 368, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 687.)
In January 2010, Robinson filed a motion for attorney fees. City filed an opposition to the motion as well as objections to the declaration submitted by Robinson's attorney in support of the motion.
In April 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for attorney fees. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court recapped the issues and ruling in the underlying action, stated the motion for attorney fees was timely, and indicated it would consider the motion on its merits. The trial court addressed the criteria for an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5 and concluded Robinson was not entitled to fees under section 1021.5. The trial court's statements regarding the criteria contained in section 1021.5 are set forth in part I.C., post.
In May 2010, the trial court filed a written order stating that “the motion of [Robinson] for an award of attorneys fees shall be and hereby is denied.”
In January 2010, Robinson filed a memorandum of costs requesting $6,801.24. Later that month, City filed a motion to strike or tax costs. The motion asserted, among other things, that all claimed costs that were incurred on or after May 7, 2007, were not recoverable because City's section 998 offer to compromise the case for over $61,000 exceeded the judgment for $50,140 that Robinson subsequently obtained.
In March 2010, Robinson filed an opposition to the motion to strike or tax costs. Robinson asserted that the offer to compromise had not been served on his attorney. Robinson also asserted that City's offer was not a good faith offer and, therefore,not did qualify as a valid offer under section 998.
On May 20, 2010, the trial court denied the motion to strike the memorandum of costs and granted the motion to tax costs. The court found that the offer to compromise had been served on May 7, 2007, and concluded that costs incurred after that date would be taxed.
On June 22, 2010, Robinson filed a notice of appeal regarding the denial of his motion for attorney fees and the order granting City's motion to tax costs.
In January 2011, Robinson requested that this court take judicial notice of the entire record on appeal in case No. F059608. City filed a written statement of nonopposition. As is common in subsequent appeals concerning attorney fees or costs, we issued an order taking judicial notice of the appellate record generated in the appeal concerning the underlying claims. (E.g., Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1, 45, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 416 []; Wagner Farms, Inc. v. Modesto Irrigation Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 765, 768, fn. 3, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 [].)
Section 1021.5 codifies California's version of the private attorney general doctrine, which is an exception to the usual rule that each party bears its own attorney fees. ( Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1147, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 179 P.3d 882.) The purpose of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases. ( Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 331, 101 P.3d 140.) The portion of section 1021.5 relevant to this appeal states:
“Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”
This statutory language can be divided into the following separate elements. A superior court may award attorney fees to (1) a successful party in any action (2) that has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if (3) a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (4) private enforcement is necessary because no public entity or official pursued enforcement or litigation, (5) the financial burden of private enforcement is such as to make a fee award...
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