Robinson v. City Of D.C.
| Decision Date | 31 May 1921 |
| Docket Number | (No. 10624.) |
| Citation | 107 S.E. 476 |
| Parties | ROBINSON v. CITY OF COLUMBIA. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Richland County Court; M. S. Whaley, Judge.
Action by D. W. Robinson against the City of Columbia. Decree of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
D. W. Robinson, of Columbia, pro se.
Colin S. Monteith, of Columbia, for respondent.
This is an action, under the statute, to recover $33.45, alleged to be excess taxes paid by the plaintiff on his property located in the city of Columbia. Thecomplaint alleges that the excess tax was levied under the act of 1919 (31 St. at Large, p. 273). It is alleged that this act violates section 17 of article 3, and section 3 of article 8, in that, first, the title does not conform to the body of the act, and, second, that there is no limitation on the power of cites to levy taxes.
I. Does the title conform to the body of the act? It does not. It would serve no good purpose to cite authorities for this holding. The unconstitutionality is too clear, a. simple statement of case is sufficient. Section 2937, Code of Laws of South Carolina, vol. 1, is a special act and applies only to the city of Anderson. That section was amended to include the city of Greenville; again amended to exclude the city of Greenville; then amended to include the city of Spartanburg. The act in question in 1919 amended the Spartanburg act so as to make it general. The act reads as follows:
The title to the act and the title on the cover to the act are not the same, and the respondent seeks to sustain the act by showing that certain words, to wit, "by striking out certain provisions therein contained, " had, by a clerical, error, been omitted from the title. That does not cure the defect. There were three statutes amending section 2937; all of them were special statutes, and even If omitted words could be supplied (it is elemental that they cannot), they gave no notice that the object of the act was to change a special law into a general law. It is true that the title to an act should not contain all of the provisions of the act, but it must indicate the subject of the proposed legislation. The act to amend an act relating only to Anderson and Spartanburg by striking out certain provisions therein contained gives notice of a change that affects only Anderson and Spartanburg, and this act affected neither, but made a general law out of a special law.
II. The decree from which this appeal is taken says: "The last ground, however, was not relied upon by plaintiff." There is nothing in the case to show that this statement is erroneous. The second ground cannot be considered. It is now academic any way.
The judgment is reversed.
COTHRAN, J. I concur in the conclusions reached by the other members of this court, but feel that the far-reaching effect of this judgment justifies a separate statement, expressing in somewhat different form the grounds of my concurrence.
The plaintiff, a citizen of the city of Columbia, paid the amount of taxes levied by the city authorities upon his property for the year 1919, $123.65, under protest, and within the proper time brought this action to recover the sum of $33.45, that being the difference between the amount collected upon the basis of a 27 1/2-mill levy and the amount which should have been collected upon a 20-mill levy; his contention being that under the law the city of Columbia was limited to the latter levy.
The plaintiff relies upon the act of 1893 (21 Stat. 678) as a limitation upon the authority of the city of Columbia to levy a tax in excess of 20 mills. The defendant relies upon the act of 1919 (31 Stat. 273) as removing all limitations upon the authority of the city of Columbia to levy taxes for municipal purposes.
The plaintiff contests the validity of the act of 1919, and attacks it upon two grounds: (1) That it violates the provisions of the Constitution, art. 3, § 17, in that the subject of the act is not expressed in the title; (2) that it violates the provisions of the Constitution, art. 8, § 3, in that it contains no restriction upon the authority of the cities affected by it to levy municipal taxes.
The action was instituted in the county court of Richland county, and upon trial there the county judge rendered a decree in favor of the city upon the first objection of the plaintiff, stating that the second was not pressed at the trial before him. The plaintiff has appealed, and by exceptions raises the same questions in this court.
The matter is quite complicated and requires a consideration of the statute law as it was in 1912 (the date of the adoption of the Code of Laws), the amendments thereto, and the act of 1919 above referred to.
Section 2950, vol. 1, Code of Laws A. D. 1912, as amended by the act of 1912 (27 Stat. 635), contains a limitation upon the authority of cities and towns of over 5, 000 inhabitants, in the levying of taxes, of 12 1/2 mills, allowing them in addition thereto to levy such taxes as might be necessary to pay interest upon bonds and to provide for a sinking fund to retire such bonds. This was a general act, applying to all municipalities of the class stated, except the cities of Anderson and Chester, as to which special provision was made in sections 2937 and 2938; Anderson being given, as we shall see, unlimited authority, and Chester being limited to 15 mills.
Section 2937 opens up as a general act conferring unlimited authority upon all municipalities of the 5, 000 and over class, but closes with a proviso that it shall apply only to the city of An derson; the effect of which is that this section was made a special act applying only to the city of Anderson, while all other municipalities of the class stated, with the exception of the city of Chester, limited to 15 mills by section 2938, were subject to the limitations of 12 1/2 mills contained in section 2950.
The act of 1915 (29 Stat. 71) amended section 2937 by including the city of Greenville along with the city of Anderson, conferring upon Greenville also unlimited authority. So that upon its enactment only the cities named possessed this unlimited authority.
The act of 1916 (29 Stat, 736) amended the amendatory act of 1915 by practically repealing it, excluding the city of Greenville from the provisions of section 2937. So that upon its enactment section 2937 was restored to its original form and only the city of Anderson possessed the unlimited authority.
The act of 1918 (30 Stat....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Miles Laboratories v. Seignious
...S.C. 117, 71 S.E. 654; Lillard v. Melton, 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421; Furman v. Willimon, 106 S.C. 159, 90 S.E. 700; Robinson v. City of Columbia, 116 S.C. 193, 107 S.E. 476; McKiever v. Sumter, 137 S.C. 266, 135 S.E. 60; Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153; State ex rel. ......
-
State v. Harris
... ... attention some four months later at Bryson City ... I got ... your notice to report the argument of the counsel, etc., on ... ...
-
Priester v. Ester
...sought to be raised is, therefore, not properly before us, and the exception must be overruled on that ground. Robinson v. City of Columbia, 116 S. C. 193, 107 S. E. 476; Jefferson v. Southern Express Co., 103 S. C. 75, 87 S. E. 209; Wideman v. Hines, 117 S. C. 516, 109 S. E. 123; Robinson ......
-
State v. Stanley
...to be bought from the game warden. It is unreasonable to expect the title to contain all of the provisions of the act. Robinson v. Columbia, 116 S. C. 193, 107 S. E. 476. Nor do we see where the act is unconstitutional because relating to two subjects. The fixing of a closed season and the ......