Robinson v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 19 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. TMD 12-1541M |
| Parties | KENNETH ROBINSON Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Kenneth Robinson ("Plaintiff" or "Claimant") brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), denying his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.§§ 401-433, 1381-83(c). Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Pl.'s Mot. Summ., ECF No. 19) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Def.'s Mot. Summ., ECF No. 20). No hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.). For the reasons presented below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff protectively filed his applications on August 28, 2008 alleging disability since May 30, 2008 (subsequently amended to January 1, 2009) due to nerve damage in his right hand/arm, carpel tunnel syndrome, a lower arm crushing incident, hypertension, a kidney condition, a liver condition and degenerative spine. R. at 35-36, 118-24, 127-30, 139, 145. His claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. R. at 54-55, 56-57, 58-62, 66-69. On October 1, 2010, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. R. at 27-53. Plaintiff was represented by counsel. In a decision October 28, 2010, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for benefits. R. at 14-22. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision subject to judicial review. R. at 1-3.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's claims for DIB and SSI using the sequential processes set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At the first step, the ALJ determined that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his amended onset date. At step two, the ALJ determined that Claimant suffered from the following severe impairments: status post right carpal tunnel release and degenerative joint disease. At step three, the ALJ found that his impairments did not meet or equal the Listings of Impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt, P, app. 1. The ALJ concluded at step four that Plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work. At step five, the ALJ concluded that, given his residual functional capacity("RFC"), Claimant was capable of performing jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Accordingly, he concluded that Claimant was not disabled. R. at 14-22.
The role of this court on review is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(1994 & Supp. V 1999); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1202 (4th Cir. 1995); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, of the evidence presented. Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984). It is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion, and must be sufficient to justify a refusal to direct a verdict if the case were before a jury. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456 (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). This court cannot try the case de novo or resolve evidentiary conflicts, but rather must affirm a decision supported by substantial evidence. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) erred in his hypothetical to the VE; (2) failed in his evaluation of Claimant's mental impairment; and (3) failed in his consideration of Claimant's work record.
The opinion of a vocational expert is not helpful if it is not delivered "in response to proper hypothetical questions which fairly set out all of [a] claimant's impairments." Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). As the Fourth Circuit has held a hypothetical question is unimpeachable if it "adequately reflect[s]" a residual functional capacity for which the ALJ had sufficient evidence. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 659 (4th Cir.2005).
Here, Plaintiff takes issue with ALJ's hypothetical to the extent it only requires the individual to "avoid constant reaching and constant fine and gross manipulation with the right upper extremity." R. at 50. He contends that the hypothetical should have gone much further restricting the individual to only one-handed jobs. He cites to a Case Development Sheet in which an unidentified SSA worker cited "one handed jobs" Claimant could perform. R. at 324. Based on this evidence, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have adopted this finding and included it in the hypothetical to the VE. The Court disagrees.
First, it is clear that the ALJ's hypothetical mirrors the ALJ's RFC which specifically states that Claimant must "avoid constant reaching and constant fine/gross manipulation with the right upper extremity." R. at 18. The Court finds that substantial evidence supports this RFC finding; and accordingly that the hypothetical was proper in this respect. The ALJ recognized that Claimant sustained a work related injury to his right hand in August, 2005 which was originally diagnosed as crush injury. R. at 16. Subsequently, he was rediagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome for which he underwent a release operation on February 26, 2007. R. at 199. Over the course of the year following surgery, Claimant reported with complaints ofpain, numbness and sensitivity although he failed to take the prescribed medication, failed to follow up on the physical therapy recommendation and did not report, at times, for three or five months between visits. R. at 271-76. Once Claimant began to take the prescribed Neurontin and attended physical therapy, he felt better and was reported to be working. R. at 270. In April, 2008, he was reported to have full range of motion. Id. In June, 2008, while Plaintiff continued to experience some numbness, he continued to have good range of motion and satisfactory strength. R. at 269. At that time, Dr. Dorin noted a successful surgery, a decrease in symptoms and that he could go back to his regular work activity except to avoid freezing temperatures. R, at 269. Nowhere did Dr. Dorin suggest that Claimant be limited to one-handed work. See also R. at 345 ().
The ALJ noted that during a consultative examination conducted in November, 2008 by Dr. Sosanya, Claimant continued to complain of poor grip and tingling sensation which was worse in his three lateral fingertips.R. at 17, 305. However, Dr. Sosanya observed that Claimant's right hand grip was only "mildly reduced when compared to the left hand." R. at 307. He also reported that Claimant again had a full range of wrist motion and normal deep tendon flexes. Id. The ALJ further noted that Dr. Stern indicated Claimant could not use his right hand for simple grasping, pushing or fine manipulation and this did not prevent him from working. R. at 20, 319, 321.
The ALJ considered all of this evidence as well as Claimant's testimony. R. at 18-19He afforded great weight to the opinion of Dr. Dorin who performed the carpal tunnel release surgery. In addition to the findings discussed above, Dr. Dorin also opined that Claimant could lift between 10 and 20 pounds and can work as long as he avoids tools such as a hammer. R. at 19, 335-36. The ALJ also noted that while Dr. Stern indicated that he could not use his right hand repetitively for simple grasping, pushing and fine manipulation, that this is consistent with the RFC. R. at 20, 319. To the extent there may be some evidence which would indicate Claimant might have more restriction than that found by the ALJ, it is not the job of the Court to reweigh the evidence and the Court finds that the evidence cited above and relied upon by the ALJ constitutes substantial evidence to support his hypothetical to the VE as well as his RFC limitation with respect to his right hand. See Smith v. Commissioner of Social Sec, Civil No. 4:09cv80, 2010 WL 1640271 at *3 (E.D. Va. April 22, 2010).2
Plaintiff next argues the ALJ failed to follow the proper procedure in analyzing his mental impairment. In addition to the five-step analysis discussed above and outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the Commissioner has promulgated additional regulations governing evaluations of the severity of mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. These regulations require application of a "special technique" ("psychiatric review technique") at the second and third steps of the five-step framework, Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 844 n. 4 (7th Cir.2007), and at each level of administrative review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a). This technique requires the reviewing authority to determine first whether the claimant has a "medically determinable mental impairment." § 404.1520a(b)(1). If the claimant is found to have such an impairment, the reviewing authority must "rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s) in accordance with paragraph (c)," § 404.1520a(b)(2), which specifies four broad functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration,persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation. §...
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