Robinson v. Com.
Decision Date | 08 June 2007 |
Docket Number | Record No. 061911. |
Citation | 645 S.E.2d 470 |
Parties | Clifford ROBINSON v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Mark S. Gardner (Muriel-Theresa Pitney, Gardner, Maupin, Sutton & Haney, on brief), Spotsylvania, for appellant.
Virginia B. Theisen, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert F. McDonnell, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.
Present: All the Justices.
OPINION BY Chief Justice LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
In this appeal, we consider whether the driver of a vehicle was involved in an accident within the intendment of Code § 46.2-894, a penal statute. This statute states in relevant part:
....
"Any person convicted of a violation of this section is guilty of (i) a Class 5 felony if the accident results in injury to or the death of any person, or if the accident results in more than $1000 of damage to property or (ii) a Class 1 misdemeanor if the accident results in damage of $1000 or less to property."
Clifford Robinson, Jr., was indicted by a Spotsylvania County grand jury for reckless driving and for the felony failure to stop and provide certain information in violation of Code § 46.2-894. At a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Robinson of reckless driving and fixed his punishment at six months in jail. The circuit court convicted Robinson of violating Code § 46.2-894 and fixed his punishment at two years imprisonment, which was suspended, and a fine of $1,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 48 Va.App. 623, 633 S.E.2d 737 (2006). We awarded Robinson an appeal limited solely to a review of his conviction based upon the violation of Code § 46.2-894.
The following evidence was adduced at trial. On June 2, 2004, around noon, Robinson was driving a sports utility vehicle on Gordon Road in Spotsylvania County. He stopped his vehicle to comply with a traffic control signal at the intersection of Gordon Road and Harrison Road. Christine Antonuccio, who was driving a Mustang automobile, stopped her car beside Robinson's vehicle, at the same intersection. The traffic light was red. Justin Antonuccio, who was four years old, was seated in the rear of Christine Antonuccio's car.
Gordon Road consists of four lanes; two lanes permit motor vehicle operators to travel north, and the other two lanes permit motor vehicle operators to travel south. The posted speed limit is 40 miles per hour. Approximately one-tenth of a mile immediately south of the intersection where Robinson and Antonuccio had stopped their vehicles, the two lanes of travel on Gordon Road gradually merge into a single lane. Two traffic signs contain the following warnings: "Single Lane Ahead" and "Merge Right." Robinson's vehicle was situated in the right lane, and he had the right-of-way. Antonuccio's vehicle was situated in the left lane, which merged into Robinson's lane, and she was required to yield the right-of-way.
There were no imperfections on the surface of the road. The road was dry; the sun was shining; and visibility was clear.
Once the traffic control signal changed to green, Robinson and Antonuccio began to drive their respective vehicles south on Gordon Road. As Robinson began to drive his vehicle, Antonuccio accelerated her car, and the two vehicles were "side by side." Franklin McNeal Fleming, a deputy sheriff with the Spotsylvania County Sheriff's Office, testified about the following facts Robinson had provided during Fleming's investigation of the accident.
Fleming testified that he asked Robinson why he had not permitted Antonuccio to drive her car in front of his vehicle and thereby merge. Robinson responded that "he was frustrated about people cutting others off all the time when they tried to merge at that location." Robinson told Fleming that Robinson was traveling between 45 and 50 miles per hour when Antonuccio tried to enter into his lane of travel. There was no physical contact between Antonuccio's car and Robinson's vehicle.
Robinson testified that when the traffic control light turned green, he "inten[ded] to lead in such a way that [Antonuccio] could come in behind [his vehicle]." Robinson accelerated his vehicle "briskly," thereby preventing Antonuccio from merging her car in front of his vehicle. When Antonuccio refused to reduce the speed of her car, Robinson "backed down because both lives were endangered [and] the cars would have collided."
Fleming concluded, based upon his examination of Antonuccio's speedometer after the accident, that she was traveling 76 miles per hour when she lost control of her car. Fleming testified that Antonuccio's car "went into a yaw." According to Fleming, a yaw occurs
Antonuccio's car created 150 feet of yaw marks on the road surface, and she never applied her brakes. After her car left the roadway, the car traveled 38 feet and "crashed" into a tree. The car struck another tree, and the car was "almost cut in half." Antonuccio and her child died as a result of injuries they incurred from the accident.
Fleming testified without objection that after Antonuccio drove her car "totally inside" the merged lane, she had ample opportunity to slow down. There were approximately "a hundred fifty to two hundred feet from the end of the merge, or the end of the left lane, to the point where [the] yaw mark begins."
The day after the accident, sheriff's deputies, who had received an anonymous tip, visited Robinson at his home. They discussed the accident with him. They examined his sports utility vehicle. They observed "pits and ... cracks" in the windshield and damage caused by gravel and rock debris when Antonuccio's car left the roadway and traveled on the gravel shoulder.
Robinson argued in the Court of Appeals, and argues in this Court, that he was not involved in the accident within the intendment of Code § 46.2-894. He contends that Antonuccio lost control of her vehicle...
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