Williams v. Com.

• Decision Date: 04 September 2007
• Docket Number: Record No. 0870-06-2.
• Citation: 50 Va. App. 337,649 S.E.2d 717
• Parties: Kenney Quinard WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

649 S.E.2d 717

50 Va. App. 337

Kenney Quinard WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 0870-06-2.

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Richmond.

September 4, 2007.

J. Martelino, Jr., for appellant.

Kathleen B. Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Judges HUMPHREYS, CLEMENTS and McCLANAHAN.

ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS, Judge.

Kenney Quinard Williams ("Williams") appeals his conviction of possession of burglarious tools, in violation of Code § 18.2-94. He argues that (1) the trial court erred in construing the statute to include a plastic bag as a larcenous "implement," and (2) the statute is void for vagueness under the United States and Virginia Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we agree with Williams that a plastic bag is not an "implement" as contemplated by the statute, thus we reverse his conviction and need not address the constitutional validity of the statute.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this matter are not in dispute. On July 3, 2005, Williams entered a sporting goods store while shopping at a mall in Chesterfield County. Williams remained in the store briefly, then left. Williams returned a short while later, sat down next to a stack of boxes, removed a plastic bag — with a shoe store's logo — from his pants, placed a boxed pair of shoes into the bag, and left the store without paying for the shoes. When Williams was apprehended in the mall, he admitted to stealing the shoes.

The Commonwealth charged Williams with petit larceny and possession of burglarious tools, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-96 and 18.2-94, respectively. Williams pled guilty to the petit larceny charge and not guilty to the charge of possession of burglarious tools. Prior to trial, Williams filed a motion to dismiss the burglarious tools charge, asserting that the statute was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. The trial court denied this motion. Williams stipulated to the facts offered by the Commonwealth during the motion to dismiss, but argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict because a plastic bag was not an "implement" as contemplated by the statute. The trial court disagreed and convicted Williams of possession of burglarious tools, ruling that a plastic bag constituted an "implement" under the statute so long as it was used with intent to commit larceny. Williams now appeals.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Williams concedes that he had the requisite criminal intent, but argues that a plastic bag is not an "implement" as contemplated by Code § 18.2-94. On brief, the Commonwealth argues that Williams' conduct violated Code § 18.2-94 because he used the shopping bag with the intent to steal the shoes. However, this argument presupposes that the plastic bag satisfies the definition of implement, a term that is not statutorily defined. Thus, our task is to determine whether the General Assembly intended an ordinary bag to constitute an "implement" under Code § 18.2-94. Because this is a question of law involving the construction and application of Code § 18.2-94, we review the trial court's determination de novo. See Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 352, 577 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2003).

Although commonly referred to as "Possession of burglarious tools," Code § 18.2-94 is somewhat broader than its title implies. In pertinent part, the statute provides:

If any person have in his possession any tools, implements, or outfit, with intent to commit burglary, robbery, or larceny . . . he shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony. The possession of such burglarious tools, implements, or outfit . . . shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to commit burglary, robbery, or larceny.

This statute does not prohibit "the mere possession of `any tools, implements, or outfit,'" as "[s]uch articles `may be, and usually are, designed and manufactured for lawful purposes.'" Moss v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 1, 3, 509 S.E.2d 510, 511 (1999) (quoting Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 790, 75 S.E.2d 482, 486 (1953)). Instead, "[t]he gravamen of the offense arises from the possessor's `intent to use' these `common, ordinary' objects for a criminal purpose specified by statute, burglary, robbery or larceny."¹ Id.

"Generally, the words and phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly manifest." Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994). "[T]he language of [] a penal statute should be given a reasonable or common sense construction, consonant with the objects of the legislation." Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 59:6 (6th ed. 2001). "Indeed, when determining the boundaries of such a statute, `the plain obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction. . . .'" Law v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 154, 158, 571 S.E.2d 893, 895 (2002) (quoting Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992)).

However, "[t]his general rule applies except when the language of the statute is ambiguous or would lead to an absurd result." Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). In such an instance, "[t]he meaning of doubtful words in a statute may be determined by reference to their association with related words and phrases." Commonwealth v. United Airlines, Inc., 219 Va. 374, 389, 248 S.E.2d 124, 132 (1978). "Thus, when general words and specific words are grouped together, the general words are limited and qualified by the specific words and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects identified by the specific words." Id. at 389, 248 S.E.2d at 132-33. Moreover, "[w]e `assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute.'" Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 261, 590 S.E.2d 563, 566 (2004) (quoting Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990)).

The terms "tools," "implements," and "outfit" are not defined statutorily.² Implement has several different noun meanings, some more specific than others. Generally defined, an implement is "an article [ ] serving to equip[.]" Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1134 (1993). "Implement applies to anything, usu[ally] a contrivance, necessary to effect an end or perform a task[.]" Id. More specifically however, according to Ballentine's Law Dictionary 587 (3d ed. 1969), an implement is "[a] tool, instrument, utensil, or machine for carrying on work, particularly a machine for agricultural work. A thing necessary to a trade and without which the work cannot be performed." Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary 754 (6th ed. 1990) defines implements as "things as are used or employed for a trade, or furniture of a house. Particularly applied to tools, utensils, instruments of labor; as the implements of trade or of farming."³

The generally accepted definitions of "tool" are (1) an instrument (as a hammer or saw) used or worked by hand, and (2) an implement or object used in performing an operation or carrying on work of any kind. See Webster's, supra, at 2408; see also Moss, 29 Va.App. at 4-5, 509 S.E.2d at 511-12 (finding that keys were "something [ ] used in performing an operation or necessary in the practice of a vocation or profession"). Similarly, the commonly accepted noun definitions for the word "outfit" are (1) the materials, tools, or implements comprising the equipment necessary for carrying out a particular project, and (2) wearing apparel designed to be worn on a special occasion or in a particular situation. See Webster's, supra, at 1601; see also Mercer v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 380, 385, 512 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1999) (holding that "wearing apparel designed to be worn in a particular situation" constituted an "outfit" as envisioned by Code § 18.2-94).

Clearly, the terms "tool," "implement" and "outfit" have somewhat different but overlapping meanings. The Commonwealth urges this Court to construe "implement" broadly, implicitly arguing that almost any item used with the requisite intent, but not qualifying as a "tool" or "outfit," constitutes an "implement" for the purposes of the statute. Assuming that the Commonwealth is correct in asserting that, in the abstract, the term "implement" is more general than the terms "tool" and "outfit," the Commonwealth's argument ignores the principle of statutory construction stated above. That is, when general words and specific words are used together, the general words are limited and qualified by the specific words. See United Airlines, 219 Va. at 389, 248 S.E.2d at 132-33. Moreover, as our Supreme Court reiterated recently, "[t]he use of such expansive definitions of a word in a penal statute is contrary to our well-established principle that when a statute `is penal in nature, it must be strictly construed against the state and limited in application to cases falling clearly within the language of the statute.'" Robinson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 45, 52, 645 S.E.2d 470, 473-74 (2007) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983)). Thus, we are obligated by principles of statutory construction to limit the meaning of "implement" according to the more specific words contained in the statute.⁴

In fact, we note that when the word "implement" appears in the Virginia Code, it frequently appears in conjunction with specific words denoting equipment or machinery related to an occupation or profession. See Code §§ 18.2-325(3)(b) (defining "gambling device" as "[a]ny machine, apparatus, implement, instrument, contrivance, board or other thing"); 34-26(7) (exempting "[t]ools, books, instruments, implements, equipment, and machines . . . necessary for use in the course of the householder's occupation or trade" from creditor process); 59.1-352.1 (defining "dealer" as "a person engaged in the...