Robinson v. Health Midwest Development.
| Decision Date | 06 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | WD58290 |
| Parties | Felicia N. Robinson, Appellant v. Health Midwest Development Group d/b/a Lafayette Regional Health Center, Respondent WD58290 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. David Shinn, Judge
Counsel for Appellant: Stephen Nordyke
Counsel for Respondent: William L. Yocum, J. Calvin Downing and Richard Paul, III
Opinion Summary: Felicia N. Robinson appeals summary judgment for Health Midwest Development Group on her negligence claim against it for damages for the personal injuries she sustained in an automobile accident on November 17, 1993. In her petition, Robinson alleged that Health was negligent based on various acts and omissions of its medical staff in providing treatment of and care for Verlea Rosemary Schmidt, who, after being given a prescription drug that was known to the staff to cause drowsiness and dizziness, drove from the Health's facility, crossed the center line of the roadway, and collided head-on with her vehicle, causing her injury.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Division Four holds: As to Point I, the question is whether on the material facts not in dispute and those facts still in dispute, Robinson, as the non-movant, could have established the requisite proof elements of a general negligence claim against Health, specifically in this point, whether she could establish that Health owed her a duty of care. No Missouri cases have decided this issue. Whether a health care provider, specifically a physician, has a duty to the general public to warn a patient not to drive while impaired due to taking a prescribed medication is an open question. It is instructive to first discuss whether such a duty is owed to the patient, since the two are logically intertwined. The courts have impliedly recognized such a duty in related circumstances; under some circumstances, a physician may have a duty to a patient to warn the patient of the risks and dangers associated with taking a prescribed drug, including avoiding certain activities, such as driving.
Unlike the special relationship of physician-patient, on which the duty to the patient to warn is predicated, there obviously does not exist a special relationship between a physician and the general public on which to base such a duty. However, a duty can still arise absent a special relationship based on applying the public policy factors cited by the Missouri Supreme Court in Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen. Based upon an analysis of public policy and a consideration of Missouri case law and case law from other jurisdictions, this Court finds that, under a given set of circumstances, a fact finder could find that a physician owed a duty of care to a member of the general public to warn a patient not to drive while under the influence of an intoxicating drug prescribed by the physician. As to this case, the summary judgment record would support the fact that Robinson could have conceivably established at trial that the medical staff had a duty not only to its patient but to the general public to warn the patient not to drive while under the influence of Compazine, which, unbeknownst to her, caused drowsiness and dizziness. Summary judgment on the ground that she could not establish at trial a duty on which to predicate a claim was error.
As to Point II, to succeed on her claim of negligence against Health as to a breach of a duty to warn, Robinson would be required to show, inter alia, that the medical staff's failure to warn the patient not to drive was not only the cause in fact, but the proximate cause of her injuries. She could conceivably satisfy the "but for" test that the injuries complained of would not have occurred but for the failure to warn.
Proximate cause is not causation in fact, but is a limitation the law imposes upon the right to recover for the consequences of a negligent act. As such, the test for proximate cause is not whether a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen the particular injury, but whether, after the occurrences, the injury appears to be the reasonable and probable consequence of the act or omission of the defendant. Here, a fact finder could find that Robinson's injuries were the natural and probable consequence of the medical staff's failure to warn the patient not to drive. Moreover, because a fact finder could find either way on the issue of whether the patient was aware of the dangers in driving while under the influence of Compazine, for purposes of summary judgment, her choice in driving would not be an intervening cause. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that Robinsont could not establish the requisite causal link between at least one of the specifications of negligence alleged.
The respondent, Health Midwest Development Group, on her negligence claim against it for damages for the personal injuries she sustained in an automobile accident on November 17, 1993. In her petition, the appellant alleged that the respondent was negligent based on various acts and omissions of its medical staff in providing treatment of and care for Verlea Rosemary Schmidt,1 who, after being given a prescription drug that was known to the staff to cause drowsiness and dizziness, drove from the respondent's facility, crossed the center line of the roadway, and collided head-on with the appellant's vehicle, causing her injury.
The appellant raises two points on appeal. In Point I, she claims that the trial court erred in granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment on her negligence claim against it based on there being no duty of care owed by the respondent because, as a matter of law, on the undisputed material facts alleged by the respondent and the facts still in dispute, a reasonable fact finder could find such a duty existed. In Point II, she claims that the trial court erred in granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment on her negligence claim for lack of causation because, as a matter of law, on the undisputed material facts alleged by the respondent and the facts still in dispute, a fact finder could reasonably find that the respondent's acts or omissions in its treatment and care of Schmidt were the direct and proximate cause of the appellant's personal injuries sustained in the accident.
We reverse and remand.
On November 17, 1993, at approximately 12:42 p.m., Rosemary V. Schmidt presented herself at the emergency room of the Lafayette Regional Health Center (LRHC) located in Jackson County, Missouri, requesting medication for her nerves. Roxanne Nordsieck, the staff nurse on duty, questioned Schmidt about her symptoms and complaints, and checked her vital signs. Thereafter, Nordsieck referred Schmidt to a staff physician, Dr. Timothy Ryan, for examination and evaluation. During his examination of Schmidt, Dr. Ryan determined that she was coherent, not impaired in any way, and neither homicidal nor suicidal. Following the examination, Dr. Ryan directed Nordsieck to give Schmidt an injection of five milligrams of Compazine, a drug known to medical personnel to cause drowsiness, dizziness, and the lowering of blood pressure.
At approximately 1:10 p.m., Nordsieck intravenously administered five milligrams of Compazine to Schmidt. Neither Dr. Ryan nor Nordsieck warned Schmidt, either before or after administering the drug, that she might experience certain side effects, including drowsiness, dizziness, or a lowering of her blood pressure, as a consequence of having taken the Compazine, and that therefore, she should not drive. Nordsieck only advised Schmidt that she was "receiving something for her headache." Thereafter, at approximately 1:45 p.m., without being formally discharged from the LRHC, Schmidt left and proceeded to drive herself home. At 1:55 p.m., ten minutes after leaving the emergency room at LRHC, some seven miles away from the facility, Schmidt's vehicle crossed the center line of Missouri Highway 13 and collided with a vehicle being driven by the appellant on a straightaway portion of the road. The appellant sustained serious physical injuries from the accident.
The appellant tried to avoid the accident by braking, downshifting, and swerving her vehicle to the right almost completely onto the shoulder, but was unable to avoid the accident. A subsequent investigation by the Missouri Highway Patrol (MHP) revealed that there were 21 feet of braking tire marks leading off the roadway from the appellant's car, but none from Schmidt's car. The investigation by the MHP did not disclose defects in either vehicle that could have contributed to or caused the accident. An investigating police officer, however, did find an empty beer container in Schmidt's car after the accident, and Schmidt admitted to drinking before the accident.
On February 14, 1997, the appellant filed a petition for damages against the respondent, a Missouri corporation doing business as the LRHC, wherein she alleged, inter alia, that the respondent's medical staff negligently failed to warn Schmidt not to drive while under the influence of the Compazine, and that the failure to so warn was the direct and proximate cause of her injuries. On April 2, 1997, the respondent filed its answer denying liability. In July 1999, the case went to trial, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the court declared a mistrial.
Before the retrial of the case, the respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on December 16, 1999, wherein it alleged that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law in that the appellant could not establish at trial that the respondent owed a duty of care to her or that one or more of the specifications of negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her injuries. The appellant filed her response to the respondent's motion on January 18, 2000, wherein she stipulated to the seven material facts alleged by the respondent not to be in dispute and alleged numerous additional...
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