Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Systems, 94-CV-71584-DT.

• Decision Date: 30 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-CV-71584-DT.,94-CV-71584-DT.
• Citation: 892 F. Supp. 176
• Parties: Jimmie ROBINSON, in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Laverne Robinson, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEMS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

892 F. Supp. 176

Jimmie ROBINSON, in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Laverne Robinson, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEMS, Defendant.

No. 94-CV-71584-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

December 30, 1994.

Fatima Hassan Salam, Detroit, MI, for plaintiff.

Richard DeNardis, Detroit, MI, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This five-count handicap discrimination/medical malpractice wrongful death action is presently before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant has filed a Motion to bar Plaintiff from calling witnesses at trial because of the failure to submit witness lists as required under the Court's Scheduling Order.

Plaintiff has responded to both of Defendant's Motions to which responses, Defendant has replied. Plaintiff also has filed a Motion to voluntarily dismiss his two federal claims and to remand the state law claims to Wayne County Circuit Court.

Having reviewed and considered the parties' respective motions and the briefs and exhibits submitted in support and in opposition to the motions, and the Court finding that oral arguments are unnecessary and that the matter can be decided on the briefs, the Court is now prepared to rule on these matters. This Opinion and Order sets forth that ruling.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the treatment of Plaintiff's decedent, Laverne Robinson, in the emergency room of Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit.

On November 20, 1993, 45-year-old Laverne Robinson was brought into the Henry Ford Hospital emergency room by the Detroit Fire Department's EMS ambulance at 4:45 p.m. She had been experiencing shortness of breath and possible seizure activity.

Upon arriving at the hospital, Ms. Robinson's condition was stable. She was oriented to identity, time and place, and said she generally was fine except for a dry throat. Her medical history was taken by the emergency room staff. While giving her medical history, Ms. Robinson advised that she had previously been tested positive for HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus), the virus which causes AIDS.

While Ms. Robinson was in the emergency room, she had one shortness of breath episode which included some dizziness and headache, which lasted approximately ten minutes. Upon examination, she was diagnosed as having an upper respiratory infection. Blood tests were run which showed virtually normal levels. A chest x-ray was also taken which showed no apparent problems.

Ms. Robinson spent approximately eleven hours in the emergency room. During that time, she was monitored continuously. Her temperature, pulse, respiration rate and blood pressure were taken three times. After remaining stable for several hours, she discharged at 4:05 a.m. on November 21st with a prescription for antibiotics and directions to see her regular doctor as soon as possible.

On November 22, 1993, at 7:30 a.m., Ms. Robinson was brought back to the emergency room in full cardiopulmonary arrest. Efforts to revive her were not successful and she was pronounced dead at 8:55 a.m.

Six months after she died, Jimmie Robinson, acting in his capacity as personal representative for Laverne's estate, initiated the instant action in Wayne County Circuit Court. Defendant subsequently removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.

III. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges three counts of discrimination (Counts I, II and V), one count of negligence/medical malpractice (Count III) and one count of violation of the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Count IV).

With respect to the discrimination claims, Plaintiff alleges that Henry Ford Hospital violated the Michigan Handicappers Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.A. § 37.1103(b) (Count I), the Detroit City Ordinance prohibiting AIDS discrimination, Ordinance No. 33-88 (Count II), and the federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Count III). In each of these counts, Plaintiff claims that the hospital denied Laverne Robinson appropriate medical care because she was HIV positive.

In Plaintiff's negligence/medical malpractice claim (Count III) and in his EMTALA claim (Count IV), Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Robinson received inadequate an inappropriate treatment in the Hospital's emergency room.

Defendant now seeks entry of summary judgment in its favor arguing that for each Count in his Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to make out the elements of a legally cognizable claim.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper "`if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Three 1986 Supreme Court cases—Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) — ushered in a "new era" in the standards of review for a summary judgment motion. These cases, in the aggregate, lowered the movant's burden on a summary judgment motion.¹ According to the Celotex Court,

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

After reviewing the above trilogy, the Sixth Circuit established a series of principles to be applied to motions for summary judgment. They are summarized as follows:

• Cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.

• The movant must meet the initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's case. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.

• The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."

• The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.

• The trial court has more discretion than in the "old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence. The respondent must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Further, "where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is plausible.

Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir.1989).

The Court will decide Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by application of the foregoing standards.

2. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT LAVERNE ROBINSON WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BY THE HOSPITAL BECAUSE SHE WAS "HIV" POSITIVE

As indicated above, Plaintiff alleges that Laverne Robinson was denied adequate medical treatment at Henry Ford Hospital because she was HIV positive in violation of (1) the Michigan Handicappers Civil Rights Act, (2) the federal Rehabilitation Act, and (3) Detroit City Ordinance No. 33-88.

The Michigan Handicappers Civil Rights Act provides:

(1) The opportunity to obtain employment, housing and other real estate and full and equal utilization of public accommodations, public services, and educational facilities without discrimination because of a handicap is guaranteed by this act and is a civil right.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in article 2 relating to discrimination in employment, a person shall accommodate a handicapper for purposes of employment, public accommodation, public service, education or housing unless the person demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.

M.C.L. § 37.1102.

The federal Rehabilitation Act provides, in pertinent part:

(a) No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, ... be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....

* * * * * *

(b) For purposes of this section, the term "program or activity" means all of the operations of —

* * * * * *

(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or as an entire sole proprietorship —

* * * * * *

(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation.

29 U.S.C. § 794(a) and (b).

Individuals who have tested positive for AIDS or the AIDS-related HIV virus are covered as handicapped or disabled individuals under both the Michigan and the federal acts. Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 440 Mich. 496, 486 N.W.2d 657 (1992); Toney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 201 (E.D.Pa. 1993); Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F.Supp. 39 (D.Mass.1990); Casey v. Lewis, 773 F.Supp. 1365 (D.Ariz.1991); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F.Supp. 559 (D.D.C.1992).

Similarly, Section 1 of Detroit City Ordinance No. 33-88 makes it an unlawful business practice

"to deny any individual the full and

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