Robinson v. Hill

Decision Date13 March 1974
Docket NumberNo. B--4224,B--4224
Citation507 S.W.2d 521
PartiesJ. W. ROBINSON et al., Appellants, v. John HILL, Attorney General of Texas et al., Appellees.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Heath & Associates, Bob Heath, Houston, for appellants.

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., Calvin Botley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., Joe S. Moss, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, for appellees.

WALKER, Justice.

This is a direct appeal as authorized by Article 1738a, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St. Suit was filed by J. W. Robinson et al, appellants, as a class action against several officials of Harris County and of the State of Texas, appellees, to challenge the constitutionality of Article 2372p--3, V.A.T.S., which provides for the licensing and regulation of bail bondsmen. The suit was brought on behalf of lawyers, insurance agents and others who had previously written bail bonds to obtain a judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining appellees from implementing, administering or enforcing its provisons. Appellants' application for a temporary injunction having been denied by the trial court, they perfected their appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Article 2372p--3 declares that the business of executing bail bonds is a business affecting the public interest. It further declares that the policy of the State is to provide reasonable regulation to the end that the right of bail be preserved and implemented by just and practical procedures governing the giving or making of bail bond and other security to guarantee appearance of the accused. A county bail bond board is created in each county having a population of $150,000 or more according to the last preceding federal census. The board is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations relative to the making of bail bonds by bondsmen within the county. 'Bondsman' is defined as any person who, for compensation and as many as five times in any 12-month period, deposits cash or securities or executes as surety any bond to assure appearance. Subject to certain exemptions, no person may act as a bondsman unless licensed by the board under the Act. The following are exempted from the license requirements: (1) members of the State Bar who personally execute bonds for persons they actually represent in criminal cases; (2) persons executing bonds in counties having a population of less than 150,000 according to the last preceding federal census; and (3) persons who execute bonds as co-sureties with a licensed bondsman.

An application for an original license, which expires 24 months after the date of its issuance, must be accompanied by a fee of $500.00. The license may be renewed for a period of 12 months upon application and the payment of a $250.00 renewal fee. Upon notice from the board that an original application has been tentatively approved, the applicant is required to deposit $5,000.00 in cash or its equivalent with the county treasurer to be held as a special bond security fund and also to execute in trust to the sheriff a deed to non-exempt real property of the value of at least $10,000.00. The cash deposit and any money realized from the trust may be used to pay any judgments of bail forfeiture for which the licensee is liable and that are not satisfied within 30 days.

A corporation otherwise authorized to act as a surety must meet the same requirements as an individual before being acceptable as a 'personal surety' on a bail bond. Its certificate to do business issued by the State Board of Insurance is not conclusive as to the sufficiency of the security or the solvency of the corporation. Before acting as a surety, moreover, the company is required to file with the county clerk of the county where the bond is to be given a power of attorney designating an agent or agents to execute bail bonds, and any agent so designated may execute bail bonds for his company even though he is not licensed as a local recording agent in accordance with Article 21.14 of the Texas Insurance Code.

In passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with a presumption of validity. It is to be presumed that the Legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily, and the burden is on one who challenges an act to establish its unconstitutionality. Smith v. Craddick, Tex.Sup., 471 S.W.2d 375; Smith v. Davis, Tex.Sup., 426 S.W.2d 827, and authorities there cited. Appellants contend that Article 2372p--3 violates several provisions of the Texas Constitution. They say, in the first place, that the caption does not comply with the requirement of Art. III, Sec. 35, that no bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be expressed in its title. The statute now in question was adopted by the 63rd Legislature in 1973. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1520, ch. 550. The title of the Act reads as follows:

An Act relating to the licensing and regulation of persons or corporations who engage in the business of executing bail bonds and establishing a County Bail Bond Board in certain counties; providing for the composition, organization and powers, duties, and procedures of the board; providing forms and content of applications for licenses and for fees, deposits and deeds in trust to secure payment of judgments; making certain requirements of corporations acting as sureties; providing for renewal of licenses, renewal fees and identifying number of license; providing procedures for and reasons for refusal to issue or for revocation of licenses; providing for judicial review; providing for remittitur to principal in certain situations; providing special powers and duties of sheriff; providing extra-county authority of licensed bondsmen; prohibiting execution of bonds or advertising as a bondsman by unlicensed persons; prohibiting certain recommendations or suggestions as to an attorney or particular bondsman; providing penalties; and declaring an emergency.

Appellants insist that this title contains the following four subjects: (1) county bail bond board; (2) special powers and duties of sheriffs; (3) corporations acting as sureties; and (4) amending Article 21.14 of the Insurance Code. We do not agree. The author of the interpretive commentary in Vernon's Annotated Texas Constitution, states that the purpose of Art. III, Sec. 35, is threefold:

First, it is designed to prevent log-rolling legislation, I.e., to prevent the writing of several subjects having no connection with each other in one bill for the purpose of combining various interests in support of the whole.

Second, it prevents surprise or fraud upon legislators by means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted.

Third, it permits the people to be fairly apprised of the subjects of legislation under consideration, so that they may have an opportunity of being heard if they so desire.

Both the constitutional provision and the questioned statute are to be liberally construed in favor of constitutionality. The statute will not be held unconstitutional where its provisions relate, directly or indirectly, to the same general subject, have a mutual connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title. See Hayman Const. Co. v. American Indem. Co., Tex.Sup., 471 S.W.2d 564; Key Western Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 163 Tex. 11, 350 S.W.2d 839; Central Ed. Agency v. Independent School Dist. of...

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