Robinson v. Honda, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-00318-DSC
| Decision Date | 08 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-00318-DSC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | KENNETH ROBINSON and CHRISTOPHER HALL, Plaintiffs, v. PRIORITY HONDA d/b/a PRIORITY HONDA HUNTERSVILLE and JAMES BECKLEY, Defendants. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant "Priority's Motion for Summary Judgment" (document # 36) filed March 25, 2021 and "Defendant Beckley's Motion for Summary Judgment" (document # 39) filed April 1, 2021.
The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and these Motions are ripe for the Court's determination.
Having carefully considered the parties' arguments, the record, and the applicable authorities, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment will be granted as discussed below.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Priority Automotive Huntersville, Inc. d/b/a Priority Honda hired Defendant Beckley to be its new general manager (GM). He began work on July 19, 2019. PlaintiffsRobinson and Hall were sales managers at Priority when Beckley was hired. The facts giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims span a mere five-day period.
On Beckley's first day, Priority owner Matthew Ellmer introduced him to all employees at a staff meeting. Beckley brought approximately ten people from his previous dealership that he hoped to employ at Priority. During his brief introductory comments, Beckley instructed all existing Priority employees to continue performing their same job duties. Robinson did not personally meet Beckley or receive individual instructions from him.
Beckley moved the physical location of the sales desk to the sales lobby. He made the change to centralize management on the showroom floor and increase efficiency. Rather than work at the new sales desk, Robinson and Hall remained at their old desks, located roughly ninety feet away. Plaintiffs do not claim that they were told to remain at their old desks rather than relocate to the new sales desk with the other sales managers. The new sales desk was occupied by employees of all races.
The following day, July 20, Beckley led a sales meeting. During this meeting, he read aloud a text message he received from a former Honda co-worker, saying, "Let's run 65 percent penetration and, make Priority Honda great again." Plaintiffs claim this statement was offensive to employees of color, interpreting it as a reference to the campaign slogan used by former President Donald Trump.
In the same meeting, Beckley critiqued a recording of a sales call made by an anonymous sales manager as a training technique. He did not know which employee was recorded on the call. Robert Gathers later told Beckley that he was the manager on the call and had sold a car to thecustomer. Gathers is African American. Plaintiffs perceived Beckley's decision to critique Gathers' call as racially motivated.
Plaintiffs also allege personal items from their desks were missing following the reorganization of the sales floor. They did not recover the missing items. There is no evidence that they made an attempt to do so.
Plaintiffs did not work on July 21. On July 22, Plaintiffs claim that no work was assigned to them. Other employees had stopped bringing deals to Plaintiffs. Another employee observed that they continued to "sit at the sales desk and watch everyone work" without moving to the new location. (RG Decl. ¶¶7, 7). There is no evidence that Beckley specifically instructed other employees to cease dealing with Plaintiffs.
At one point on July 22, Beckley called over employee Kyle Vasquez while Vasquez was talking to a group that included Plaintiffs and other Caucasian and African American employees. Beckley made a comment to Vasquez to the effect of, "you need to stop hanging around those thugs and start hanging around sales managers." (Vazquez Dep., Ex. 7, ¶ 10).
The next day, July 23, Plaintiffs submitted several complaints to Priority representatives. Hall reached out to controller Diane Ulmer to get more clarity about his duties. She advised him to speak with Human Resources and provided the appropriate number. Robinson emailed Ulmer with three complaints. First, he claimed that he was demoted, told to sell cars, and never given a new pay plan. Robinson later admitted this was untrue but wrote it because he was still unclear about his duties. He also claimed that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment because of Beckley's "make Priority Honda great again" and "thug" comments. Hall texted Ellmer about his pay plan and those same comments. Then, Robinson submitted an additional complaintto Ulmer concerning a comment he had heard about from another employee. Ulmer investigated these claims for two hours and spoke to the individuals involved.
After Ulmer's investigation, she organized a meeting with Robinson and Beckley. Beckley discussed the complaints and apologized for any poor choices of words. He presented Robinson with a pay plan for a sales associate. Robinson refused to sign, believing that the sales associate position would be a demotion. Ulmer tried to speak with Hall about her investigation, but he had left and failed to return to the dealership. Plaintiffs did not return to the dealership after leaving on July 23.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. It was removed to this Court on June 8, 2020 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441, and 1446. Removal is uncontested.
Plaintiffs bring a hostile-environment constructive discharge claim, alleging they were forced to resign after experiencing a racially charged hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act ("NCEEPA"), and § 1981. They also allege unlawful demotion and retaliation under the same provisions. Finally, Plaintiffs bring claims of negligent hiring, retention and supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to chattels and conversion.
Defendants seek summary judgment as to all claims brought by Plaintiffs.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The courtshall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Vannoy v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)). "A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.
The movant has the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court must view the evidence and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The court applies "the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 570 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Tolan, 572 U.S. at 660). "Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits." Id. at 568-69 (). "The court therefore cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations." Id. at 569 (citing Mercantile Peninsula Bank v. French (In re French), 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007)). In the end, the question posed by a summary judgment motion is whether the evidence "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. "Hearsay evidence, which is inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment." MarylandHighway Contractors Ass'n Inc. v. State of Md., 933 F.2d 1246, 1251 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labratories, Inc., 916 F.2d 910, 973-74 n.8 (4th Cir. 1990)).
A hostile work environment is present "when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive work environment." Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015). For a hostile environment constructive discharge claim, Plaintiffs must show (i) they experienced unwelcome harassment; (ii) the unwelcome harassment was based on race; (iii) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and (iv) there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer. Evans v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 192 (4th Cir. 2019). Since Plaintiffs resigned, they must also show that Priority deliberately discriminated against them "to the point where a reasonable person in [their] position would have felt compelled to resign." Id. at 193 (citing Green v. Brennan, 136 S.Ct. 1769, 1777 (2016)). Plaintiffs must prove two additional elements to maintain the constructive discharge aspect of their claim: (v) the deliberateness of Priority's...
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