Robinson v. Howard Bros. of Jackson, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 May 1979
• Docket Number: No. 51093,51093
• Parties: John W. ROBINSON, Jr., et al. v. HOWARD BROTHERS OF JACKSON, INC. and Mark S. Pace.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1074

372 So.2d 1074

John W. ROBINSON, Jr., et al. v. HOWARD BROTHERS OF JACKSON, INC. and Mark S. Pace.

No. 51093.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 9, 1979.

Rehearing Denied July 25, 1979.

Perry, Crockett, Morrison & Starling, Robert E. Perry, Lester F. Smith, Tommy E. Furby, Jackson, James H. Herring, Canton, for appellants.

Heidelberg, Woodliff & Franks, George F. Woodliff, Charles G. Copeland, C. A. Henley, Jr., Watkins & Eager, Hassell H. Whitworth, John L. Low, IV, Jackson, for appellees.

Before SMITH, SUGG and BROOM, JJ.

SUGG, Justice, for the Court:

On September 20, 1975, John P. Alexander, II, purchased a pistol and on September 21, 1975, purchased 50 rounds of ammunition from Howard Bros. of Jackson, Inc. Mark Pace, a clerk in the store, filled out the bottom half of the firearms registration form after Alexander had completed the top portion of the form which included the birthdate of Alexander. Alexander presented his drivers license to Pace, which showed his birthdate as December 30, 1954. Howard's sales policy for firearms required a member of the management to authorize the sale of a firearm. Pace received approval for the sale from the manager of Howard's automotive department. Alexander certified and signed a statement that he was at least 21 years of age and that he would only use the ammunition for lawful purposes.

On September 29, 1975, Alexander purchased an additional 50 rounds of ammunition. He again certified that he was at least 21 years of age and that he would only use the ammunition for lawful purposes.

Distraught over the circumstances surrounding his love affair with Harriet Robinson, Alexander murdered Mrs. Robinson with the pistol and ammunition purchased from Howard Bros.

Plaintiffs filed suit against Howard's and Pace for the wrongful death of Mrs. Robinson. The declaration alleged that the death of Mrs. Robinson resulted from the sale of the pistol and ammunition to Alexander, a minor, in violation of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) and Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-13 (1972). ¹ Defendants admitted negligence in selling a firearm and ammunition to a minor but denied liability for the death of Mrs. Robinson. Defendants moved for a directed verdict which was granted by the trial court.

Plaintiffs argue that the murder of Mrs. Robinson is an example of acts sought to be prevented by the statutes. Plaintiffs argue that sale of the pistol was a contributing cause to the death of Mrs. Robinson and liability was established as a matter of law. If we accept appellants' position, one who sells a pistol to a minor in violation of the above statutes would be absolutely liable for any damages inflicted by a minor with the pistol. Stated differently, the seller would be an insurer of the safety of any person injured by a pistol sold to a minor.

We are unable to accept such an unrestricted view. We held in Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 91 So.2d 243 (1956) that an actor who violated a statute was not responsible for the damages that occurred as a result of a third party's negligence. Milner Chevrolet Co. violated the statute prohibiting leaving the key in the ignition of an unattended automobile. The automobile was stolen and Permenter sustained personal injuries when an automobile in which he was riding was struck by the stolen automobile. We denied recovery and held that, although the defendant was guilty of negligence by violating the statute, the reckless driving of the thief was an independent intervening agency which caused the accident and superseded the original act of negligence.

Also, in Bufkin v. Louisville and N. R. Co., 161 Miss. 594, 137 So. 517 (1931), Bufkin was injured when a passenger on defendant's train knocked him down and against the moving train. The train was exceeding the speed limit established by statute. Plaintiff argued that the excessive speed of the train was the proximate cause of his injury, rather than the act of the passenger in knocking him down. We held that the excessive speed of the train was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and stated:

A wrongdoer is responsible for the consequences of his own wrongful act, but he is not responsible for what others, acting independently of him, and for themselves, did, even though his act may be the occasion of their act. They are independent actors, and each is responsible for his own act. "Consecutive wrongs, done by independent agents, cannot be conjoined to increase or enlarge the responsibility of one of them." One person is negligent on a particular subject-matter; another person, moving independently, comes in, and either negligently or maliciously so acts as to make the negligence of the other injurious to a third person. In such a case the person so interfering "acts as a nonconductor and insulates" the negligence of the other person . . .

The negligence of appellee was harmless in itself, but was rendered harmful by the negligent act of the passenger. The proximate cause of the injury, therefore, was not the negligence of the appellee, but that of the passenger. (161 Miss. at 598, 599, 600; 137 So. at 518).

In Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, et al., 368 So.2d 213 (Miss.1979), we held that an injured party is entitled to recover against one who violates a statute if the negligent violation of the statute proximately caused or contributed to the injury. The action was based on Mississippi Code Annotated section 67-3-53(b) (1972), which prohibits the sale of beer to any person under the age of 18 years. Three minors purchased beer from the Majic Market on...