Robinson v. Lamott, 49144.

• Decision Date: 13 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 49144.,49144.
• Citation: 289 NW 2d 60
• Parties: Irwin ROBINSON, et al., Respondents, v. Marceal LAMOTT, d.b.a. Corner Bar, et al., Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Randall R. QUAST, et al., Third Party Defendants, Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

289 N.W.2d 60 (1979)

Irwin ROBINSON, et al., Respondents, v. Marceal LAMOTT, d.b.a. Corner Bar, et al., Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Randall R. QUAST, et al., Third Party Defendants, Respondents.

No. 49144.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 13, 1979.

Geraghty, O'Loughlin & Kenney and Robert M. Mahoney, St. Paul, for appellants.

Carlsen, Greiner & Law, Jack D. Elmquist and H. Louise Olson, Minneapolis, Barnett, Ratelle, Hennessy, Vander Vort, Stasel & Herzog and W. Scott Herzog, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Heard before OTIS, YETKA, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

SCOTT, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court in McLeod County, denying defendants' motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Everett Robinson. The district court also certified the question presented by defendants' motion as important and doubtful. We reverse.

Plaintiffs Irwin and Alma Robinson and their son, Everett Robinson, commenced this action in McLeod County District Court against Marceal LaMott, d.b.a. Corner Bar (hereafter "Corner Bar"), and his bonding company, Western Casualty and Surety Company. They alleged in their amended complaint that during the evening of February 26, 1977, and the early morning hours of February 27, 1977, while plaintiff Everett Robinson was in a state of intoxication, Corner Bar sold him intoxicating liquor in violation of Minn.St. 340.14, subd. 1a. Plaintiffs claim that as a direct result of this illegal sale of liquor Everett Robinson was struck by an automobile while walking along a street after leaving the bar, causing plaintiffs to sustain substantial damages which are compensable under Minn.St. 340.95. In their original complaint, but not in their amended complaint, plaintiffs also assert a common-law claim for negligence.

On May 12, 1978, defendants moved for summary judgment against Everett Robinson (hereinafter "plaintiff") on the ground that a party injured as a result of his own intoxication could not maintain an action under § 340.95. Plaintiff responded by claiming through affidavits and medical records that he was a chronic alcoholic and therefore was a member of the class of persons protected by the statute.

The first question to be considered is that certified by the district court, which reads as follows:

"Whether the civil damage act, Minnesota Statutes, Section 340.95, creates a cause of action in favor of one injured by reason of his own intoxication, if it can be established that, at the time of the alleged illegal sale, he was an alcoholic."

Additionally, on appeal, plaintiff presents a second and third issue, contending that (2) if Section 340.95 does not entitle an alcoholic to relief, then an action can be maintained under common law negligence, and (3) in any event, an action may be brought on the liquor vendor\'s surety bond pursuant to Minn.St. 340.12.¹

1. Minn.St. 340.95, the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, provides, in relevant part, as follows:

"Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured in person or property, or means of support, by an intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name, against any person who, by illegally selling or bartering intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained; * * *." (Emphasis added.)

This court, in Sworski v. Colman, 204 Minn. 474, 283 N.W. 778 (1939), held that a person injured by reason of his own intoxication was not entitled to recovery under the Civil Damage Act. In so doing, the court reasoned:

"Is the quoted statute the predecessor to § 340.95 one giving to the individual who partakes of intoxicating liquors unlawfully furnished by another in such a position that he may maintain an action for the harm resulting to him from such intoxication, absent, as here, any allegation of assault, force, deceit, or other like means used by the alleged wrongdoer to bring about his intoxication? The quoted statute negatives any such notion. The cause giving rise to recovery of damages has for its foundation injury `in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person or by the intoxication of any person, * * *.\' (Italics supplied.) Under this statute, if there was any wrong done by Colman defendant bar the cause accrued to the parents of Clifford the intoxicated party, in which event the action should have been brought by them, not by Clifford\'s administrator. There are several cases sustaining that view and our attention has not been directed to any holding otherwise." 204 Minn. 477, 283 N.W. 780. (Emphasis in original.)

This view has been reiterated by numerous cases decided subsequent to the Sworski decision. See, e. g., Martinson v. Monticello Municipal Liquors, 297 Minn. 48, 209 N.W.2d 902 (1973); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963); Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131 (1960); Stabs v. City of Tower, 229 Minn. 552, 40 N.W.2d 362 (1949). As was stated in Randall, supra:

"* * * The Civil Damage Act does not create a cause of action in favor of one injured by his own intoxication. Only an innocent third person who is injured as a result of the intoxication of another is entitled to its benefits. * * *

"It is immaterial whether the sale was made to plaintiff personally or to a third person. It is the fact of his voluntary intoxication which bars recovery * * *.

"* * * Had the legislature intended to give a person whose voluntary intoxication is the proximate cause of his injury a remedy unknown to the common law, it may be expected that it would have clearly done so." 258 Minn. 83, 103 N.W.2d 133.

Plaintiff does not challenge the correctness of the principle enunciated in Sworski. Instead, he argues that the Sworski rule is inapplicable to the instant case because plaintiff is a chronic alcoholic and thus does not drink voluntarily. As plaintiff points out, this court has recognized that some chronic alcoholics do not consume liquor by choice and therefore they partake involuntarily. See, State v. Fearon, 283 Minn. 90, 166 N.W.2d 720 (1969). However, it does not follow that because of this "involuntary" consumption of liquor an alcoholic is entitled to recovery under § 340.95.

The use of the word "voluntary" intoxication in cases subsequent to Sworski, see, e. g., Randall, supra, referred to the consumption of alcohol which was not forced by a third party. Support for this is found in the Sworski decision itself, wherein the court phrased the critical inquiry in the following manner:

"Is the quoted statute the predecessor to § 340.95 one giving to the individual who partakes of intoxicating liquors unlawfully furnished by another in such a position that he may maintain an action for the harm resulting to him emphasis original from such intoxication, absent, as here, any allegation of assault, force, deceit, or other like means used by the alleged wrongdoer to bring about his intoxication? The quoted statute negatives any such notion." 204 Minn. 477, 283 N.W. 780 (emphasis added).

Thus, although an alcoholic's consumption of liquor may be involuntary in that he does not drink by choice, see, State v. Fearon, supra, his alcohol consumption is nonetheless voluntary within the meaning of Sworski and its progeny. Indeed, the purpose of § 340.95 is to compensate "innocent third persons" who are injured as a result of the illegal sale of liquor to an intoxicated person. See, Randall, supra; Stabs, supra. The thrust of Sworski and later decisions is that persons who, for whatever reason, are unable to exercise self-control in consuming alcoholic beverages are not among the class of persons protected by the Act. See, e. g., Stabs, supra. This reasoning applies even when the individual's intoxication is caused by alcoholism.

A contrary result would constitute a usurpation of legislative power. The legislature undoubtedly concurs in our long-standing construction of § 340.95, since it has not seen fit to reverse the Sworski decision by subsequent legislative action.² See, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Spaeth, 232 Minn. 128, 44 N.W.2d 440 (1950). See, also, Minn.St. 645.17(4). Just as significant is the legislature's failure to provide an exception to the Sworski principle. The legislature has had numerous opportunities to modify the law to allow an alcoholic to recover damages, yet it has not seen fit to do so. In light of this legislative silence, we must presume the legislature intended that the Sworski rule be applied, without qualification, to an intoxicated individual suffering from alcoholism. This conclusion merely recognizes that the question involved in this case is a legislative one and thus a change in the law must be effected by a clear manifestation of legislative intent. Since we find no such expression of statutory intent, we must reject plaintiff's contention.

It should be noted that in support of his position plaintiff claims that granting a right to recovery under the Civil Damage Act to alcoholics would be appropriate because (1) it would serve as a deterrent for the illegal sales of alcohol by liquor vendors; (2) the penal, remedial and compensatory purposes of the Act would be promoted; and (3) the cost of compensation could best be borne by a liquor vendor's insurer. However, all these arguments apply equally as well to anyone who is injured because of intoxication, and are not persuasive in showing why an alcoholic should be able to recover and not all consumers of liquor in like circumstances.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that alcoholics are "voluntary" consumers of liquor within the meaning of Sworski and subsequent cases. We therefore hold that plaintiff is precluded from recovery under Minn.St. 340.95.³

2. In many prior cases this court stated, in dicta, its agreement with the then generally recognized...