Robinson v. N. Dakota Workforce Safety & Ins.
Decision Date | 30 July 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 20180383,20180383 |
Citation | 931 N.W.2d 692 |
Parties | Jack ROBINSON, Appellant v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKFORCE SAFETY AND INSURANCE, Appellee |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Erich M. Grant, Minot, ND, for appellant.
Jacqueline S. Anderson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Fargo, ND, for appellee.
[¶1] Jack Robinson appeals from a district court judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") order finding Robinson personally liable for any unpaid workers' compensation premiums, penalties, interest, and costs owed by Dalton Logistics, Inc. ("Dalton"). Robinson argues WSI failed to properly serve him with the administrative order resulting in a lack of personal jurisdiction and that his due process rights were violated. We reverse the judgment and remand to the agency with directions.
[¶2] In June 2015, WSI issued a notice of decision finding Robinson, as vice president of Dalton Logistics, Inc., personally liable for all unpaid workers' compensation premiums, penalties, interest, and costs owed by Dalton.
[¶3] In August 2015, after no response from Robinson, WSI commenced a civil action in district court seeking a judgment against Robinson for unpaid workers' compensation premiums, penalties, and interest. In November 2015, WSI moved for summary judgment. Robinson opposed WSI’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that Robinson was not properly served the notice of decision. In December 2016, the district court action was dismissed without prejudice based on the parties' stipulation.
[¶4] In March 2017, WSI issued an administrative order, again finding Robinson personally liable for amounts owed by Dalton. The administrative order was served by certified mail on the attorney Robinson retained in the district court proceedings. In April 2017, Robinson’s attorney requested the matter be dismissed, arguing Robinson had not been properly served "notice of the decision," by regular mail, citing N.D.C.C. § 65-04-32. The request stated that although Robinson’s attorney represented Robinson in past actions, "he has not been authorized to accept service on his behalf to commence the present action," and that valid service of process was necessary for WSI to assert personal jurisdiction over Robinson. Robinson requested in the alternative that a hearing be scheduled for presenting evidence to correctly determine the past due premium amounts and whether Robinson was personally liable. The request for a hearing was granted.
[¶5] At the administrative hearing, Robinson’s attorney moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on Robinson’s behalf, reiterating his objection to the lack of service as required under N.D.C.C. § 65-04-32(1), arguing failure to properly serve Robinson personally with the notice of decision resulted in a failure to effect personal jurisdiction over him and due process violations. Robinson’s attorney further argued WSI was not authorized to serve the administrative order on Robinson’s attorney, because he had not represented that he had authority to accept service on behalf of Robinson. WSI argued the administrative proceedings were not commenced following the issuance of a notice of decision governed by N.D.C.C. § 65-04-32(1) ; rather, the current proceedings were initiated by serving an administrative order, governed by N.D.C.C. § 65-04-32(3), which does not require first serving a notice of decision. WSI argued it served Robinson’s attorney with the administrative order because Robinson’s attorney was still on the account as the attorney of record. After the hearing, the ALJ issued findings, conclusions of law, and an order affirming WSI’s March 2017 administrative order. The hearing officer concluded that the hearing proceeded under N.D.C.C. § 65-04-32(3), not N.D.C.C. § 65-04-32(1), denying Robinson’s motion to dismiss as a matter of law. Robinson appealed the ALJ’s order to the district court, and the district court affirmed.
[¶6] "In an appeal from a district court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision, we review the agency’s decision." Haynes v. Dir., Dep't of Transp. , 2014 ND 161, ¶ 6, 851 N.W.2d 172. This Court must affirm the agency’s decision unless:
N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46. We have also stated:
We do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency; rather, we determine only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded the agency’s findings were supported by the weight of the evidence from the entire record. We defer to an agency’s opportunity to judge witnesses' credibility. Once the facts are established, their significance presents a question of law, which we review de novo.
Beylund v. Levi , 2017 ND 30, ¶ 9, 889 N.W.2d 907 (internal citations omitted). "On appeal from the district court’s decision, we review the administrative agency’s decision in the same manner as the district court, giving due respect to the district court’s analysis and review." Bergum v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins. , 2009 ND 52, ¶ 8, 764 N.W.2d 178.
[¶7] On appeal, Robinson admits his attorney was served the administrative order by certified mail, but argues WSI was required to serve Robinson himself by certified mail. The question on appeal is whether service of the administrative order on Robinson’s attorney was adequate to acquire personal jurisdiction over Robinson in the administrative proceeding.
[¶8] We have stated, "[t]he jurisdiction of an administrative agency is dependent upon the terms of the statute and must meet at least the basic mandatory provisions of the statute before jurisdiction is established." Schwind v. Dir., N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 462 N.W.2d 147, 150 (N.D. 1990) (2d Administrative Law § 328 (1962) ) 2 Am. Jur. . As a general rule, proceedings before an administrative agency are not restricted by the technical and formal rules practiced before a court, but the fundamental principals of judicial inquiry should be observed. State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. No. Pac. Ry. Co. , 75 N.W.2d 129, 134 (N.D. 1956). Like courts, administrative agencies must have both personal and subject matter jurisdiction before they can hear a case. 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 272 (2014). Valid service of process is necessary to assert personal jurisdiction over a party. Gessner v. City of Minot , 1998 ND 157, ¶ 5, 583 N.W.2d 90. However, methods of serving agency process may be specified by statute or rule. 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 281 (2014). Section 65-04-32(3), N.D.C.C., provides:
Within sixty days after receiving a petition for reconsideration, unless settlement negotiations are ongoing, the organization shall serve on the parties by certified mail an administrative order including its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, in response to the petition for reconsideration. The organization may serve an administrative order on any decision made by informal internal review without first issuing a notice of decision and receiving a request for reconsideration.1
[¶9] Robinson argues that under N.D.C.C. § 65-04-32(3), he must be served as a party, rather than service by certified mail on his attorney, because the administrative order is service of process which requires the application of either the statute or N.D.R.Civ.P. 4. Process, under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(c), includes the requirement for service of a summons and complaint. "Under our law, ‘process’ means ‘a writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings.’ " Olsrud v. Bismarck-Mandan Orchestral Ass'n , 2007 ND 91, ¶ 13, 733 N.W.2d 256 ( ). The term "process" as defined under N.D.C.C. § 1-01-49(12) is a term of art that by definition applies only to judicial proceedings. The rules of civil procedure govern the procedure in civil actions and proceedings in district court, subject to some exceptions. N.D.R.Civ.P. 1. In other words, service of process as described in N.D.R.Civ.P. 4 only applies to service of the summons and complaint in judicial proceedings.
[¶10] The administrative order is not a writ or summons in a judicial proceeding, and does not require service of "process" under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4. Rather, the equivalent of "service of process" required for WSI to initiate an agency proceeding by administrative order is to serve the parties of an administrative order by certified mail under N.D.C.C. § 65-04-32(3). WSI argues service of documents other than service of a summons and complaint are to be made under N.D.R.Civ.P. 5(a)(1). However, Rule 5, N.D.R.Civ.P., only provides for service of documents that are not process. Principal Residential Mortg., Inc. v. Nash , 2000 ND 21, ¶ 9, 606 N.W.2d 120. See also N.D.R.Civ.P. 5 (explanatory note).
[¶11] Serving parties with notice in accordance with the rules of civil procedure may also be designated by statute. See N.D.C.C. § 65-01-16(5) (...
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