Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1889
• Citation: 112 N.Y. 315,19 N.E. 625
• Parties: ROBINSON v. OCEANIC STEAM NAV. CO., Limited.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

112 N.Y. 315

19 N.E. 625

ROBINSON

v.OCEANIC STEAM NAV. CO., Limited.

Court of Appeals of New York.

January 29, 1889.

Appeal from superior court of New York city, general term.

Action by John Robinson, as administrator, of Jane Robinson, deceased against the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, to recover damages for negligently causing the death of his intestate. Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction of the court.

Thos. P. Wickes, for appellant.

Lawrence Godkin, for appellee.

EARL, J.

The plaintiff, as administrator of Jane Lingard Robinson, deceased, commenced this action in the New York superior court to recover damages against the defendant, a foreign corporation, for wrongfully and negligently causing the death of his intestate. In the complaint the death is alleged to have been caused upon the ocean, within the territorial limits of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, by a collision between two of the defendant's vessels, upon one of which the deceased was a passenger. The action is based upon the English statute called ‘Lord Campbell's Act,’ passed in 1846, which has been substantially re-enacted in this state. The defendant appeared in the action, interposed an answer to the complaint, and noticed the cause for trial. Afterwards it made a motion that the summons be vacated and the complaint dismissed, on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction of the action. That motion was denied at the special term, and from the order there made the defendant appealed to the general term, where the order was reversed, and the motion granted, and the plaintiff then appealed to this court.

It appeared upon the motion, and it is an undisputed fact, that the residence of the intestate at the time of her death was at Fall River, in the state of Massachusetts, and that the plaintiff was and is a resident of the same place, and that he was appointed administrator by the surrogate of the county of New York. The claim of the defendant is that as the plaintiff was a non-resident, and the defendant was a foreign corporation, and the cause of action did not arise within this state, the court had no jurisdiction of the action under section 1780 of the Code. The plaintiff contends that although he personally resided in the state of Massachusetts, within the meaning of the section referred to, he was a resident of this state, because he was here appointed administrator; but he was nevertheless personally a non-resident. Such a personmay, under the statutes, be appointed an administrator, but he does not thereby become in any sense a resident of the state. Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172;In re Page, 107 N. Y. 266, 14 N. E. Rep. 193. The case of Leonard v. Navigation Co., 84 N. Y. 48, is not an authority upon this point for the plaintiff, as in that case the defendant was a domestic corporation.

It is true that the plaintiff's cause of action is transitory, and that a plaintiff may bring a suit upon such a cause of action wherever he may be provided he can find a court which has jurisdiction of the action, and can obtain jurisdiction of the defendant. But a cause of action, even if transitory, must always arise somewhere, and this cause of action arose where the tort was committed which caused the death of the plaintiff's intestate. That this is a cause of action for a tort is too clear for reasonable dispute. It exists only by virtue of the statute referred to, and is based entirely upon the negligence and tortious conduct attributable to the defendant. We therefore have a case where the plaintiff is a non-resident, the defendant a foreign corporation, and the cause of action did not arise within this state, and therefore no court within this state has jurisdiction of the action.

Under the Revised Statutes, so far as we are able to discover, there was no provision for an action in the courts of this state by a non-resident against a foreign corporation; and the only provision for suits against foreign corporations was that found in 2 Rev. St. p. 459, § 15, where it is provided that suits brought in the supreme court by a resident of this state against any corporation created by or under the laws of any other state, government, or country, for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand, may be commenced by attachment. That provision remained until 1849, when by chapter 107 of the laws of that year it was amended so as to read as follows: ‘Suits may be brought in the supreme court, in the superior court of the city of New York, and in the court of common pleas in and for the city and county of New York, against any corporation created by or under the laws of any other state, government, or country for the recovery of any debt or damages, whether liquidated or not, arising upon contract made, executed, or delivered within this state, or upon any cause of action arising therein. Such suits may be commenced by complaint and summons, together with an attachment as now provided by law, and such complaint and summons may be served as provided by sections 113 and 114 of the Code of Procedure.’

Under the section, as thus amended, any plaintiff could commence an action against a foreign corporation upon any cause of action arising within this state. In the same year section 427 was added to the Code of Procedure, providing as follows: ‘An action against a corporation, created by or under the laws of any other state, government, or country, may be brought in the supreme court, the superior court of the city of New York, or the court of common pleas for the city and county of New York, in the following cases: (1) By a resident of this state for any cause of action; (2) by a plaintiff not a resident of this state, when the cause of action shall have arisen, or the subject of the action shall be situated, within the state.’

This section did not assume to define all the cases in which actions could be brought against foreign corporations, and did not absolutely limit the power and jurisdiction of the courts mentioned. It specified the cases in which foreign corporations could compulsorily, by service of process in the mode prescribed by law, be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts. It did not deprive the courts of any...