Robinson v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 24 February 1896
• Citation: 65 Mo. App. 216
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

65 Mo. App. 216

Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri.

MARY A. ROBINSON, Appellant, v. THOMAS C. ROBINSON, Respondent.

Feb. 24, 1896.

Appeal from the Bates Circuit Court.--HON. JAMES H. LAY, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Thomas J. Smith and Francisco Bros. for appellant.

(1) Plaintiff is not under the law required to show that her life and conduct as the wife of defendant had been wholly free from blame in order that she might be divorced from her husband for any of the grounds specified in the petition if proven, but it is enough if the evidence fails to show that she has been guilty of anything charged in the cross bill against her, which, if true, would be grounds upon which defendant might be divorced. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 42 Mo. 547; Owen v. Owen, 48 Mo. App. 208. (2) In a divorce suit the appellate court weighs the evidence as in a suit in equity, and upon the whole evidence determines the rights of the parties. (3) Under the whole evidence, the plaintiff should be granted the relief asked in her petition.

Graves & Clark for respondent.

(1) Where the evidence in divorce cases is conflicting and the decision of the court that tries the cause depends upon the credit to be given to the witnesses, an appellate court will not interfere with the judgment. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 29 Mo. 95; Gillespie v. Gillespie, 28 Mo. 598; Owen v. Owen, 48 Mo. App. 208-212; King v. King, 42 Mo. App. 454; Nichols v. Nichols, 39 Mo. App. 291; Miller v. Miller, 14 Mo. App. 422; Rawlings v. Rawlings, 102 Mo. 563-567; Griesdeick v. Griesdeick, 56 Mo. App. 94. (2) In cases of this kind a finding upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed upon appeal. This is the rule in this state and elsewhere. Bucki v. Bucki, 85 Hun (N. Y), 619. (3) While in this case and other equity cases the appellate court will review the evidence, yet it will defer very largely to the opinion of the trial court because of the superior advantages which that court possesses of gleaning from the demeanor of the witnesses the truthfulness of the story told.

Mathias v. O'Neil, 94 Mo. 523-530; Drostin v. Mueller, 103 Mo. 624-634; Parker v. Roberts, 116 Mo. 656-667.

SMITH, P. J.

This is an action of divorce. The grounds of divorce alleged in the petition were, in substance, that defendant was a man of violent temper and accustomed to the use of abusive language to plaintiff, calling her a “God-damned devil; a God-damned bitch; a liar;” that defendant had struck plaintiff with a whip; choked her and abused their children; that he had charged her with having committed the crime of adultery; and that he had failed to properly provide for her, in consequence of which she was forced to leave him.

The plaintiff, at the trial, was introduced as a witness in her own behalf and testified to the commission of each of the several grievances alleged in her petition.

She established by her testimony a prima facie right to a decree in her favor.

The defendant was introduced as a witness in his behalf and in his testimony contradicted that of the plaintiff from beginning to end. His testimony disproved every fact which that of the plaintiff had proved. The testimony of the one, in favor of the affirmative of the issues, was offset by that of the other in favor of the negative.

There is little in the testimony of the other witnesses that in any way corroborates that of either the plaintiff or defendant.

Looking through the evidence presented by the record, it is found that the testimony of the one is about as well corroborated as that of the other. Each of them realizing this anomalous condition of their case, sought to turn the scale by the introduction of the testimony of their two infant children, Maud and Glenn, aged, respectively, ten and thirteen years. The testimony of these children witnesses tended to support that of the mother. They each testified to facts and circumstances that had...