Robinson v. Siple
Decision Date | 18 June 1895 |
Citation | 31 S.W. 788,129 Mo. 208 |
Parties | Robinson v. Siple et al., Appellants |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Vernon Circuit Court. -- Hon. D. P. Stratton, Judge.
Affirmed.
W. M Bowker and M. T. January for appellants.
(1) A party can not sue on one contract and recover on another. Broning v. Walburn, 45 Mo. 477; Smith v Shell, 82 Mo. 215; Crum v. Cummings, 69 Mo 325; Feurth v. Anderson, 87 Mo. 354; Sisney v. Arnold, 28 Mo.App. 568. (2) A suit brought by a party upon a contract made for his benefit by one assuming to act as his agent, is a ratification of the contract and is equal to a previous authorization. In such cases, the principal, seeking an enforcement of the contract is answerable for any fraud perpetrated in making it. Mechem, Agency, sec. 151, p. 99, sec. 743, p. 384, and sec. 178, p. 113; Savings Association v. Morrison, 48 Mo. 273; Norton v. Bull, 43 Mo. 113; State ex rel. v. Harrington, 100 Mo. 170. (3) After ratification by suit, all declarations during negotiations of the agent concerning the contract made by him, are admissible as part of the res gestae. (4) A party to a contract is entitled to rescind for material misrepresentation, even if innocently made. Yeater v. Hines, 24 Mo.App. 619; Parker v. Marquis, 64 Mo. 38; Cohn v. Reed, 18 Mo.App. 115; Sackleben v. Heintze, 117 Mo. 520. (5) Although the general rule is that a party desiring to rescind a contract must tender back the thing received, and place the other party in statu quo, yet this rule has well recognized exception; and where through the fraud of the other party or his agent, the defrauded party has become entangled so that the status quo can not be restored, the defrauded party will not be deprived, for that reason, of his right to rescind. Mason v. Bovet, 43 Am. Dec. 651; Hammon v. Pennock, 61 N.Y. 145; Brown v. Norman, 7 Am. Rep. 665; Bryant v. Isburg, 74 Am. Dec. 661; Downs v. Smith, 76 Am. Dec. 148; Guckenheimer v. Angevine, 81 N.Y. 397. (6) It is error to instruct peremptorily if the evidence is at all conflicting.
G. S. Hoss and Thomas & Hackney for respondent.
(1) Defendants were not entitled to a rescission of the contract, first, because defendants could not, and did not offer to, place plaintiff in statu quo; second, because defendants, by their unreasonable delay, had waived their right, if any, to a rescission. (2) One joint contractor can not rescind without assent of the others. Melton v. Smith, 65 Mo. loc. cit. 324; Brewster v. Wooster, 9 N.Y.S. 312; Spencer v. St. Clair, 57 N.H. 9; Estes v. Reynolds, 75 Mo. 563. (3) The attempted rescission came too late; and the trial court correctly ruled that as a matter of law they had waived their right of rescission. Taylor v. Short, 107 Mo. 384; Estes v. Reynolds, 75 Mo. 563; Melton v. Smith, 65 Mo. 315; Key v. Jennings, 66 Mo. 370; Hart v. Handlin, 43 Mo. 175; Dougherty v. Stamps, 43 Mo. 343; Tower v. Pauly, 51 Mo.App. 75, and cases cited; Lewis v. Brookdale Land Co., 28 S.W. 324. To entitle a party to rescind a contract on the ground of fraud, he must promptly exert the right of rescission as soon as he discovers the fraud.
This is an action for $ 6,000, alleged to have been the agreed price for a tract of land owned by plaintiff, and conveyed by him, at the request of defendants, to one Owens, in payment for a herd of horses purchased by defendants from Owens, and to foreclose a mortgage on said horses, executed by defendants to plaintiffs to secure the payment of the purchase price for said land. The defendants are W. H. Robinson, E. Siple, G. W. Siple and Walter D. Beanblossom.
To which petition defendants E. Siple, G. W. Siple and W. D. Beanblossom filed the following answer:
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