Robinson v. State

• Decision Date: 08 October 1991
• Parties: Crystal ROBINSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 356

600 A.2d 356

Crystal ROBINSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Oct. 8, 1991.

Decided: Dec. 4, 1991.

On appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Nancy Jane Perillo, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for appellant.

Gary A. Myers, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Georgetown, for appellee.

Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY and WALSH, JJ.

CHRISTIE, Chief Justice:

The defendant/appellant, Crystal Robinson, was charged by indictment with one count of emotionally abusing Jane Roe, ¹ a resident of a long-term care facility under the patient abuse statute, 16 Del.C. § 1136(a), and with one count of conspiring with a co-worker to commit such offense under 11 Del.C. § 511. Both offenses are class A misdemeanors. On May 16, 1990, as a result of a jury trial in the Superior Court, Robinson was found guilty as charged. She was sentenced to pay the costs of prosecution and a fine of $101.00 for each offense. She was also sentenced to 31 days of incarceration for each offense to be served consecutively. However, the prison sentences were suspended for three months of probation, as to each charge. Robinson now appeals those convictions.

Robinson has raised five issues on this appeal. She contends that: 1) the Superior Court erred as a matter of law by permitting the State to amend the indictment to add the mens rea element of "knowingly" as specified in 16 Del.C. § 1136(a); 2) the Superior Court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the physical and mental condition of Roe at the time of the offense; 3) the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying Robinson's motions for a mistrial based on the fact that the State had improperly elicited testimony that Robinson's codefendant, Yvette Jones, had entered a plea of guilty; 4) the Superior Court erred as a matter of law when it did not include the recitals made in the bill of particulars as elements of the offense in the court's instructions to the jury; and 5) the patient abuse statute, 16 Del.C. 1136(a), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under due process principles with regard to prosecutions predicated on the "emotional abuse" element, 16 Del.C. § 1131(1)(b), of the statute. We find each of these contentions to be without merit and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

FACTS BASED ON TESTIMONY OF STATE'S WITNESSES

The charges against Robinson arose out of an incident occurring on a Sunday morning at approximately 7:30 a.m. on August 13, 1989 in Room 400 at the nursing home facility known as the Layton Home. At the time of this incident, Robinson had been employed at the Layton Home for over two years as a nurse's aide. Room 400, which was the home for four elderly residents, was 14 feet by 14 feet in dimension. In this room, Jane Roe, eighty-five years of age, had been quietly sitting in her wheelchair. Meanwhile, two housekeepers were doing the daily housecleaning and bringing fresh linen to Roe and her roommates. While the two housekeepers were working, defendant Robinson and codefendant Jones, both of whom were employed at the Layton Home, came into Room 400. Ignoring the two housekeepers and the other residents in the room, Robinson approached Roe and allegedly stated in an "insincere" tone of voice that someone had been stealing some of Roe's clothes. This statement was not true. Roe, who was very possessive of her belongings, immediately became very upset. While the record is unclear on the exact sequence of the subsequent events, the Court will relate them as they could have been found to have occurred. Throughout this incident, the defendants and Roe maintained an abusive dialogue, which sometimes became quite loud. A total of six towels (as many as three at one time) were thrown at Roe by codefendant Yvette Jones as Roe sat confined to her wheelchair. Meanwhile, Robinson took a cup of water and, out of Roe's sight, used her fingers to throw drops of water on Roe. At the same time, Robinson mimicked the sound of spitting which further upset Roe. Roe cried out for Robinson to stop spitting on her and for the two defendants to get away from her. Apparently in response to Roe telling Robinson to "Get away from me you bitch", Robinson told her "It takes one to know one." Robinson also admitted that she had called Roe "mean" and had told her to "shut up" and had argued briefly with Roe. In the meantime, Robinson had also placed a small artificial flowerpot on Roe's head. When the flowerpot fell to the floor a second later, the defendants laughed. With Roe now yelling "bloody murder", Robinson told her to "kiss [my] butt" which prompted Roe to respond with an identical suggestion. Not to be outdone, Robinson repeated the statement a second time, stood in front of Roe, lifted her nurse's uniform, shook her rear end, and placed it on the meal table of Roe's wheelchair. Roe managed to push Robinson away and yelled that God would punish the defendants for their conduct. The entire incident lasted approximately fifteen to twenty minutes. Additional facts will be presented as necessary to address Robinson's contentions on appeal.

The defendant testified that there was a relatively brief verbal exchange and some laughter. Then she left the room without having taken part in any of the other actions outlined above. She also testified that she had none of the various intentions required by the statute.

A.

Robinson's first contention on appeal is that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law by permitting the State to file an amended indictment which added the essential mens rea element of "knowingly" to the patient abuse charge which was omitted from the original indictment. Robinson contends that this constituted a prejudicial amendment of "substance" thus requiring the reversal of both of her convictions. See Keller v. State, Del.Supr., 425 A.2d 152, 154-55 (1981); Harley v. State, Del.Supr., 534 A.2d 255, 256-57 (1987); State v. Blendt, Del.Super., 120 A.2d 321, 322-23 (1956); Superior Court Criminal Rule 7(e). In connection with Robinson's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on due process grounds, defense counsel raised the fact that the original indictment failed to include the requisite mental state for the patient abuse charge. ² Defense counsel also raised the fact that the charge was erroneously brought under the definitional section of § 1131 rather than the violations section of § 1136(a). The Superior Court allowed the State to amend the indictment to expressly allege the statutory mens rea element of "knowingly" and to correct the citation from 16 Del.C. § 1131(a)(2) to § 1136(a). ³ See Superior Court Criminal Rule 7(c) (error in citation shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error does not mislead the defendant to his prejudice).

This Court has held on several occasions that a trial court has the power to amend an indictment as to matters of form, but not as to matters of substance, so long as no new, additional, or different charge is made thereby and the accused will not suffer prejudice to substantial rights. Keller, 425 A.2d at 154-55; Harley, 534 A.2d at 256-57; Blendt, 120 A.2d at 322-23; Superior Court Criminal Rule 7(e). The purpose of this rule is to assure that the accused receives notice of the charges against him so that he has an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. Keller, 425 A.2d at 155. However, although an indictment fails to specify the statutory mens rea element of "knowledge" or "intent" for the charged crime, the indictment may still be valid where other allegations contained in the indictment compel an inference of the requisite mental state. See, e.g., United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183, 1199 (5th Cir.) (indictment charging illegal importation of marijuana was not fatally defective in failing to include "knowingly or intentionally" in its language, where the language used was accompanied by specification of statutory numbers, and where jury was charged that they had to find knowledge or intent in order to convict), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 315, 50 L.Ed.2d 286 (1976); United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764, 765 (4th Cir.1964) (element of "knowingly" for the crime of kidnapping can be implied from allegations that the defendant seized, confined, kidnapped, abducted and carried away the victim); Hughes v. United States, 338 F.2d 651, 652 (1st Cir.1964). Although the original indictment against Robinson failed to expressly state the statutory mens rea element of "knowingly", the Superior Court correctly noted that Robinson could not be found guilty without proof of the state of mind required by the law defining the offense. 11 Del.C. § 251(a). In addition, we find that the allegations that Robinson emotionally abused Roe "by ridiculing, demeaning, and making derogatory remarks directed toward [Jane Roe]" compel the requisite inference that Robinson acted "knowingly" as required by 16 Del.C. § 1136(a). The common understanding of the terms "ridiculing", "demeaning", and "derogatory", ⁴ assumes that the person speaking the words or doing the acts "is aware that his conduct is of that nature" or "is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause that result." 11 Del.C. § 231(b) (defining "knowingly"). We find that the amended indictment did not result in a new, additional, or different charge being made against Robinson and that the original indictment placed her on notice of the essential elements of the charge so that she could adequately prepare her defense. Therefore, we find no evidence of prejudice to Robinson. We conclude that the Superior Court did not err as a matter of law by allowing the State to amend the indictment to add the term "knowingly" and to correct the statutory citation.

B.

Robinson's second contention on appeal is that the Superior Court abused its discretion by...