Robinson v. State
| Decision Date | 07 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 27762,Appellate Case No. 2015-001773 |
| Citation | 422 S.C. 78,810 S.E.2d 32 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Michael Lee ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent. |
Appellate Defender Susan B. Hackett, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney General DeShawn H. Mitchell, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE KITTREDGE:
This is a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter. Petitioner Michael Lee Robinson was indicted in 2013 on charges of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor. The alleged offenses occurred between 1998 and 2000. However, between 2001 and 2012, the CSC statute was amended, increasing the sentencing range for this crime. The State offered "to let" Petitioner plead guilty under the prior sentencing law but insisted that Petitioner would be subject to the increased 2012 sentencing scheme if he rejected the offer and went to trial.1 Plea counsel, apparently unaware of the inapplicability of the 2012 sentencing enhancement under any circumstances, recommended Petitioner accept the offer. Based on counsel's recommendation, Petitioner pled guilty.
The PCR court denied relief, and this Court granted a writ of certiorari to review that decision. Petitioner pled guilty on plea counsel's advice to accept the plea offer because Petitioner would otherwise be subject to an increased sentence based on a statute amended after the offense date. However, Petitioner was not subject to the increased sentence in the 2012 amended statute, for that would have violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States Constitution and South Carolina Constitution. Because the PCR court's decision is controlled by an error of law, we reverse.
In February 2013, a Greenville County grand jury indicted Petitioner on several counts of first-degree CSC with a minor for alleged acts that occurred between July 1, 1998, and July 31, 2000. At the time the alleged acts occurred, the crime of first-degree CSC with a minor carried a sentencing range of zero to thirty years. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-3-655(A)(1) (1984) (defining the crime), 16-1-90(A) (1998) (), 16-1-20(A)(1) (1995) (). However, in subsequent years, the sentencing range for first-degree CSC with a minor was increased to twenty-five years to life. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(D)(1) (2012). The State offered a plea deal for Petitioner to plead guilty to one count of first-degree CSC with a minor and, in exchange, the State would "agree to let" Petitioner "be sentenced under the old version of the law" and the remaining charges would be dismissed. Plea counsel recommended that Petitioner accept the State's offer to avoid the harsher sentence under the 2012 amended statute. Plea counsel never informed Petitioner that under no circumstances could he be sentenced under the 2012 amended statute.
Petitioner maintains that plea counsel's deficient advice was not sufficiently cured during the guilty plea hearing. The plea judge initially referenced the sentencing range under the 2012 amended statute, as the following colloquy reveals:
(emphasis added). Pursuant to the plea deal, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of first-degree CSC with a minor. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment and the remaining charges were dismissed. No direct appeal was taken.
Petitioner filed a PCR application contending that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance and, as a result, his guilty plea was involuntary. At the PCR hearing, Petitioner testified that he had told plea counsel "nothing occurred" and he "wanted to go to trial." Petitioner further testified that he ultimately entered the guilty plea, based upon plea counsel's recommendation, to avoid a sentence under the 2012 amended statute of twenty-five years to life. Petitioner stated that he was scared about the potential life sentence under the amended law and decided to plead guilty to avoid a life sentence. Petitioner was adamant that counsel never informed him of the inapplicability of the 2012 amended statute enhancing the sentencing range, and it is undisputed that Petitioner, due to counsel's erroneous advice, believed he could face a life sentence under the new law.
Plea counsel acknowledged that Petitioner maintained his innocence and wanted a trial. Specifically, plea counsel stated, "Yeah ... pretty much the entire time he said this had not happened and that he wanted a trial." As part of counsel's admission that he erroneously informed Petitioner that he would be subject to the 2012 increased sentencing scheme, counsel further admitted that he did not review the sentencing ranges on each of the charges with Petitioner.2 Specifically, plea counsel testified that he recommended Petitioner accept the plea offer because the State had agreed to let Petitioner "plea and be sentenced under the old version of the law" and the State had "indicated that if we were to go to trial they were going to pursue the new version of the law."
The PCR court dismissed Petitioner's application, finding Petitioner failed to prove both prongs of the Strickland test. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (); see also Sellner v. State , 416 S.C. 606, 611, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (recognizing "[t]he two-part test also ‘applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel’ " (quoting Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ). In particular, the PCR court order inexplicably stated, "While [Petitioner] may have felt unsettled when plea counsel advised he was facing a life sentence, this was an accurate statement of the law ." (emphasis added). This Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.
A PCR court's findings of fact will be upheld if there is any evidence of probative value in the record to support them. Sellner v. State , 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016). However, we review questions of law de novo. Id. Moreover, "this Court will reverse the decision of the PCR court when it is controlled by an error of law." Gonzales v. State , 419 S.C. 2, 10, 795 S.E.2d 835, 839 (2017) (citing Terry v. State , 383 S.C. 361, 371, 680 S.E.2d 277, 282 (2009) ).
"A defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Terry , 383 S.C. at 370, 680 S.E.2d at 282 (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ). "Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice ‘was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’ " Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) ). "[T]he defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ " Lee v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1965, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017) (quoting Hill , 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366 ).
Petitioner argues that plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because Petitioner based his decision to plead guilty on plea counsel's incorrect advice—that Petitioner should accept the guilty plea or he could be sentenced under the post-offense amended law with an increased sentencing range. Petitioner contends this ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea involuntary. We agree. It is clear that Petitioner would not have pled guilty but for counsel's erroneous sentencing advice. Because the PCR court failed to recognize that plea counsel's advice was deficient—as an increased punishment under the amended law would have violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States Constitution and South Carolina Constitution—the PCR court's decision is controlled by an error of law and we reverse.
With regard to the deficiency prong, plea counsel's advice was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) ). His performance fell below reasonable professional norms as his advice that the State had the ability to prosecute Petitioner under the 2012 amended law was clearly incorrect.
It is well established that "[a] law which imposes additional punishment to that prescribed at the time the offense was committed is...
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