Robinson v. State
| Citation | 179 S.E.2d 248,227 Ga. 140 |
| Decision Date | 07 January 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 26192,26192 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
| Parties | M. R. ROBINSON v. The STATE. |
Syllabus by the Court
The provision of the Juvenile Court Act that, 'All cases of children shall be dealt with at separate hearings by the court and without a jury,' (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1013, 1027) does not violate the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in denying a child, charged as a delinquent because of the alleged violation of the criminal laws of this State, the right of trial by jury in the juvenile court.
J. B. Shapiro, Jr., Atlanta, for appelant.
Dudley W. Garrett, Tony H. Hight, Atlanta, for appellee.
The Court of Appeals certified to this court the following question: 'Is the provision in Section 21 of the Juvenile Court Act (Section 12 of the Act of 1968, Ga.L.1968,[227 Ga. 141] pp. 1013, 1027) that 'All cases of children shall be dealt with at separate hearings by the court and without a jury,' violative of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it denies a child, charged as a delinquent under the Act because of the alleged violation of the criminal laws of this State, the right of trial by jury in the juvenile court?'
In Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32, this court held that the Juvenile Court Act of 1951 (Ga.L.1951 pp. 291, 302) did not violate our State Constitution (Act. I, Sec. I, Par. V; Code Ann. § 2-105), guaranteeing the right of trial by jury to every person charged with an offense against the laws of this State, because the proceedings in the Juvenile Court were civil and not criminal. See also Porter v. Watkins, 217 Ga. 73(3), 121 S.E.2d 120. The rulings in these cases would apply to the amended law (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1013, 1027; Code Ann. § 24-2420), and would be controlling on the question of the constitutionality of that section under the similar requirement of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States (that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to trial by jury), unless recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States require a different ruling.
The Court of Appeals cited in connection with the certified question decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as follows: In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84; In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138.
Three of these decisions, In Re Gault, Kent v. United States, and In Re Winship, dealt with juvenile court proceedings, and held that juveniles charged with offenses of a penal nature in juvenile courts were entitled to notice of hearing, right of counsel; privilege against self-incrimination; right of confrontation, cross-examination, and review; and proof of charges of a criminal nature beyond a reasonable doubt. None of these cases decided whether or not there is a right of trial by jury in juvenile courts.
In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, supra, it was said that the court did not mean 'to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' This statement was quoted with approval in the Winship case, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, supra. Thus it appears that the Supreme Court of the United States did not hold that the proceedings in the juvenile court were criminal, but only that certain guaranties of due process applicable to criminal trials must be applied in the juvenile court hearings.
No procedure is available to the juvenile court judges of this State to impanel a jury. It is the policy of our law that all cases concerning children 'shall be dealt with at separate...
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