Robinson v. State
| Decision Date | 04 August 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 576S158,576S158 |
| Citation | 365 N.E.2d 1218,266 Ind. 604 |
| Parties | William ROBINSON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Daniel Lee Pflum, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant (Appellant) was charged with first degree murder, Ind.Code (Burns 1975) 35-13-4-1, convicted in a trial by jury of second degree murder, Ind.Code (Burns 1975) 35-1-54-1 and sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal presents the following issues:
(1) Whether, as a matter of law, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the verdict and more specifically, whether the testimony of the sole eyewitness was sufficiently reliable to identify the defendant as the assailant.
(2) Whether a knife admitted into evidence over objection was relevant to the determination of the defendant's guilt.
(3) Whether it was error for the trial court to deny the defendant's motion for a mistrial based upon allegedly improper voir dire examination by the State of the prospective jurors.
(4) Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony of the decedent's mother, which related a conversation had between her and the defendant, and revealed that the decedent had told the witness that the defendant had made incestuous overtures to her.
The trial under review was the third for the defendant for this crime, the first having resulted in a hung jury and the second in a conviction and a reversal. Robinson v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 517, 297 N.E.2d 409. A complete recital of the evidence is not required, as its sufficiency is questioned only in respect to the credibility of the lone eyewitness to the killing. A synopsis, however, will be beneficial, inasmuch as it will disclose the context in which our determinations and those of the trial court were made.
The victim, Patricia, was the twenty year old daughter of the defendant. At the time she was killed, she was living with a great aunt in Indianapolis, having moved there to escape her father's abnormal attentions and wrath and to continue her college work. There had been much discord between the defendant and Patricia and between the defendant and Patricia's mother, dating from Patricia's early high school days and centering upon her socializing with boys, which he had forbidden. Shortly following her graduation from high school, Patricia took a job and enrolled in college in Kokomo, where the family resided. She moved out of the defendant's household to get away from the defendant. This had her mother's approval but not that of the defendant. Subsequently, she moved back into the defendant's household to reduce expenses and upon defendant's promise that he would leave her alone and permit her to live as a young adult. The defendant, however, did not comply with his commitment, and Patricia subsequently moved out again. On many occasions, the defendant accosted Patricia, without cause, and made unfounded accusations and called her vile names, sometimes in the home and sometimes in public places. He followed her and chased her into her rented quarters on one occasion and on another occasion into the home of a girl friend. On several occasions, he struck her, and on one occasion he held her and other members of the family at bay with a thirteen inch kitchen knife and said that he would kill anyone who moved. This followed a family argument during which he forbade Patricia's going to Bloomington to school. On another occasion, approximately seven months prior to the killing, the defendant followed Patricia and her girl friend into church where they had gone to attend a Sunday School class, and demanded to know where the two had been the night before. He followed them into the building, grabbed Patricia by the arm and said that she did not have long to live. Ultimately, Patricia moved from Kokomo into the Indianapolis home of her mother's aunt, Mrs. Ethel Boren, where the murder occurred.
In the early evening of July 21, 1967, Patricia left the Indianapolis residence bound for church. Shortly, thereafter, she ran back into the house with the defendant pursuing her. As they came into the house, the defendant pulled a handgun from his trouser waistband, fired five shots into Patricia and fled.
The sole eyewitness to the slaying was the victim's great aunt, then seventy-eight years old and eighty-five years old when she identified the defendant as the assailant at his third trial. This in-court identification was the only direct evidence connecting the defendant with the crime.
The defendant attacks the sufficiency of the identification and urges this Court to employ the same "totality of the circumstances" test used to determine the reliability of in-court identifications which occur subsequent to impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification procedures. See e. g.: Neil v. Biggers, (1972) 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401; Simmons v. United States, (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247. That test, however, is compelled by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in order to exclude identification testimony when the reliability of such has been potentially affected by unreasonably suggestive police or prosecutorial misconduct, Cooper v. State, (1977) Ind., 359 N.E.2d 532. In this case, the defendant has made no showing that the identification testimony of the witness had been influenced in any way by any State action. Absent such a showing, when eyewitness identification is presented as a sufficiency issue upon appeal, there is no reason to treat it any differently than other evidence.
Baum v. State, (1976) Ind., 345 N.E.2d 831, 834, 835.
This Court normally will refuse to weigh the evidence or to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. Rosell v. State, (1976) Ind., 352 N.E.2d 750 and cases there cited. A conviction may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. Frith v. State, (1975) Ind., 325 N.E.2d 186; Jones v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 480, 255 N.E.2d 219. It goes without saying, however, that such evidence must support a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Gaddis v. State, (1969) 253 Ind. 73, 251 N.E.2d 658.
Although the witness was of advanced age, she was related to the defendant and had seen him several times prior to the slaying, albeit several years had passed since she had last seen him prior to the murder. The reliability of her identification had been skillfully explored by defendant's counsel on cross examination, and its weaknesses pointed out to the jury.
In Gaddis v. State, supra, this Court reversed a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence when equivocal eyewitness testimony was the only evidence of guilt. Here, the testimony was not equivocal, although it was perhaps subject to close scrutiny for reliability, owing to the witness' advanced years and some evidence revealing that she had been confused in her identification of the defendant at a prior trial. Additionally, there was considerable circumstantial evidence introduced, as revealed by our prior synopsis, which greatly reinforced the eyewitness' identification.
Following the testimony of Patricia's mother relating the aforementioned incident with the knife, the knife was admitted into evidence over the defendant's objection that it was not relevant to the crime charged. However, the testimony
concerning the threat made by [266 Ind. 609] the defendant was clearly relevant as tending to prove the elements of premeditation and malice, Dinning v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 399, 269 N.E.2d 371; and the introduction of the knife made that testimony more credible and portrayed the force of the threat. By seeing the actual knife used in the threat, the jury could better assess the seriousness of the threat and the credibility of the witness. "The fact that a piece of evidence makes an inference slightly more probable suffices to show its relevance." Magley v. State, (1975) Ind., 335 N.E.2d 811; Thomas v. State...
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