Robinson v. State, 1D02-0964.
Decision Date | 28 July 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 1D02-0964.,1D02-0964. |
Citation | 850 So.2d 658 |
Parties | Karlier ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General; Daniel A. David, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Appellant, Karlier Robinson, appeals the trial court's imposition of a split sentence upon revocation of his community control. Appellant first argues that the trial court's written sentence was illegal because it exceeded the statutory maximum for the underlying offense and failed to conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement. Appellant also argues that both the oral pronouncement and written sentence were illegal because they failed to credit appellant for the time he had previously served on community control. We agree with both arguments and, therefore, reverse appellant's sentence and remand for resentencing.
By information, the State charged appellant with exploitation of an elderly person, a third-degree felony punishable by a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment.1 On August 15, 2001, after appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere, the trial court sentenced appellant to two years' community control followed by three years' probation. Subsequently, an affidavit was filed charging appellant with five violations of community control. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on February 6, 2002, the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty of the violations, revoked his community control, and sentenced him to three years' incarceration followed by two years' probation. However, the trial court's written sentence imposed a split sentence of three years' imprisonment followed by three years' probation. Thus, the written sentence varied from the oral pronouncement and resulted in a longer sanction than that orally imposed. Appellant timely appealed. On April 30, 2002, during the pendency of this appeal, appellant filed a motion in the trial court to correct the illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). On July 22, 2002, eighty-three days after appellant filed his motion, the trial court entered a resentencing order correcting the inconsistency between the oral and written sentences but did not credit appellant for the time he had already served on community control.
Appellant first contends on appeal that the trial court's written sentence was illegal because it exceeded the statutory maximum for the underlying offense and failed to conform to the court's oral pronouncement. Newly imposed sanctions, whether of probation or of incarceration, "must not exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense." Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla.1995). Thus, the trial court's written sentence of three years' incarceration followed by three years' probation is illegal because it exceeds the five-year statutory maximum for the underlying offense. See id.; see also Henderson v. State, 720 So.2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ( ). Moreover, because the written sentence is inconsistent with the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls. See State v. Jones, 753 So.2d 1276, 1276 n. 2 (Fla.2000); Timmons v. State, 453 So.2d 143, 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Although the trial court attempted to correct its sentencing errors in its July 22, 2002, order,2 because the trial court entered its order in response to appellant's rule 3.800(b)(2) motion more than sixty days after appellant filed his motion, the motion is deemed denied and the order is a nullity. See Fla. R.Crim. Pro. 3.800(b)(2)(B); see also Campbell v. State, 789 So.2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ( ).
Appellant also contends that the trial court's oral pronouncement and written sentence were illegal because they failed to credit appellant for the time he had previously served on community control. We have previously held that a defendant who violates the probationary period of a split sentence is entitled to receive credit for time served on the incarcerative portion of the...
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...forbids jail-time credit for time spent in community control, with the limited exception adopted in Fraser. See Robinson v. State, 850 So.2d 658, 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding that "time served on community control may not be applied to a post-revocation sentence of incarceration"); Grif......
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Holmes v. State, 1D01-3409.
...order is a nullity and the appellant's motion is deemed denied. See Byrd v. State, 840 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Robinson v. State, 850 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(1)(B)(2003). Nonetheless, by filing a rule 3.800(b) motion, the appellant preserved this issue......
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...within sixty days, the motion is deemed denied. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B); Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(f)(6)(A); Robinson v. State, 850 So.2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). On appeal, appellant again raises both issues addressed in his rule 3.800(b)(2) Appellant's first issue on appeal, as......
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