Robinson v. State, 39552
| Decision Date | 17 January 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 39552,39552 |
| Citation | 223 Miss. 70,77 So.2d 265 |
| Parties | Mose ROBINSON v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
John E. Perkins, Natchez, for appellant.
J. P. Coleman, Atty. Gen., by Wm. E. Cresswell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Mose Robinson, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Humphreys County of rape, and was sentenced to death.
The prosecutrix is a resident of Louisiana, and a doctor's wife, with two small children. In jury, 1954, she was visiting relatives in Clarksdale, Mississippi. On Friday night, July 9, she left Clarksdale around 8 o'clock P. M., driving alone in her automobile. She planned to spend the night with friends in either Greenwood or Jackson, and then to drive on to her home in Louisiana the next day. Driving south, she arrived in Tchula around 11:30 P. M., and, after leaving there, she got on the wrong road and became lost. She wandered around for some time and asked directions at four different places, but was not successful in finding her way. The radiator of her car was running hot, and around 2 o'clock A. M., she stopped her car in front of three houses, and remained there until daylight. After dawn she again started the car and drove it almost to a gravel road near a little church, where the car stalled again. She got out of the car and walked up a country road on Refuge Plantation in Humphreys County, which is about 12 miles from Belzoni. She passed two Negro men with a mule, and inquired of one family as to where she was. They also gave her a drink of water.
She then walked back to her car, and saw the defendant and S. L. Venable, both Negroes, sitting in it. She directed them to leave, and they walked a short distance away. She got in the car and defendant and Venable reappeared. Defendant jerked her out of the car by her hair and arms, and, while she was struggling and fighting him, he carried her into a small wooded tract near the church, where the defendant raped her. She escaped before Venable could commit the same crime. While defendant was committing the rape, Venable stood by watching and holding a mule.
Harrison Carter, a young Negro boy somewhat over 10 years of age, and a nehew of the defendant, testified that he had earlier that Saturday morning given the prosecutrix a drink of water; that he heard her 'hollering' and he went into the woods behind the church, where he saw the defendant commit the rape of her; that Venable was standing by holding the mule, and when appellant completed the rape, Carter led the mule back to his house.
R. J. Pope, a produce salesman who lived on Refuge Plantation, testified that around 7 to 7:30 A. M. that Saturday morning, July 10, an old Negro man came to his house and reported to him that there was a white and they drove to where the prosecutrix' and they drove to where the prosecutrix' car was parked. Clothes were scattered all over the interior of the car. He could not find the woman, so he drove up the road a distance, near the church, where he heard a female voice calling. He then drove to a nearby store and had someone call the sheriff. Returning to the scene, the prosecutrix was coming out of the wooded area, apparently in a hysterical condition. She told him, 'Watch out they will get you.' She would not talk with him until the sheriff arrived. He also saw 'a little boy', apparently Harrison Carter, coming out of the area leading a mule. The next morning, Sunday, R. J. Pope went to the area where he had heard her hollering and found a woman's underclothing, 'step-ins', and the grass and briars had been considerably disturbed.
Appellant was arrested on the next day, Sunday, July 11, and signed a written confession that he committed the crime. It was undisputedly voluntary, and was not objected to. This confession confirms in substantial detail the testimony of the prosecutrix, Pope, and Carter. Appellant did not testify in the trial. His only defense was a claim of insanity at the time of the offense and of the trial.
Appellant contends that the verdict and judgment are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and are not supported by the evidence. There is no foundation whatever for this contention. The prosecutrix and Carter testified as eyewitnesses to the crime. Pope's testimony further coroborates in numerous details that of the prosecutrix and Cater. Appellant signed a voluntary written confession describing his actions and the crime in detail. And the facts stated in that confession are fully corroborated by the testimony of the State's witnesses. Appellant says that the prosecutrix did not identify him as the person who committed the crime, but we think that her testimony unequivocally states that appellant was the man who committed the criminal acts in question. Appellant's guilt is clear and undisputed.
It is also argued that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a continuance. The crime occurred on Saturday morning, July 10, 1954. Appellant was arrested on Sunday morning, July 11, and that afternoon he signed a written confession. The Circuit Court of Humphreys County was then in its regular July term. It had convened on Monday, July 5, for four Code of 1942, Sec. 1398. The circuit judge recalled the grand jury. On Monday, July 12, appellant was indicted for rape, and the trial court appointed an attorney to represent him. On Tuesday July 13, he filed a motion for a continuance to the next term, setting up as the sole ground 'that the defendant and his attorney will not have sufficient time during this term of court to prepare his defense properly.' On the same day, July 13, this motion was overruled, and a severance was granted. Appellant then filed another and identical motion for a continuance, which was overruled also on July 13. His motion for a special venire was sustained on July 13, and the jurors were ordered summoned for Friday, July 16. The trial, verdict and judgment were had on Friday, July 16.
This Court has held and Code Sec. 1520 provides that the granting of a continuance is largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and that refusal of a continuance will not be grounds for reversal unless that discretion has been abused and the court is satisfied that injustice has resulted therefrom. Code Sec. 2518 states that 'All indictments shall be tried at the first term, unless good cause be shown for a continuance.' Miss.Const. of 1890, Sec. 24, provides that justice shall be administered without delay, and Sec. 26 guarantees to an accused 'a speedy and public trial'. This case presented no complicated factual or legal questions. All of the witnesses, except the prosecutrix, apparently resided in the community in Humphreys County, and all were available to both sides. The only exception would be a Memphis doctor, who will be discussed when the defense of insanity is considered.
Appellant did not comply with the requirements of Sec. 1520. He attached no affidavits in support of his motions for continuance. He offered no evidence in the record in support of his motions for continuance, and made no showing that any particular witness or evidence was not available. He did not renew his motion for a continuance at the commencement of the trial. After the trial, his motion for a new trial did not assign the denial of a continuance as an error, and contained no affidavits or other evidence indicating what any absent witness might testify to, or indicating any prejudice to him. Thus appellant failed to comply with the long established rule of Lamar v. State, 1885, 63 Miss. 265; Bolin v. State, 1950, 209 Miss. 866, 48 So.2d 581. The court appointed for appellant an able attorney of Humphreys County, and apparently he made for appellant the only feasible defense, insanity. All of the State's witnesses, except the prosecutrix, were cross-examined in detail by appellant's counsel, and he appears to have been as well represented as the facts of the case permitted. Considering the entire record, we are of the opinion that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a continuance, and that no injustice has resulted from such denial. Appellant was clearly guilty of the crime, and the jury found against him on his plea of insanity. Other cases somewhat similar to the instant one on the denial of a continuance are Newell v. State, 1950, 209 Miss. 653, 48 So.2d 332; Freeman v. State, Miss.1901, 29 So. 75; and Jones v. State, 1882, 60 Miss. 117. See also 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 478; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 131. The determination of the time to prepare to be allowed to accused and his counsel must necessarily be left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court, to be determined from all the...
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