Robinson v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 02 May 1912
• Citation: 68 Wash. 351,123 P. 444
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: ROBINSON et ux. v. TAYLOR.

123 P. 444

68 Wash. 351

ROBINSON et ux. v. TAYLOR.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 2, 1912

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; King Dykeman Judge.

Action by Anson Robinson and wife against Walter C. Taylor. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Hastings & Stedman and Edward L. Turner, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Weter &amp Roberts, of Seattle, for respondents.

ELLIS J.

On September 18, 1903, the defendant, Walter C. Taylor, and his wife, being then the owners of tract No. 2 of Kelsey's Brighton Beach acre tracts, located in King county, Wash and at present within the city limits of Seattle, conveyed a part thereof to the plaintiffs by the following description: 'The north half of tract two (2) of Kelsey's Brighton Beach acre tracts.' The defendant's wife is now dead; and he has succeeded to whatever interest she had in the premises in controversy. Tract 2 is of irregular shape, bounded on the greater part of the east side by a diagonal line, running in a northwesterly direction, bordering Rainier avenue; the remainder of the east line running north and south. It is bounded on the north by Graham avenue, running east and west, on the south by an alley, also running east and west, and on the west by Forty-Sixth avenue, running north and south. In shape, it is a rectangle, with a considerable triangle cut off of the northeast corner, making the north line less than half as long as the south line. The west boundary is an unbroken line. The east boundary is a broken line, with a considerable angle. The plaintiffs, respondents here, claim that the deed to them conveyed one-half in area of this tract. The defendant claims all of the land south of a line drawn parallel with the south boundary of tract 2 from a point bisecting the west boundary line. The defendant was in possession of all of the south part of tract 2 up to a line so drawn. The land in dispute, and for the possession of which the plaintiffs sued, is the strip, a little over 33 1/2 feet wide, lying between that line and a line dividing tract 2 into north and south halves, according to area. The case was tried to the court without a jury. A judgment was rendered, awarding the possession of the land in dispute to the plaintiffs, quieting their title thereto, and for costs. The defendant has appealed.

The refusal of the court to allow the appellant to introduce testimony as to transactions and conversations had between the parties, prior to the execution of the deed, for the purpose of showing what the intention of the parties was at the time the deed was executed, is assigned as error.

Was this testimony properly excluded? As stated by the appellant, 'this is the sole and only question presented by this appeal.' This question must be answered in the affirmative. There is no ambiguity in the description. In themselves, the words used are clear and distinct, and such that in ordinary use would have been one meaning. When we come to apply them to the subject-matter, we find nothing to introduce any element of uncertainty. The description calls for the north half of a definite tract of land. Suppose that tract 2 had been a perfect rectangle. It must be conceded that in such a case there would be no ambiguity. We can conceive of no reason why the mere fact that the whole tract is not a rectangle should in any manner change the ordinary meaning of the words 'north half.' In deeds, as in other instruments, 'words which are not technical must be construed as bearing their ordinary signification.' 2 Devlin on Real Estate (3d Ed.) § 837, p. 1517; Bradshaw v. Bradbury, 64 Mo. 334.

The word 'half,' in its literal signification, is a quantitative term. When applied to a given thing capable of division into two equal parts, it means one of those parts. 'The term 'half' is as definite as the whole, and it could scarcely be contended that, if, by mistake, the deed had been of the whole lot, parol proof could be received to prove that but half was intended to be conveyed. If a term is equivocal or technical, parol proof may be resorted to to define it, as we refer to dictionaries or books of art or science. There are many terms in engineering which are not altogether familiar to persons uninstructed; and where they occur in contracts or evidence, unless the parties agree in their import, proof of their true import must be resorted to. But it would not be competent to prove that a week meant 4 days, or a rod, in engineering, 10 feet or that a solid yard of masonry consisted of but 20 solid feet. The proof offered, and which was received, was of this character, although not altogether so obviously so as the illustrations given above. The deeds of former owners of the land, although of record in the registry of deeds, not being referred to in this deed, can neither restrict nor extend the import of the terms used.' Butler...