Robinson v. U.S. Bureau of Prison

• Decision Date: 07 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-CV-0190.,02-CV-0190.
• Parties: Joyce ROBINSON, as Successor in interest and surviving heir to decedent, Vernon Miller, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS; U.S. Bureau of Prisons' Raybrook Federal Correctional Facility; John Nash, Warden U.S. Bureau of Prisons' Raybrook Federal Correctional Facility; Daniel Mercado, as an individual and in his official capacity at the Raybrook Correctional Facility; and John Doe(s), unknown correctional officers, at U.S.B.P. Raybrook Correctional Facility, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

244 F.Supp.2d 57

Joyce ROBINSON, as Successor in interest and surviving heir to decedent, Vernon Miller, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS; U.S. Bureau of Prisons' Raybrook Federal Correctional Facility; John Nash, Warden U.S. Bureau of Prisons' Raybrook Federal Correctional Facility; Daniel Mercado, as an individual and in his official capacity at the Raybrook Correctional Facility; and John Doe(s), unknown correctional officers, at U.S.B.P. Raybrook Correctional Facility, Defendants.

No. 02-CV-0190.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

February 7, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Smith, Hirsch, Blackshear & Harris, PLC, Attorney for Plaintiff, Nashville, TN, Fannie J. Harris, Esq.

Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Attorneys for Defendants, Albany, James C. Woods, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Of Counsel.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

HURD, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Joyce Robinson commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1988, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution arising out of the death of her son, Vernon Miller ("Miller"), while he was incarcerated at the Ray Brook Federal Correctional Institution in Ray Brook, New York ("FCI Ray Brook"). Defendants now move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiff opposes. The motion was taken on submit without oral argument.

II. FACTS

At all times relevant hereto, Miller was Sin the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons at the FCI Ray Brook. (PL's Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 1.) In the evening of May 30, 1999, he was playing chess with another inmate, Isa Gray ("Gray"), in the Genesee Housing Unit ("GHU"). (Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 2.) The chess game escalated into a physical altercation between Miller and Gray. (PL's Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 8; Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 4.) Gray ultimately stabbed Miller in the chest with a sharpened metal shank. (Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 14.¹) Defendant Corrections Officer Daniel Mercado ("Mercado"), the only officer supervising the inmates in the unit, did not witness the fight. (PL's Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶¶ 7, 9.)

At 8:30 p.m., prison officials scheduled a facility-wide move whereby inmates were moved from one area within the prison to another. (Id. at ¶ 11.) During the move, Mercado was positioned in front of the GHU where he could observe the common area of the prison yard and open the door of the unit. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.) Miller ran out of the unit, stated that he had been stabbed, and that he thought he was going to die. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Mercado reached out for Miller and activated his body alarm. (Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 8.) Miller pulled away from Mercado and headed toward the Health Services Unit ("HSU"). (PL's Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 15.) While walking toward the HSU, Senior Officer Davis arrived and attempted to assist Miller to the HSU. (Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at 19.; Pl's Mem. of Law, Ex. A at pp. 4-5.²) On the way to the HSU, Miller collapsed. (Pl's Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 15.)

Shortly after Mercado radioed for assistance, FCI Ray Brook Emergency Medical Technician Steven Orman ("Orman") responded to the scene. (Pl's Ex. A, p. 14.; Def.'s Ex. 2; Def.'s Ex. 5.) Orman observed that Miller had lost a significant amount of blood (at least one liter) and continued to bleed heavily. (Def.'s Exs. 2, 5.) Prison officials requested an ambulance. (Id.; Pl's Ex. D.) Although the records submitted are difficult to discern, it appears that prison officials called for an ambulance shortly after Mercado learned of Miller's injury. (Pl's Ex. D; Def.'s Ex. 2.³) According to prison medical records Miller was alert and fully oriented when Orman arrived. (Def.'s Ex. 2, 5.) Orman proceeded to render first aid to Miller which consisted of applying direct pressure to the wound and providing oxygen and intravenous fluids. (Def.'s Ex. 2, 5; Pl's Ex. A, p. 14-15.) Orman's records provide that Miller's heart sounded

clear and regular/rapid. Pt complained of being cold and was very restless. Pt moved to ambulance stretcher and removed from institution for hospital treatment. Pt. remained alert and lucid throughout the time and was being cared for by HSU staff.

(Def.'s Ex. 2.)

During the time Miller was receiving treatment, prison officials also were investigating the incident. Prison officials questioned Miller about who was responsible for the stabbing. (Pl's Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 17; Pl's Ex. A, p. 9.) Miller allegedly responded that Gray did it. (Pl's Ex. A, p. 9.) Another officer displayed a picture of an inmate to Miller and asked whether the picture was of the perpetrator. (Id.) Miller responded that the inmate in the picture, Gray, stabbed him. (Id.)

The ambulance took Miller to the Adirondack Medical Center Emergency Room. According to hospital records, he arrived in the emergency room at 9:24 p.m. (Def.'s Ex. 2.) Miller died at 10:49 p.m. as he was being prepared for the operating room. (Id.) Miller's death certificate states that the immediate cause of death was internal and external exsanguination (i.e., he bled to death).

Joyce Robinson was appointed by the Illinois state courts as the representative of her son's estate. The instant action was commenced on February 13, 2002.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because defendants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, plaintiff is on notice that defendants seek summary judgment. Plaintiff and defendants submitted materials outside the pleadings. Further, plaintiff does not claim that she has not had sufficient opportunity to develop the facts necessary to oppose defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f); Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1989) (party seeking additional discovery prior to disposition of summary judgment motion must file affidavit with district court stating (i) what facts are sought; (ii) how they create genuine issue; (hi) what effort has been made to obtain them; and (iv) why efforts have been unsuccessful). Accordingly, the instant motion will be treated as one made pursuant to Rule 56.

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The ultimate inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented, the legitimate inferences that could be drawn from that evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and the applicable burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining a motion for summary judgment, all inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in the exhibits and depositions "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir.1987). Nevertheless, "the litigant opposing summary judgment `may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials' as a vehicle for obtaining a trial." Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir.1980) (quoting SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.1978)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

1. Proper Basis for Claims

Plaintiff brings the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal agencies or employees. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims will be treated as ones brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir.1994); Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (construing pro se section 1983 claims against federal defendants as Bivens claims), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898, 109 S.Ct. 242,102 L.Ed.2d 231 (1988).

2. Qualified Immunity

The individual defendants first contend that plaintiffs constitutional claims should be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity.

[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. What this means in practice is that whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if either (a) the defendant's action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law. A right is clearly established if (1) the law is defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has recognized the right, and (3) a reasonable defendant would have understood from the existing law that [his] conduct was unlawful. The question is not what a lawyer would learn or intuit from researching case law, but what a reasonable person in the defendant's position should know about the constitutionality of the...