Robinson v. United States
| Decision Date | 27 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-cv-00514 |
| Parties | MIGUEL ROBINSON Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. No. 1, “Petition”), supported by a memorandum of law (Doc. No. 2, “Memorandum in Support”) and supplemental petition (Doc. No. 9 “Supplemental Petition”), wherein Petitioner seeks vacatur of his conviction and sentence in his underlying criminal case (case no. 3:16-cr-219-1) by which he is serving a prison term of 204 months. The Government filed a response in opposition to the Petition, and the Supplemental Petition (Doc. No. 28, “Response”) and Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. No. 34).
For the reasons discuss, the Petition (Doc. No. 1) and Supplemental Petition (Doc. No. 9) will be DENIED.
BACKGROUND[1]
In an indictment filed on November 2, 2016, Petitioner was charged in Counts One through Four, with: (i) possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count One); (ii) possession of firearms subsequent to a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (Count Two); (iii) possession of ammunition subsequent to a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (Count Three); and (iv) possession of firearms in furtherance of a federal drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Four).[2] (Doc. No. 1-1, “Indictment”). On July 31, 2017, Petitioner pled guilty to Counts One through Four of the Indictment. (Doc. No. 66). On December 13, 2017, Chief Judge Waverly Crenshaw sentenced Petitioner to serve a term of imprisonment of 204 months total (144 months on Count One, 120 months on Counts Two and Three, to all run concurrently, plus 60 months on Count Four to run consecutively to the other three counts), followed by four years of supervised release. (Doc. No. 73). Thereafter, Petitioner appealed, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. (Doc. Nos. 75, 76, 79, 80); United States v. Robinson, 744 Fed.Appx. 277 (6th Cir. 2018). Petitioner has been serving his sentence at United States Penitentiary Hazelton. According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Petitioner's projected release date is April 25, 2031. See Federal Inmate Locator, Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed Sept. 6, 2022).
On June 20, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant Petition.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides a statutory mechanism for challenging the imposition of a federal sentence:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In order to obtain relief under Section 2255, a petitioner “‘must demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury's verdict.'” Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003)).
If a material factual dispute arises in a Section 2255 proceeding, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute. Ray v. United States, 721 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 2013). But a petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he has not alleged any facts that, even if accepted as true, would entitle the petitioner to federal habeas relief. See McSwain v. Davis, 287 Fed.Appx. 450, 458 (6th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, a hearing may be unnecessary precisely because they cannot be accepted as true; that is, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary “‘if the petitioner's allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.'” Monea v. United States, 914 F.3d 414, 422 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Valentine v. United States, 488 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2007)). Relatedly, an evidentiary hearing likewise is not required if the record conclusively shows that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Ray, 721 F.3d at 761; Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999).
In Grounds One and Two, Petitioner asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the suppression hearing (Ground One) and during the plea process (Ground Two).
A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective assistance” of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “It has long been settled that a guilty plea is open to attack on the ground that counsel did not provide the defendant with reasonably competent advice.” Hunter v. United States, 160 F.3d 1109, 1115 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth a test to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a break down in the adversary process that rendered the result unreliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.[3] Under the first prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner must establish that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance....” Id. at 688. Strategic choices made by counsel after thorough investigation are virtually unchallengeable. Id. at 690. Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was deficient. See Short v. United States, 471 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Under the second prong of Strickland, the petitioner must establish that the attorney's poor performance prejudiced the defense of the case. Monea, 914 F.3d at 419. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). “Proving prejudice is not easy.” Id. Petitioners face a “high burden” in demonstrating “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 536 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel on the first appeal by right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97 (1985). Court-appointed counsel, however, does not have a constitutional duty to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by a defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). An attorney's failure to present a non-meritorious issue on appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Daniel v. Overton, 845 F.Supp. 1170, 1176 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
During the pretrial stage of Petitioner's case, his counsel filed a motion to suppress that challenged the constitutionality of the search warrant executed by law enforcement at Petitioner's home. (R. 15). After a full evidentiary hearing, Judge Crenshaw found that the warrant affidavit lacked the requisite nexus to support probable cause, but that the search did not violate Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights because law enforcement acted in good faith when relying on the warrant, and that therefore the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) was applicable. (R. 35). Petitioner's counsel moved to reopen the hearing, arguing that evidence not presented in the first evidentiary hearing would establish that law enforcement specifically Detective Nearn, “w[as] dishonest or reckless in preparing [his] affidavit” and thus the Leon good-faith exception did not apply. (R. 52). Judge Crenshaw denied the motion to reopen the hearing, finding that Petitioner's counsel had “not presented a reasonable explanation as to why he did not present this evidence . . . on the initial motion to suppress.” (R. 58 at 1). Judge Crenshaw further explained that “even if [the Court] were to reopen the hearing, none of [Petitioner's] averments make the Court question whether Detective Nearn was ‘dishonest or reckless.'” (Id. at 2). Petitioner filed a motion asking Judge Crenshaw to reconsider that ruling, and that request was denied. (R. 59, R. 63). In his Petition, Petitioner argues that his counsel, by failing to introduce evidence of bad faith during the initial suppression hearing, rendered ineffective assistance of co...
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