Robinson v. Vanex Tube Corp.
| Decision Date | 25 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–T–0087.,2014–T–0087. |
| Citation | 58 N.E.3d 430 |
| Parties | John W. ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. VANEX TUBE CORPORATION, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Raymond J. Masek, Warren, OH, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.
Brendan J. Keating, Guarnieri & Secrest, P.L.L., Warren, OH, for Defendant–Appellee.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT
, J.
{¶ 1} This is from a final order in a civil case before the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court dismissed one claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
and granted summary judgment on two other claims. Focusing upon the summary judgment ruling, appellants, John Robinson and Richard Limber, maintain that the court erred in entering judgment against them on their age discrimination claims because there was conflicting evidence concerning whether appellees, Vanex Tubing Corporation and VTC Services, Inc., rehired a younger person to do the same jobs they performed before being laid off. For the following reasons, the summary judgment ruling on the age discrimination claims was proper, but dismissal of Robinson's constructive fraud claim was not.
{¶ 2} Vanex is a manufacturer of steel tubing, with its principal place of business in Niles, Ohio. In addition to owning shares in Vanex, James Griffin is also the human resources director of the company. Separate from Vanex, Griffin is the sole owner of VTC Services, engaged in the business of hiring employees who then perform work for Vanex. While VTC Services does not provide workers to any other company, Vanex still hires some of its employees directly.
{¶ 3} John Robinson was employed by Vanex for fifteen years. Near the end of his employment, Robinson worked as a facing machine operator. In contrast, even though Richard Limber was also a facing machine operator at Vanex, he was employed by VTC Services during his entire seventeen-year tenure. Neither had an employment contract, and neither was covered under a collective bargaining agreement. Both Robinson and Limber were employees-at-will.
{¶ 4} In the last few months of 2008, Vanex's business decreased. As a result, in January 2009, a number of Vanex and VTC Services employees were terminated using the “last hire-first fire” method. Over the next six months, Vanex did not see any improvement in sales. Thus, in July 2009, there were additional cuts in its workforce. This time, however, ties were severed with all facing machine operators.
{¶ 5} On July 23, 2009, both Robinson and Limber received written notice that they were being placed on “permanent lay-off.” Both men were at least sixty-five years old. A third facing machine operator, Tim Durr, then thirty-one years old, was also laid off.
{¶ 6} Nine months later, VTC Services rehired Durr who was then assigned to Vanex. Durr was the only facing machine operator to be recalled by either Vanex or VTC Services. Robinson and Limber were not recalled.
{¶ 7} In April 2013, Robinson brought the underlying action against Vanex only. In addition to alleging that his employment was unlawfully terminated as a result of his age, Robinson further asserted that Vanex perpetrated a constructive fraud.
{¶ 8} After Vanex filed its answer, Robinson moved to add Limber as a second plaintiff. In denying this motion, the trial court held that the addition of Limber would not be “just” because Vanex had already submitted a responsive pleading. In light of this, Limber instituted a separate case against Vanex. In addition to stating his own claim for age discrimination, Limber alleged that his termination resulted in the breach of express and implied representations made during the course of his employment.
{¶ 9} As the parties were engaging in discovery, Robinson moved the trial court to consolidate his case with Limber's for purposes of trying the two age discrimination claims together. In granting this motion, the trial court expressly limited its consolidation order to the “age discrimination matter.” Nonetheless, the two cases were subsequently treated as if they had been consolidated for all purposes. For example, when Limber moved to add VTC Services as the second defendant in his case, the motion was filed under Robinson's case number, as was the court's judgment granting Limber's motion.
{¶ 10} After discovery was completed, Vanex and VTC Services filed a motion seeking either dismissal of Robinson's and Limber's age discrimination claims under Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
or summary judgment under Civ.R. 56(C). Under the dismissal aspect of the motion, they contended that the discrimination claims failed to state viable grounds for relief because Robinson's and Limber's complaints did not reference R.C. Chapter 4112. Under the summary judgment aspect, appellees maintained that the undisputed facts did not support a finding of age discrimination because Tim Durr was not rehired to do the same job that Robinson and Limber had performed prior to being laid off. Via affidavit, James Griffin, as human resources director for Vanex, averred that Durr was rehired to unload trucks, not as a facing machine operator.
{¶ 11} In response to appellees' motion, Robinson and Limber first asserted that both of their age discrimination claims would be going forward under R.C. 4112.14
. As to the summary judgment aspect of the motion, Robinson and Limber challenged appellees' contention as to the nature of Tim Durr's job when he was rehired in March 2010. Attached to their response was an excerpt from John Robinson's deposition. According to the excerpt, Robinson testified that he spoke with Durr immediately after Durr was recalled to work, and Durr stated that he had been rehired as a facing machine operator.
{¶ 12} The trial court dismissed Robinson's constructive fraud claim on the grounds that it failed to state a viable claim for relief under Ohio law and granted summary judgment on both age discrimination claims. In concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be litigated, the trial court held that Robinson and Limber failed to present any evidence to rebut appellees' contention that Durr was not rehired to work as a facing machine operator.
{¶ 13} Robinson and Limber raise two assignments of error for review:
{¶ 14} “[1.] The trial court committed prejudicial error in dismissing all causes of action in the complaints of appellants when the only issue before the trial court pursuant to its order of consolidation dated November 27, 2013 was the age discrimination matter.
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} Under their first assignment, appellants contest the trial court's ruling dismissing Robinson's constructive fraud claim. According to them, the substance of the constructive fraud claim should not have been addressed because the two underlying cases were proceeding solely on the age discrimination claims. In support, appellants emphasize that the trial court's order to consolidate their cases was expressly limited to the two discrimination claims.
{¶ 17} Appellants' motion to consolidate was made pursuant to Civ.R. 42(A)(1)
, which allows a trial court to consolidate civil cases for hearing or trial when they involve common issues of law or fact. The rule further provides that a consolidation order can apply to all or some of the issues in the cases. Regarding the underlying cases, the trial court specifically limited its consolidation order to the two discrimination claims asserted in Robinson's and Limber's respective complaints. When the parties were prepared to place the age discrimination claims before the trial court for final determination, the two cases would go forward together.
{¶ 18} However, the trial court's consolidation order did not contain any language staying the rest of Robinson's complaint, i.e., his constructive fraud claim, until after final disposition of the age discrimination claims. To this extent, the consolidation order did not prohibit appellees from filing a dispositive motion on the construction fraud claim.
{¶ 19} Yet, appellees' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment readily shows that they never sought dismissal of the constructive fraud claim. While appellees referenced Robinson's constructive fraud allegation in summarizing his complaint, no argument to dismiss that claim was presented. Instead, both aspects of appellees' motion pertained solely to the age discrimination claims. Therefore, in dismissing Robinson's constructive fraud claim, the trial court proceeded sua sponte.
{¶ 20} “In general, a court may dismiss a complaint on its own motion pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
only if the parties are given notice of the court's intention to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 72 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 1995-Ohio-251, . A trial court errs when it dismisses a complaint, sua sponte, without first notifying all parties of its intent. Mayrides v. Franklin Cty. Prosecutor's Office (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 381, 384, . The exception to this rule is where the complaint is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint. State ex rel. Edwards, 72 Ohio St.3d at 108 .
{¶ 21} “A sua sponte dismissal without notice or an opportunity to respond is fundamentally unfair to litigants.
. It places the court in the role of a proponent rather than an independent entity. Id. Sua sponte dismissals also prejudice [plaintiffs] as they deny any opportunity to respond to the alleged insufficiencies. Id. at 384 .” Moore v. Houses on the Move, Inc., 177 Ohio App.3d 585, 2008-Ohio-3552, 895 N.E.2d 579, ¶ 12–13 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 22} As the trial court dismissed Robinson's claim without notice or affording him an opportunity...
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