Robinson v. Vill. of Sauk Vill.
| Decision Date | 09 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-20-0223,1-20-0223 |
| Parties | Javier ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF SAUK VILLAGE, the Village of Crete, Mark Bugajski, Andrew Vaughan, Allen Rinchich and Juan Garcia, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Kevin O'Connor and Cameron J. Tober, of O'Connor Law Firm, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.
Timothy C. Lapp, of Hiskes, Dillner, O'Donnell, Marovich & Lapp, Ltd., of South Holland, for appellees Village of Sauk Village, Mark Bugajski, and Andrew Vaughan.
Patrick H. O'Connor, of Hartigan & O'Connor P.C., of Chicago, for other appellees.
John K. Kennedy and Daniel Watkins II, of Kennedy Watkins LLC, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
¶ 1 The plaintiff, Javier Robinson, filed the instant action against the defendants, the Village of Sauk Village, the Village of Crete, Officer Mark Bugajski, Officer Andrew Vaughan, Officer Allen Rinchich, and Officer Juan Garcia, seeking damages for injuries he sustained when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Mark Coffey who was fleeing from the police.1 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants, and the plaintiff has appealed. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the matter for further proceedings.
¶ 2 The plaintiff filed a six-count complaint, charging the individual defendants with willful and wanton conduct that proximately resulted in the injuries he sustained when he was struck by Coffey's vehicle. The complaint also sought recovery from the two village defendants under the doctrine of respondeat superior by reason of the actions of their respective individual defendant-employees. The Village of Sauk Village, Bugajski, and Vaughan (collectively the Sauk Village defendants) answered the plaintiff's complaint, denying the material allegations of willful and wanton conduct. The Village of Crete, Rinchich, and Garcia (collectively the Village of Crete defendants) answered the plaintiff's complaint, denying the material allegations of willful and wanton conduct and raising seven affirmative defenses, including immunities under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) ( 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2016)). Thereafter, the Sauk Village defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Bugajski and Vaughan asserted immunity under section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2016) ), arguing that their actions did not rise to the level of willful and wanton conduct; a lack of proximate cause; and immunity under section 4-106 of the Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/4-106 (West 2016) ). The Village of Sauk Village asserted immunity under section 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 2016) ). The Village of Crete defendants also moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under sections 4-106 and 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act. Garcia also asserted immunity under section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2016) ). On January 9, 2020, the circuit court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.
¶ 3 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2018). Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. In re Estate of Hoover , 155 Ill. 2d 402, 411, 185 Ill.Dec. 866, 615 N.E.2d 736 (1993). In conducting that review, we have examined all of the pleadings and evidentiary material on file at the time of the entry of the orders appealed from in their light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kolakowski v. Voris , 83 Ill. 2d 388, 398, 47 Ill.Dec. 392, 415 N.E.2d 397 (1980). From that evidentiary material taken with its inferences most favorable to the plaintiff (see Lapidot v. Memorial Medical Center , 144 Ill. App. 3d 141, 147, 98 Ill.Dec. 716, 494 N.E.2d 838 (1986) ), we adduce the following facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
¶ 4 On August 10, 2017, Rinchich, Officer Patrick Hoernig, and Garcia were working the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift as police officers for the Village of Crete. Rinchich and Hoernig were patrol officers; Garcia was a sergeant and the officer in charge. While patrolling, Rinchich heard a radio dispatch of a recently stolen black Buick LaCrosse (hereinafter referred to as the black Buick), and soon thereafter, he saw what he believed to be the stolen black Buick traveling in the opposite direction. Rinchich made a U-turn in his patrol car and began following the black Buick. After following behind the vehicle for approximately a quarter of a mile, Rinchich activated the flashing lights on his patrol car in an effort to cause the vehicle to stop. After Rinchich activated the flashing lights on his patrol car, the black Buick being driven by Coffey sped up. Rinchich gave chase and radioed Hoernig and Garcia, informing them that the black Buick would not stop. Garcia and Hoernig joined in the chase behind Rinchich. Coffey, driving the black Buick, led the officers through multiple jurisdictions at high rates of speed, at times upwards of 90 miles per hour, disregarding traffic signals and into oncoming traffic. The black Buick came to a stop in a churchyard in Dyer, Indiana. Upon entering the churchyard in pursuit, Rinchich positioned his patrol car perpendicular to the black Buick with the headlights of the patrol car shining on the driver's side. Rinchich exited his patrol car with his weapon drawn and yelled "hands" at Coffey. When Garcia and Hoernig arrived, they placed their patrol cars adjacent to and behind Rinchich's vehicle. Both officers exited their vehicles with their weapons drawn.
¶ 5 Bugajski and Vaughan, police officers in the Village of Sauk Village, were eating in the Sauk Village police station when they heard a radio dispatch that police officers from the Village of Crete were in pursuit of a stolen vehicle. Both officers got into their respective patrol cars and drove to the area where the radio dispatch indicated that the pursuit was heading. Before Bugajski and Vaughan could locate the pursuit, they were advised that it had passed out of Sauk Village. The two officers continued to monitor their radios as they patrolled in Sauk Village until they heard a subsequent radio broadcast that the pursuit was heading back into Sauk Village. The officers drove toward Steger Road and Torrence where they could see flashing lights in the distance.
The next radio broadcast stated that the fleeing black Buick was heading in the direction of a church parking lot on Steger Road in Dyer, Indiana. Bugajski proceeded to the church parking lot where he observed the three patrol cars from the Village of Crete and the three officers from the Village of Crete, Rinchich, Garcia, and Hoernig, out of their patrol cars with their weapons drawn and pointed at Coffey who was seated in the black Buick with its engine running.
¶ 6 Rinchich got no closer than 10 or 15 feet from the black Buick. Coffey remained in the vehicle with the engine running and never opened the door of the car. One minute and nineteen seconds after Rinchich arrived in the church parking lot, Coffey put the black Buick in gear and drove off. Rinchich, Garcia, and Hoernig followed in pursuit. Bugajski, along with Vaughan, who had arrived in the church parking lot after the black Buick drove off, monitored the chase on the radio, blocked off intersections, and at times joined in the pursuit.
¶ 7 The black Buick driven by Coffey reentered Illinois with Rinchich, Garcia, and Hoernig in pursuit. The black Buick and the pursuing officers were traveling at high rates of speed, which at times were upwards of 100 miles per hour, disregarding traffic signals and into oncoming traffic. The chase traveled through a residential neighborhood where Coffey exited the black Buick, got into another vehicle, and drove off. After Coffey switched cars, Vaughan began pursuing that vehicle with Hoernig and Garcia following. As the vehicle in which Coffey was traveling sped through the intersection of 221st Street and Sauk Trail, it struck the plaintiff who was walking across the street in a crosswalk. Coffey continued to flee, returning to Indiana where he was shot and killed by a local police officer. The plaintiff was taken to a hospital in an ambulance.
¶ 8 On January 9, 2020, the circuit court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In its oral ruling, the circuit court found that the defendants were immune from liability under section 4-106 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provides that neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for any injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner. See 745 ILCS 10/4-106 (West 2016). The circuit court reasoned that, at the point in time that the police officers pointed their guns at Coffey as he sat in the black Buick in the church parking lot, he was in custody as no reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave, and that when he struck the plaintiff, he was an escaping prisoner. Following the hearing, the circuit court entered a written order, granting both the Sauk Village defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the Village of Crete defendants’ motion for summary judgment "for the reasons stated on the record."
¶ 9 In urging reversal of the summary judgments entered in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff argues that, at the time he was struck, Coffey was not an escaped or escaping prisoner, and as a consequence, the defendants are not immune from liability under section 4-106 of the Tort Immunity Act. He contends that Coffey "was not in custody in the church parking lot as there was no limitation on his freedom of movement before he fled from...
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Robinson v. Vill. of Sauk Vill.
...police officers were chasing was not "an escaped or escaping prisoner" within the meaning of the Tort Immunity Act. 2021 IL App (1st) 200223, 449 Ill.Dec. 171, 178 N.E.3d 778. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND¶ 3 Plaintiff, Javier Robins......