Robinson v. Vill. of Sauk Vill.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 127236 |
| Citation | 2022 IL 127236,201 N.E.3d 1091,460 Ill.Dec. 618 |
| Parties | Javier ROBINSON, Appellee, v. The VILLAGE OF SAUK VILLAGE et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Timothy C. Lapp, of Hiskes Dillner O'Donnell Marovich & Lapp, Ltd., of South Holland, and Patrick H. O'Connor, of Hartigan & O'Connor P.C., of Chicago, for appellants.
Kevin W. O'Connor and Cameron J. Tober, of O'Connor Law Firm, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.
John K. Kennedy, of Kennedy Watkins LLC, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
¶ 1 Section 4-106(b) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) ( 745 ILCS 10/4-106(b) (West 2016)) provides local public entities and public employees with absolute immunity from liability for "[a]ny injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner." In this case, the appellate court held that the defendants, several police officers and their government employers, did not have immunity under section 4-106(b) for injuries suffered by the plaintiff, a pedestrian hit by a fleeing vehicle during a police chase, because the person the police officers were chasing was not "an escaped or escaping prisoner" within the meaning of the Tort Immunity Act. 2021 IL App (1st) 200223, 449 Ill.Dec. 171, 178 N.E.3d 778. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.
¶ 3 Plaintiff, Javier Robinson, filed a complaint against the defendants, the Village of Sauk Village, Sauk Village police officers Mark Bugajski and Andrew Vaughn, the Village of Crete, and Village of Crete police officers Allen Rinchich and Juan Garcia.1 Plaintiff sought to recover for injuries he suffered when he was hit by a vehicle fleeing from the defendant police officers. Plaintiff alleged the police officers’ conduct was willful and wanton and that the Villages were liable for their employees’ actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting, in pertinent part, absolute immunity under section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/4-106(b) (West 2016)).
¶ 4 The pleadings and evidentiary materials on file show that on August 10, 2017, at approximately 5 a.m., Officer Rinchich received a report that a black Buick LaCrosse had been stolen. He observed a vehicle matching that description and began following it. After confirming that the vehicle was reported stolen, Rinchich activated his emergency lights, and the Buick, driven by Mark Coffey,2 began to speed up and flee. Village of Crete police officers Garcia and Patrick Hoernig eventually joined in the chase behind Rinchich. Coffey led the officers on a chase through multiple jurisdictions at speeds of up to 90 miles per hour. At times, the vehicles disregarded traffic signals and drove into oncoming traffic.
¶ 5 Coffey was pursued into Indiana, where he eventually came to a stop in a church parking lot in Dyer, Indiana. Before stopping, Coffey was approximately one-quarter mile ahead of the officers. When Officer Rinchich caught up, he entered the church parking lot and parked his squad car perpendicular to the driver's side of the Buick, with his headlights shining into the driver's side of the Buick. Rinchich got out of his squad car, drew his handgun, and repeatedly yelled "hands" at Coffey. When Officers Garcia and Hoernig arrived, Garcia parked next to Rinchich's squad car, with Hoernig parking behind them. Garcia and Hoernig also got out of their vehicles and drew their handguns.
¶ 6 During the chase, Sauk Village police officers Bugajski and Vaughan received radio dispatches about the pursuit, eventually notifying them that the Buick was heading toward the church parking lot in Dyer, Indiana. Officer Bugajski drove to that location and observed the three Village of Crete squad cars and Officers Rinchich, Garcia, and Hoernig with their weapons drawn and pointed at Coffey. Officer Garcia asserted that a total of six police vehicles were in the church parking lot and officers deployed various weapons, including an AR-15 assault rifle and a shotgun.
¶ 7 Officer Rinchich approached to within approximately 10 feet of Coffey. The dash camera video from Rinchich's squad car shows that he approached near the front of the Buick on the driver's side but after a couple seconds he backed away out of view of the camera. Coffey remained seated in the vehicle with the engine running and the door closed. Coffey ignored the officers’ orders to exit the vehicle and repeatedly shouted, "shoot me." Coffey also pointed a bottle and then a small black object at Rinchich. Rinchich asserted that the black object looked like a gun.
¶ 8 A little over one minute after Rinchich arrived in the parking lot, Coffey drove away. Officers Rinchich, Garcia, and Hoernig again pursued while Officer Bugajski and Officer Vaughan monitored the chase, blocked off intersections, and joined the chase at times. During the chase, Coffey reentered Illinois with the vehicles traveling at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour. At times, Coffey disregarded traffic signals and continued to travel into oncoming traffic. The chase eventually proceeded into a residential neighborhood where Coffey stopped, got out of the Buick, got into a parked car, and drove away again.
¶ 9 Officers Vaughan, Hoernig, and Garcia attempted to pursue, and as Coffey sped through an intersection at approximately 5:17 a.m., he struck plaintiff, who was walking across the street in a crosswalk. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries. Officer Garcia's police report states that plaintiff was lying "in a pool of blood with blood coming from his head" and "each of his leg bones on both legs [were] protruding from the skin at mid shin." Plaintiff was taken to a hospital by ambulance. Coffey continued to flee and returned to Indiana, where he was shot and killed by Indiana police officers.
¶ 10 Based on the evidence, the Cook County circuit court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment, ruling that Coffey was in custody when the police officers pointed their weapons at him and ordered him to show his hands in the church parking lot. The circuit court determined that Coffey was an escaping prisoner after that point and that defendants had absolute immunity from liability for plaintiff's injuries under section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/4-106(b) (West 2016)).
¶ 11 The appellate court disagreed with the circuit court, holding that, at the time plaintiff was struck by the car, Coffey was not "an escaped or escaping prisoner" as required for absolute immunity under section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. 2021 IL App (1st) 200223, ¶¶ 1, 22, 449 Ill.Dec. 171, 178 N.E.3d 778. The Tort Immunity Act defines a prisoner as " ‘a person held in custody,’ " but it does not define the term "custody." Id. ¶ 10 (quoting 745 ILCS 10/4-101 (West 2016) ). Contrary to defendants’ argument, the appellate court determined that a mere show of authority by police officers is not sufficient to establish physical custody. Id. ¶ 17. According to the appellate court, Coffey's freedom of movement was not directly controlled or limited by the officers, and the evidence did not establish, as a matter of law, that he was in physical custody before he fled the church parking lot. Id. ¶ 18. The appellate court concluded that defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that Coffey was an escaped or escaping prisoner within the meaning of the Tort Immunity Act when he struck plaintiff. Id. ¶ 22. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendants based on the immunity provided in section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
¶ 12 We allowed defendants’ petition for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)). We also allowed the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file an amicus curiae brief ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010)).
¶ 14 On appeal to this court, defendants contend that our decision in Ries v. City of Chicago , 242 Ill. 2d 205, 351 Ill.Dec. 135, 950 N.E.2d 631 (2011), and the appellate court's decision in Townsend v. Anderson , 2019 IL App (1st) 180771, 443 Ill.Dec. 87, 161 N.E.3d 211, support a conclusion that a show of authority by police officers is sufficient to establish custody within the meaning of section 4-106(b). In Ries , this court held that the Tort Immunity Act "does not require a formal arrest or imprisonment." Ries , 242 Ill. 2d at 216, 351 Ill.Dec. 135, 950 N.E.2d 631. Defendants maintain that Coffey's freedom of movement was sufficiently controlled and limited by multiple police officers, with guns drawn, shouting commands for Coffey to show his hands and get out of the vehicle. According to defendants, section 4-106(b) immunity applies in this case because the facts establish that Coffey was an "escaping prisoner" after he was confronted by multiple police officers with their guns drawn in the church parking lot.
¶ 15 Plaintiff responds that a show of authority alone is not enough to establish custody for the purpose of immunity under section 4-106(b). In Ries , this court defined "custody" to require an element of direct control over the suspect's freedom of movement. According to plaintiff, defendants did not control or limit Coffey's freedom of movement in any real way. They did not block his path, they never got closer than 10 to 15 feet away from him, and Coffey never complied with the officers’ commands or submitted to their show of authority. Plaintiff maintains that, if a mere show of authority is sufficient to establish custody under section 4-106(b), the absolute immunity provided by that section may be invoked any time a police officer tells a person to stop or turns on a squad car's lights and siren. Plaintiff concludes that the absolute immunity under section...
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