Robinson v. White County, Ar

• Decision Date: 03 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-3362.,05-3362.
• Citation: 452 F.3d 706
• Parties: Frank ROBINSON, Appellant, v. WHITE COUNTY, ARKANSAS; Bob Parish, individually and in his official capacity as County Judge of White County, Arkansas; Pat Garrett, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of White County, Arkansas, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

452 F.3d 706

Frank ROBINSON, Appellant, v. WHITE COUNTY, ARKANSAS; Bob Parish, individually and in his official capacity as County Judge of White County, Arkansas; Pat Garrett, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of White County, Arkansas, Appellees.

No. 05-3362.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 17, 2006.

Filed: July 3, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Neil R. Chamberlin, argued, Jacksonville, Arkansas, for appellant.

Michael R. Rainwater, argued, Little Rock, Arkansas (JaNan Arnold Davis, on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN and RILEY, Circuit Judges, and ROSENBAUM,¹ District Judge.

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Frank Robinson (Robinson) appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to White County Judge Bob Parish (Judge Parish) and Sheriff Pat Garrett (Sheriff Garrett) (collectively, the appellees) in Robinson's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest following the collapse of a bridge Robinson drove across in a loaded eighteen-wheel truck. Robinson alleged claims against the appellees in their individual and official capacities, a civil conspiracy claim, and several state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the appellees based on qualified immunity. Robinson appeals. We reverse the district court's order with respect to the individual capacity and state law claims against Sheriff Garrett, and we otherwise affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2003, Robinson was driving a loaded Home Depot truck en route to a delivery when he encountered an old single lane steel framed wooden topped bridge in White County, Arkansas. Ordinarily a weight limit sign was posted at the bridge, but on that day the sign was missing. Robinson was unfamiliar with this stretch of road and with this bridge. As Robinson drove across, the bridge collapsed, with the truck and bridge falling into the creek, injuring Robinson.

White County Sheriff's Department Sergeant Terry Sablotny (Sergeant Sablotny) and Deputy Andres Mariani (Deputy Mariani), among others, responded to the accident. Deputy Mariani found the weight limit sign lying obscured in the grass. At some point, Judge Parish was notified of the accident. Judge Parish, having not visited the accident scene, concluded Robinson "either broke [the] weight limit law or ... [did] something reckless to cause that bridge to fall." Judge Parish spoke to the White County Sheriff's Department dispatcher and told the dispatcher to ask Sheriff Garrett to issue Robinson a citation. Judge Parish also called Sheriff Garrett directly, telling Sheriff Garrett to "[p]ut [Robinson] in jail."

Sheriff Garrett telephoned Sergeant Sablotny and informed him Judge Parish was mad and wanted Robinson put in jail and to post bond. Not having visited the accident scene, Sheriff Garrett instructed Sergeant Sablotny to issue a citation. When Sergeant Sablotny told Sheriff Garrett the weight limit posting was missing (so he did not know what Robinson should be cited for), Sheriff Garrett did not change his instruction to issue a citation. In a subsequent telephone conversation, after checking with a state trooper, Sergeant Sablotny told Sheriff Garrett the "closest thing" he could find to a statute Robinson violated was Ark.Code Ann. § 27-51-104, which prohibits "careless driving." Sheriff Garrett responded to Sergeant Sablotny, "Works for me."

Robinson was arrested for careless driving and released after posting a $150 bond. In June 2003, Robinson was acquitted on the careless driving charge. The presiding district court judge of Searcy County, Missouri, testified, by affidavit, the only witness at the citation hearing, Deputy Mariani, testified: "[T]he weight limit sign for the bridge was not up at the time of the accident, [Deputy] Mariani did not believe that Robinson had broken any law, and [Deputy] Mariani issued a citation to Robinson only because he had been instructed to do so."

Robinson later sued White County, Judge Parish, and Sheriff Garrett under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging the appellees conspired to violate Robinson's right to be free from unlawful arrest, and alleging various state law claims. The appellees moved for summary judgment based on the "objective reasonableness" arrest standard under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion. The appellees then moved for reconsideration and filed an amended summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment on all of Robinson's claims. Robinson appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same standards as the district court. McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir.1995). We will affirm the summary judgment if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Robinson, demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. There is no genuine issue of material fact if the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for Robinson. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

A. Sheriff Garrett's Qualified Immunity for Individual Capacity Claim

We first address Robinson's individual capacity claim against Sheriff Garrett. As recited in Wright v. Rolette County, 417 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir.2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1338, 164 L.Ed.2d 53 (2006), the test for qualified immunity is:

Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity unless their alleged conduct violated clearly established federal constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person in their positions would have known. We analyze qualified immunity issue [sic] in two steps. First, we ask whether the facts as asserted by the plaintiff show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. If the answer is no, we grant qualified immunity. If the answer is yes, we go on to determine whether the right was clearly established. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.

1. Violation of a Constitutional Right

The appellees argue Sheriff Garrett's conduct did not violate Robinson's constitutional right because a reasonable officer at the scene would have believed he had probable cause to arrest Robinson. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir.1989). In determining whether there was arguable probable cause to arrest Robinson, we start at square one: the statute cited for Robinson's arrest. Sheriff Garrett ordered Robinson arrested for violating Ark.Code Ann. § 27-51-104, the Arkansas "careless driving" statute, which states in relevant part,

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any vehicle in such a careless manner as to evidence . . . a failure to maintain proper control.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or drive any vehicle . . . in violation of the following prohibited acts:

. . . .

(4) Driving too close to, or colliding with . . . fixtures, . . . or objects adjacent to the public thoroughfares;

. . . .

(6) To operate any vehicle in such a manner which would cause a failure to maintain control;

. . . .

(8) To operate a vehicle in any manner, when the driver is inattentive, and such inattention is not reasonable and prudent in maintaining vehicular control.

The appellees first argue a reasonable officer would have had probable cause to believe Robinson "collided with . . . objects adjacent" to the road because Robinson's truck was lying among the bridge's remains, thus (1) "colliding" with the bridge after the collapse, or (2) evidencing a collision causing the collapse. See id. § (b)(4). We disagree and find the appellees' proposed statutory reading does not square with common sense traffic law enforcement practice. First, under the appellees' proposed statutory reading, Arkansas drivers had best beware, for an innocent victim could be cited for careless driving if, as the result of another driver negligently colliding with the victim's car, the victim's car careens into another object. This is obviously an absurd result. No reasonable officer would cite such a victim for careless driving, just as no reasonable officer would view the "careless driving" statute as prohibiting collision with a bridge that has just collapsed from underneath the vehicle. Second, no evidence, or reasonable inference from the evidence, indicates Robinson's truck struck the bridge and caused the collapse.

The appellees alternatively argue a reasonable officer, given the results of the bridge collapse, would have had probable cause to believe Robinson was inattentive. See id. § (b)(8). We again disagree, as the officers had no evidence Robinson was inattentive.

Finally, the appellees argue a reasonable officer would have had probable cause to believe Robinson failed to maintain proper control or operated his truck in a manner causing a failure to maintain proper control. See id. § (a), (b)(6). The appellees' purported ratiocination is that Robinson operated a very heavy vehicle, the sheer weight of which caused the bridge collapse, which in turn caused Robinson to lose control of the vehicle, hence Robinson operated the truck in a manner causing a loss of control. We have no difficulty rejecting the appellees' circuitous argument foursquare. Again, under the appellees' construction, innocent Arkansas drivers could be cited for loss of control following a collision caused by persons or events other than the driver. No reasonable officer would apply...