HONORABLE ROBERT W. MCGINNIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00040
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: DIXON, J. LAMBERT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: On remand from the Kentucky Supreme Court, we must reconsider our previous opinion in this case, Robinson v. Whitley, 2009-CA-002182-MR, 2009-CA-002210-MR (Ky. App., July 22, 2011), applying theSupreme Court's holding that Harold and Bonnie Whitley's ("Whitleys")1 action seeking a declaration that a road was not properly adopted by the county into the county road system is best construed as a quiet title action brought as a declaratory judgment action rather than an appeal from a fiscal court ruling.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The procedural posture of the case, resulting in the remand, was set forth in the Supreme Court's decision:
Batte Lane is single lane, dirt and gravel road located in Robertson County that traverses Whitley's property and serves as access to the property of several other parties to this action, including Appellee Maryanna Robinson. Appellants contend that Whitley has fee simple title to the passway pursuant to his deed. Appellees contend that Robertson County has title to the property by its lawful incorporation into the Robertson County road system in 1987.
Whitley and his wife bought the affected land in 1994 and assumed then that Batte Lane was legally and formally part of the Robertson County road system. However, in January 2004, burdened by what he regarded as undesirable traffic which he wanted to limit by erecting gates, Whitley petitioned the Robertson County Fiscal Court to abandon, or formally "discontinue" from the county road system pursuant to the relevant provisions of KRS2 Chapter 178, the portion of Batte Lane that traversed his property. In February 2004, the matter was formally addressed by the Fiscal Court at a public hearing on the issue, after which the Fiscal Court formally decided against Whitley's petitionand voted against the discontinuance of the roadway. This decision of the Fiscal Court was not appealed.
In the following months, additional study of the records relating to the legal status of the road led Whitley to believe that road had never been properly adopted by the county as a part of the official county road system, and therefore was not actually the county's road to abandon. So, at the August 20, 2004 regular meeting of the Fiscal Court, Whitley appeared with his attorney and presented the Fiscal Court with information supporting his claim that the road had never belonged to the county because it had never been properly incorporated into the county road system. Notably, he did not repeat his February 2004 request for the county to officially "discontinue" the road because his point was that the county had lacked any legal interest that it could "discontinue." Instead, Whitley asked the Fiscal Court to acknowledge that there had never been a formal adoption of Batte Lane into the official county road system. The Fiscal Court declined to make that concession; it simply reaffirmed it legal position that Batte Lane "is part of the county road system."
In September 2004, the Appellants filed a Complaint in Robertson Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the disputed section of Batte Lane was not a lawfully adopted county road. The pleading is captioned "Complaint Seeking Declaration of Rights and Appeal." Robertson Fiscal Court, Robertson County, and Robinson were named as defendants. Appellees answered the complaint and asserted that the disputed section of Batte Lane had properly been adopted as a county road pursuant to KRS 178.115(1), and in the alternative, that the road was a "public road" by prescription or other method. The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the substantive issue of the road's legal status as a duly adopted county road, a public passway, or a private lane.
Ultimately, the trial court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact which wouldnecessitate a trial and that, as a matter of law, the disputed section had not been properly adopted as a county road pursuant to the statutory requirements of KRS Chapter 178. The circuit court also concluded that the disputed segment of Batte Lane was not a "public" road pursuant to the provisions of the Chapter. Post-judgment motions to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment (or portions thereof) followed in the normal course. At the request of Appellee Robinson, the circuit court entered an order altering the final judgment "to reflect that the Court considered [the] action to be an original action for Declaratory Judgment," rather than a KRS Chapter 178 appeal from a county fiscal court road issue.
In the Court of Appeals, the Fiscal Court and Robinson asserted not only that the trial court erred in its judgment regarding the road's legal status, but that the circuit court also erred by treating the case as an original action pursuant to the declaratory judgment statute instead of an appeal pursuant to KRS 178.100 from an action of the county fiscal court. As previously noted, the difference is significant because under [Trimble Fiscal Court v. Snyder, 866 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. App. 1993)], judicial review of a fiscal court decision "ordering a new road to be opened, or ordering an alteration or discontinuance of an existing road, or allowing gates to be erected across a road or abolishing existing gates, or a decision refusing any such order," KRS 178.100, is limited to a determination of whether the county court's decision "was arbitrary, including whether there was substantial evidence to support the decision." Snyder, 866 S.W.2d at 126. On the other hand, an action for declaratory relief commenced in the circuit court is an original action to be tried de novo, in which the circuit judge ascertains the facts without deference to the fiscal court's view.
Whitley v. Robertson Cnty., 406 S.W.3d 11, 13-15 (Ky. 2013) (internal footnotes omitted).
The Supreme Court, in vacating our opinion, found that at the August 2004 fiscal court meeting, the Whitleys did not request, and the fiscal court did not order or refuse to order, "a change in the physical or legal status of a road." Id. at 16. Instead, the fiscal court refused an admission that the formal adoption of the road into the county system had never occurred, an event not mentioned as appealable to the circuit court pursuant to KRS 178.100. Id. Hence, the standard of review for an appeal from a fiscal court decision, pursuant to Snyder and KRS Chapter 178, was inapplicable.
The Supreme Court noted that KRS 418.040 and 418.0453 are suitable to resolve the present controversy, which the Court described as a "dispute . . . also concerned with title to the disputed section; that is, whether the Whitleys still own the property or whether the county has obtained title to it by its incorporation into the county road system or through some other means. In addition, the parties contest the status of the disputed section; i.e., whether or not it is a county road or a private drive." Id. at 18. Thus, an original action for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination of who has title to and the status of Batte Lane, was permitted. In concluding, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court's de novo adjudication of the Whitleys' original action for declaratory judgment was proper, and directed us to consider "the remaining unaddressed issues." Id. at 20.
Since Robinson and the Fiscal Court originally appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Whitleys, our standard of review on remand is limited to the summary judgment appellate standard. CR4 56.03 provides that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment may be granted when "as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor and against the movant." Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). Whether summary judgment is appropriate is a legal question involving no factual findings, so a trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Coomer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 319 S.W.3d 366, 370-71 (Ky. 2010).
On appeal, Robinson makes three arguments not addressed by our prior opinion. First, she argues that the circuit court erred by finding that the disputed portion of Batte Lane was never properly adopted into the county road system by the fiscal court. On this matter, Robertson County argues that strict compliance with the requirements of KRS Chapter 178, outlining the procedure for adopting a road into the county system, is unnecessary; rather,...
