Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville

• Decision Date: 27 February 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4:89-CV-204-HLM.
• Citation: 785 F. Supp. 989
• Parties: Enrique ROBLES, M.D., Plaintiff, v. HUMANA HOSPITAL CARTERSVILLE; Fareed Z. Kadum, M.D.; and Charles Goolsby, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

785 F. Supp. 989

Enrique ROBLES, M.D., Plaintiff, v. HUMANA HOSPITAL CARTERSVILLE; Fareed Z. Kadum, M.D.; and Charles Goolsby, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 4:89-CV-204-HLM.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Rome Division.

February 27, 1992.

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Allan Leroy Parks, Jr., Kirwan Goger Chesin & Parks, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Kevin E. Grady, Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Ga., Robert Lowry Berry, Robert Maddox Brinson, Brinson Askew & Berry, Rome, Ga., Robert Gaither Tanner, Long Weinberg Ansley & Wheeler, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.

ORDER

HAROLD L. MURPHY, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 21, 1991, this Court ordered both parties to brief the issue of whether Plaintiff has standing to prosecute the anti-trust claims alleged in this case. The parties have submitted those briefs. After reviewing the parties' submissions, the depositions and the entire record, the Court concludes that Plaintiff does not meet the Todorov standing requirements, and, consequently, he does not have standing to prosecute the alleged anti-trust claims. In regard to the pendent state law claims, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III, Breach of Contract and denies the motion as to Count II, tortious interference with business and contract relationships and Count IV, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Furthermore, sufficient evidence has been presented to allow Plaintiff's request for punitive damages to go forward.

FACTS

Plaintiff, Dr. Enrique Robles, has practiced medicine in the Cartersville, Georgia, area for over fifteen (15) years. He procured a position on the medical staff at Sam Howell Hospital in 1973. In 1983, Sam Howell Hospital was purchased by Humana Hospital and the name changed to Humana Hospital Cartersville (HHC).

Upon Humana's acquisition of Sam Howell Hospital all staff members were required to submit applications for medical staff privileges. Prior to the acquisition, Dr. Robles had a very good record as a obstetrician in the hospital. Although the record indicates that Plaintiff had some difficulty with other doctors and the hospital's policies and rules, Defendants admit he was a technically good doctor. Consequently, he was approved for a two year appointment to the hospital staff, which Humana renewed in 1986.

When Humana purchased Sam Howell Hospital one of the hospital's goals was to change the non-profit county owned hospital into a private proprietary hospital. Because there were only two obstetricians on the staff, Drs. Goolsby and Robles, the Hospital began the search for a new obstetrician. During this search they found Dr. Kadum and, in 1984, convinced him to come to Cartersville and practice obstetrics.¹

Although Dr. Kadum and Dr. Robles were colleagues on the staff, they were never friends. From the very beginning of Dr. Kadum's arrival at HHC, a thinly veiled animosity existed between the two doctors. This animosity developed due to Dr. Kadum's initial reaction concerning Dr. Robles' competency and the fact that Dr. Robles did not call on Dr. Kadum to assist in surgery as did Dr. Goolsby.

The impetus behind the hospital investigation and eventual revocation of Plaintiff's staff privileges was a forceps induced delivery conducted by the Plaintiff. On July 31, 1987, Dr. Robles was attending the delivery of a first time mother. After two hours of protracted labor, Dr. Robles decided to use forceps to help quicken the delivery. Because of the use of forceps, the baby was badly bruised. Although no medical malpractice case was filed against the Plaintiff, the two other obstetricians on staff, Dr. Goolsby and Dr. Kadum, brought this incident to the attention of the medical staff. The hospital board decided to investigate the incident in question and, eventually, the investigation expanded to include Dr. Robles' general behavior over his fifteen year tenure at HHC.

Despite the known animosity between Drs. Kadum and Robles, Dr. Kadum was appointed to be a member of the four doctor Ad Hoc committee in charge of the investigation into Dr. Robles' behavior at the hospital. After a review of numerous of Plaintiff's charts and records over his fifteen year career, Dr. Kadum, along with the other members of the Ad Hoc committee, recommended to the Executive Committee that Dr. Robles' privileges be terminated. The Executive Committee then adopted the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation and sent their report to the Hospital Board. After the Hospital Board held a hearing, which Dr. Robles attended, the Board accepted the Executive Committee's recommendation and first suspended Dr. Robles' privileges, then later terminated those privileges. Subsequently, Dr. Robles also lost his office space in the Humana Medical office building.

At the hearing before the Hospital Board, each side presented evidence concerning the forceps induced delivery which started the investigation. Dr. Boehm, the hospital's expert, could not state that the delivery was malpractice or that the judgment exercised by Dr. Robles was erroneous. Instead, all he could conclusively criticize was Plaintiff's lack of proper documentation of the baby's vital statistics during the delivery. Dr. Robles' expert, however, stated that the delivery was correct given the circumstances of the situation. Furthermore, she stated that the standard in the profession is that the doctor does not have to write down all the noted vital signs as there are other hospital staff members who are responsible for noting the vital signs and the doctor merely signs-off on the chart.

After Dr. Robles had his privileges revoked, both HHC and the remaining obstetricians realized an increase in their business. Within three months of Plaintiff's termination, Dr. Goolsby stated that his practice was full and that he was able to adjust his practice and accept no new obstetric patients from the outside and still maintain his full time patient load of 12— 15 deliveries a month. Dr. Kadum's practice also increased after Dr. Robles' termination. His practice blossomed so much that he has hired a new associate, Dr. Riebot, to help with his growing obstetrics practice. Indeed, the hospital has even contracted with another doctor, Dr. Leedy, to eventually replace Dr. Goolsby who is retiring from the obstetrics portion of his practice.² Now, Dr. Leedy is looking to hire an associate to help his practice. As to the Hospital, it has increased its obstetrics revenue from $1.9 million in 1987 to $2.7 million in 1989, an increase in revenues of 42 percent.

Dr. Robles, however, has not taken part in this increase in obstetrics business. As a result of his losing his privileges at Humana, Dr. Robles has lost most of his practice in Cartersville. In fact, Dr. Robles has been forced to try and move his practice to Atlanta. Seeking compensation and retribution for the actions taken against him, Dr. Robles filed this lawsuit.

Jurisdiction in this case is based on the Sherman Act, as diversity jurisdiction or other federal question jurisdiction does not exist. Dr. Robles has alleged that Drs. Goolsby and Kadum conspired with HHC in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to obtain a monopoly over the practice of obstetrics and gynecology in Bartow County.³ Plaintiff also claims that the hospital is an essential facility and that HHC has used or is attempting to use its monopoly power in the hospital services market to leverage itself into and control the obstetrics market in Bartow County. In addition, Plaintiff has included pendant state law claims for breach of contract, tortious interference with business and contract relationships and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that no dispute as to any material fact exists. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.1991). This burden is met by "pointing out to the District Court—that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This initial burden remains with the moving party even when the issue involved is one on which the non-movant will bear the burden of proof at trial. Russ v. International Paper Co., 943 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir.1991).

Once the moving party has fulfilled its burden and shown that no factual issues exist which could warrant a trial, the burden shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts showing that a genuine dispute still does exist. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.1991). This burden shifts back to the non-moving party, however, only after the moving party meets its initial burden and shows that no factual issues remain for trial. Russ v. International Paper Co., 943 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir.1991). If the moving party does not meet its initial burden, the non-movant is not obligated to put forward additional evidence.

The District Court's duty is to view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Bradbury v. Wainwright, 718 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 1983). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, it is not the Court's function to decide issues of genuine material fact. Rather, the Court's function is to determine whether such an issue exists to be tried. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct....